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ABSTRACT
I argue that for most patients a good death involves more than contemporary
medicine can or should be expected to provide and that virtues can secure goods not
provided by medicine. Currently, medical care at the end of life focuses on addressing
pain and suffering, supporting independent functioning and autonomy, providing
aggressive care near death when desired, and preserving overall quality of life, among
other aims. When bioethicists have discussed a good death, they have argued primarily
for the provision of such services and for respect of patients’ autonomy. However, I
argue that such circumstances are not sufficient by themselves to ensure a good death and
a patient’s use of autonomy will be “guided” by her conception of a good death. In many
cases, a good death requires—as a necessary if not sufficient condition—virtues as well.
At least four different conceptions of a good death, I argue, exist within American
society. These conceptions imply goods that go beyond what proper medical care
currently does or should provide. Next, I discuss the challenges that dying patients face
in our contemporary medical and social context. What types of challenges—and how one
faces them—will be determined partly by one’s conception of a good death, though
certain challenges seem more universal. I argue that the challenges associated with the
loss of independence and increasing dependence on others and the nature of pain and
suffering at the end of life are among our most prominent concerns.
After discussing virtues in general and the place of emotions within them, I use
this account to show how virtues can enable a person to die well, given a particular
patient’s conception of a good death. Embodying virtues such as patience, gratitude,
generosity, and practical wisdom can help patients become the kinds of people who can
meet some of the challenges of dying. I conclude by giving a fuller depiction of one
conception of a good death rooted in the Christian moral tradition.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Isaac Asimov has said that, “Life is pleasant. Death is peaceful. It’s the transition
that’s troublesome.”1 This dissertation is about “the transition.” Dying well is a
perennial challenge, and our own time and place is no exception. Indeed, I will suggest
later that, in some ways, dying well may be more challenging in our contemporary
medical and social context than it has been in others. Many Americans can call on
personal experiences with the deaths of loved ones to confirm that dying today is often a
disquieting experience. This is true both for the patient herself and for those attending to
her. Dying well in our society requires that the patient be able to meet some profound
challenges. Virtues, I believe, are one way patients might pursue good deaths. My thesis
in this dissertation is that virtues—good character traits—can enable patients to meet the
challenges of dying in our social and medical context and to achieve good deaths.
This topic and its aims are idiosyncratic in a number of ways. For one,
bioethicists have more often talked about matters of public policy or the ethics of health
care worker conduct than they have about patients’ responsibilities.2 When bioethicists
consider how to improve the quality of our end of life experiences, they often look at

1

This quote may be found at <http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Isaac_Asimov/> accessed on June
22, 2006. I have not been able to find any other information about where this quote may be found in
Asimov’s writings.
2
Important exceptions to this claim are Alasdair MacIntyre, “Patients as Agents,” in Stuart F. Spicker and
H. Tristam Engelhardt, eds., Philosophical Medical Ethics: Its Nature and Significance (Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1977), 197-212; Karen Lebacqz, “The Virtuous Patient,” in Earl
E. Shelp, ed., Virtue and Medicine: Explorations in the Character of Medicine (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 275-88; Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, “Practicing Patience:
How Christians Should Be Sick,” Christian Bioethics 2:2 (1996): 202-21; and Christopher P. Vogt,
Patience, Compassion, Hope and the Christian Art of Dying Well (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2004).
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what medicine and related health care fields can provide.3 Ancient philosophers, for
example the Stoics, would not have placed such hope in the medical profession.4 Rather,
the ancients sought, by acquiring virtues, to become the kind of people who could
manage well such life events as dying.5 This dissertation is an effort to recover that kind
of approach, but little has been said about virtues for the end of life and so this
dissertation is idiosyncratic in that way also.6 My conviction is that those who embody
certain virtues could manage the challenges of dying in a better manner than those
without them tend to do. My aim here is to clarify what virtues might be relevant and
how they can be relevant to dying well.
My interest in this kind of approach to dying well was reinforced when, as a
teaching device, I began asking undergraduate students in bioethics classes how they
wanted to die. Their answers do not differ from those I have come to expect from just
about anyone to whom I ask that question. Many people today say they would like to die
quickly, painlessly, in their sleep or suddenly, and without any incapacity prior to death.
Given how unrealistic these desires are, I began to think about how we might respond to
the challenges that our expression of these desires implicitly acknowledges.7 I believe we

3

For an important recent example of this, see Bruce Jennings, Gregory E. Kaebnick, and Thomas H.
Murray, eds., Improving End of Life Care: Why Has It Been So Difficult? Hastings Center Report Special
Report 35:6 (2005).
4
Charles E. Cosans, “Facing Death Like a Stoic: Epictetus on Suicide in the Case of Illness,” in Mark G.
Kuczewski and Ronald Polansky, eds., Bioethics: Ancient Themes in Contemporary Issues (Cambridge,
MA: Bradford Books/The MIT Press, 2000), 229-49, 242.
5
On this, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
6
Sara Ruddick has written about virtues for the elderly in “Virtues and Age,” in Margaret Urban Walker,
ed., Mother Time: Women, Aging, and Ethics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 45-60, but she
does not deal explicitly with dying.
7
Joanne Lynn has written in many places about how unrealistic these desires are in our contemporary
setting. For one recent account, see Joanne Lynn, “Living Long in Fragile Health: The New Demographics
Shape End of Life Care,” in Jennings, Kaebnick, and Murray, eds., Improving End of Life Care (cited
above): S14-S18.
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say we want to die quickly, painlessly, suddenly, and without incapacity because so many
of us know someone who has died slowly, with pain, over a prolonged period of time that
may extend to several years, and with an ever increasing set of incapacities. Just as
ancient philosophers believed that virtues could dispose a person to deal well with the
various challenges of living, I argue here that virtues could dispose contemporary patients
to deal well—or at least better than otherwise—with the various challenges of dying.
Distinguishing Death and Dying
Before laying out a sketch of my argument, I should make a few qualifications.
Dying and death are separate, though obviously related, phenomena. This distinction is
important to my argument here. Death, if understood as the moment of the cessation of
life, happens in an instant. Thus, we talk about the “time of death” and give a specific
time. Dying takes place over a period of time. When dying starts is very hard to say,
even for doctors. Retrospectively, we can define dying as the period of time immediately
preceding death, but even in this definition, “immediately” is unclear. Patients can carry
terminal diagnoses for five or more years. Because dying tends to be a period in which
the challenges I’ve alluded to above increase in number and intensify, I’m inclined to
think that we can leave the definition of dying loose and say that the relevance of virtues
to dying increases as the number and intensity of the challenges increases. My aim is to
say how virtues can help us to manage with the challenges that arise within the period of
time we can call “dying.” I leave the exact period of dying somewhat vague, but I don’t
believe this will affect anything in my argument. Indeed, it may be that the virtues that
enable one to die well also enable one to live well with various challenges at other times
of life. This is certainly what the ancient philosophers believed was true of virtues in
3

general, and I have not invented new virtues for dying so much as I have recast familiar
ones. I don’t make any arguments that the virtues that can help us to die well will also
help us to live well, although I certainly suspect this is true.
The convention in bioethics, medicine, and in general has been to talk about good
deaths, as in, “How can medicine help patients to achieve good deaths?” However, I
have distinguished between dying and death and claimed that virtues are relevant to the
former. Because of the convention in place, and because “good deaths” is a more
felicitous phrase than “good dyings,” I will sometimes talk about good deaths, where I
mean good “dyings.” For instance, in Chapter Two I talk about different conceptions of a
good death, however, the aim there is to talk about different conceptions of what would
constitute dying well.
The distinction between death and dying explains why Epicurus’s paradox
concerning death does not apply here. Epicurus asks how any individual’s death can be
bad for him.8 He claims that something is bad only if it is a bad experience, but the dead
do not, he believes, experience anything bad about being dead because there is no one to
experience anything. Thus, he says, although we often think of death as bad, it really
isn’t bad because when “you” are dead, there isn’t any “you” anymore. Religious
objections about an afterlife aside, Epicurus’s paradox only addresses the badness of
death. It does not deal with the badness, or challenges, of dying. Indeed, given his belief
that only bad experiences are bad, Epicurus would seem to be in a position to
acknowledge that dying is indeed bad, even if death itself isn’t.

8

See Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in Letters, Principle Doctrines and Vatican Sayings, trans. by G.
Russell (New York: Macmillan, 1964).

4

Frances Kamm has discussed how good character might alleviate the badness of
death, although, like Epicurus, she does not address how her claims are relevant to dying.
She says,
the goods of fine character and wisdom … are supposed to make long
life and the enjoyment of other goods better. In dying, a person who
would have continued to have these goods of character and wisdom
loses a better life …. Yet the good person in losing life loses something
that he needs less than another person does since he has already
achieved something that is important in life.9
Kamm argues that having achieved the end purpose of attaining good character, one
cannot be harmed by the fact that death cuts off the opportunity for future moral
development. Thus, she says, good character makes death less bad. My argument, in
contrast, looks at how good character—in the form of virtues—helps one to manage the
challenges of the dying process and not death itself. In contrast to Kamm, my argument
requires that terminal patients actually exercise their virtues rather than just possess them
as an achievement of their moral development. So Kamm and I have different aims for
our discussion of the relevance of virtues and good character to the end of life; she
addresses death, and I address dying.
Other Qualifications
Kamm’s claim would, I think, apply to anyone who had good character and is
now dead. However, the virtues are not relevant to all instances of dying. For the
virtues to benefit the patient who is dying, she must be conscious. Any condition that
renders a terminal patient unconscious or severely compromises her mental competency
would be a condition in which the virtues are no longer relevant to pursuing a good death.

9

F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, Volume I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 61.
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Likewise, those who die suddenly—whether of cardiac arrest, aneurysm, or accident of
some kind—would not usually have any opportunity to exercise virtues. Terminally ill
children sometimes amaze us with their responses to their condition. How much
opportunity a child has to develop virtues that could enable him to manage the challenges
of dying depends on his age, experiences and upbringing, as well as a number of other
factors. I suspect that children facing dying must deal with a number of challenges that
elderly terminal patients do not (and vice versa). I don’t take on the special case of
children here. In this dissertation, I focus on what I take to be a paradigmatic case of
dying: an elderly person, someone who has spend considerably more of her life not dying
than being terminally ill, and someone who is dying over time and is typically
accumulating a steadily increasing number of dependencies and incapacities. When I talk
about the challenges of dying and of virtues that could enable a patient to meet such
challenges, I am thinking of this paradigmatic patient. In our time and place, this is the
most common experience of dying.10
In ethics, much talk centers on moral agents. In medicine and bioethics, the
terminally ill are often referred to as patients. I will use these two terms interchangeably,
although it sounds odd to talk of patients who are moral agents as well. My argument
embraces this odd juxtaposition. Medical patients, who—the term implies—must
patiently wait on medicine or the body’s own resources for healing, can also be active
moral agents in that they can embody virtues that can enable them to die well. However,
I don’t want to overstate my dual usage here. One virtue that I argue that medical

10

Joanne Lynn claims that at least 65% of all deaths follow the trajectory I am assuming as paradigmatic
(see “Living Long in Fragile Health,” S16).
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patients can actively embody in order to die well is patience. Patients are not always
patient, but I argue that, on at least one conception of a good death, they would do well to
be. Nevertheless, throughout this dissertation, I will speak of moral agents and of
medical patients using the terms interchangeably.
The Overall Argument
I begin, in Chapter Two, by looking at different conceptions of a good death.11 I
claim that virtues can enable a patient to die well, but it turns out that there is more than
one conception of what it is to die well. I explore a few of what I take to be the leading
conceptions, so that I can later look at how virtues might facilitate achieving each of
them. In particular, I discuss Avoiding Death, Growth in Dying, Simply Dying, and a
few different Christian Conceptions of a good death. The latter are meant to be
representative of what I take to be a variety of different religious approaches to a good
death. I don’t argue that the four conceptions I consider are the only ones. There may
well be others. However, I look at these because I believe that they are among the more
prominent. Two key claims set up this chapter. First, I distinguish between
circumstantial and personal features of dying. Most attention, I point out, has been
focused on the circumstantial factors, but these are neither necessary nor sufficient to
ensure a good death. Rather, dying well will depend, in many cases, on a patient’s
personal engagement with death and dying.
A second key claim concerns control in dying. Much of the contemporary debate
over end of life issues revolves around who gets control and what, if any, limits there are

11

Conceptions of a good death are probably related to conceptions of a well-lived life, although I do not
argue for any specific connections.
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on such control.12 But I argue that for terminal patients who have some measure of
control over their dying, the important question is “To what end should such control be
put?” That is, how should a patient use his control in order to die well? I argue that a
patient’s conception of a good death informs how she will use control in dying. Patients
would do well to be aware of how they conceive of a good death, and health care workers
would also be wise to be sensitive to different conceptions of a good death among their
patients.
After looking at conceptions of a good death, I explore the variety of different
challenges patients might face in dying in our medical and social context. Of course not
all patients will face all of the challenges I present there, and whether and how one faces
some of these challenges may depend in large part of one’s conception of a good death.
The loss of independence and a corresponding increase in dependence on other persons
and technologies and pain and suffering at the end of life are the two main themes I
discuss in the chapter of the challenges of dying. I explore only a few of the many ways
that these and other challenges at the end of life are interwoven with one another. In
some sense, it is artificial to list challenges individually, but I discuss them one at a time
in order to give an adequate account of each. This discussion makes up Chapter Three.
Chapter Four discusses one conception of virtues and focuses, in particular, on the
relationship between virtues and emotion-dispositions in this conception. My aim in this
chapter is to be broad and inclusive in two ways. One, I don’t argue that my conception
of virtues is superior to all other conceptions. Rather, I have tried to conceive of virtues
12

For an example of such debate, see Dan W. Brock, “Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” Hastings Center
Report 22:2 (1992): 10-22 and Daniel Callahan, “When Self-Determination Runs Amok,” Hastings Center
Report 22:2 (1992): 52-55.
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in a way that allows for compatibility with a broad variety of different particular
conceptions. A particular way that I pursue this aim is by claiming that virtues can be
constituent elements either in a conception of the kind of person one believes tends to
live well and/or in a conception of the kind of person one admires. That is, I distinguish
between good or admirable persons and good lives. The two concepts are often related.
Indeed, on a strain of our use of words, one could say that any person who becomes like a
moral exemplar she admires is living well. Living well, on this usage, would mean living
as the kind of person I aspire to be. However, I do not offer an account of why someone
might admire, or want to become like, a moral exemplar. Generally, I suggest this is
because the moral agent believes the person she admires tends to live well, but this is not
always the case.
The second way that I aim to be broad and inclusive is that I conceive of virtues
in a way that allows them to be constituent elements in a broad variety of different
conceptions of a well-lived life. I don’t argue for or assume any particular conception of
a well-lived human life. Rather, I assume that my conception of virtues will be adaptable
to a variety of different conceptions of a well-lived life, as well as to a variety of
conceptions of a good death.
In this chapter, I also offer two arguments for how the emotion-dispositions which
are a part of many virtues enable the virtuous agent to benefit from embodying virtues.
These arguments concern the agent’s motivation for good actions, unity of self and
character, and the place of emotions in practical wisdom. Emotions, conceived as
perceptions informed by concerns, shape how moral agents perceive and understand the
world. They are an important part of a patient’s personal engagement with his dying. In
9

Chapter Four I try to explain how the virtuous benefit from their virtues, particularly
from their emotion-dispositions.
Chapter Five consists of a look at particular virtues, as well as some classes of
virtues, that are relevant to dying. I begin by looking at virtues that I believe could be
relevant to a broad variety of conceptions of a good death. Here I discuss courage,
gratitude, humility, and practical wisdom as examples of broadly relevant virtues. In
discussing them, I also note how members of different conceptions of a good death will
specify and practice these virtues in unique ways. Thus, there are different conceptions
of the virtue of courage, for instance. Then I look at each of the conceptions of a good
death considered in Chapter Two and discuss virtues that may be particularly relevant to
each conception. I also offer some narratives—some fiction, some nonfiction—to
illustrate someone embodying the virtues under discussion.
Chapter Six looks in greater depth at one Christian conception of a good death. In
particular, I try to show how a Christian conception of the virtues of hope, patience,
gratitude, humility, peacefulness, and practical wisdom could enable Christians to “live”
the narrative that gives the Christian moral tradition its identity. That narrative is drawn
from the main themes of the Christian Scriptures. To “live” this narrative is to perceive
oneself and one’s place in the larger world, including one’s relationship to God, in terms
of the overall trajectory of this narrative. The narrative begins with creation and fall and
looks ahead to the culmination of God’s redemption of the created order. One Christian
conception of a good death will have patients seeking to see themselves and their deaths
in terms of the larger perspective of this narrative. I try to show how the virtues in
question can facilitate this task.
10

Conclusion
I do not argue that virtues are the only way to pursue a good death. However,
they are certainly one of the ways we may do so. And, it seems that they represent an
under-explored means of pursuing a good death. There has been little consideration
among bioethicists of how virtues might help us to die well. And there has been, so far as
I can see, little intention on the part of those contemplating their future deaths to seek out
virtues as a means to meet the challenges many claim they are eager to avoid. In my
informal “How would you like to die?” surveys in bioethics classes, I haven’t had anyone
yet offer this answer: virtuously! Perhaps it is time for us to consider this approach
again.
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CHAPTER II
CONCEPTIONS OF A GOOD DEATH
Introduction
In this dissertation I argue that virtues can help a person to die well. However,
before such a claim can be established we need some understanding of what it means to
die well. It turns out, I believe, that there is not one univocal conception of a good death.
So, in this chapter I survey a variety of different conceptions of a good death. Before
looking at the conceptions themselves, I make a distinction between the circumstantial
and personal aspects of a good death. This distinction serves to clarify what I am aiming
to discuss when I identify different conceptions of a good death. In short, a good death is
more than having the right kinds of circumstances surround one’s dying. Another issue
that often arises in discussions of the end of life is control over one’s dying. One might
say that whatever else a good death entails, it surely includes control. While I am
sympathetic to this line of thought, I argue that whatever control we manage to have at
the end of our lives must, for us, serve some other purpose. That is, we want control
because we believe this will enable us to die well. But then, what does it mean to die
well? The conceptions of a good death that I discuss in this chapter are an attempt to
answer that question.
Good Deaths and Bioethics
Despite—and sometimes because of—advances in medical technology, death
remains a challenge. Most people who think about it foresee a variety of pitfalls that
could prevent them from dying well. Thus, a good death remains elusive. The dying
period is growing ever longer—facilitated by medical technology’s ability to help us live
12

longer with various terminal illnesses, and often with a diminished quality of life—so we
have more time to die well, or badly. Health care practitioners will have an interest in
facilitating good deaths as part of their profession, but all of us ought to have a personal
interest here because we will all die.
What defines a good death? This is a fundamental question for bioethics, but
many aspects of it remain unexplored.13 Whatever a good death amounts to, many will
agree that it need not be the same for everyone. Is it different for everyone? If so,
perhaps we have nothing to learn from one another about dying well. But that seems
implausible. Of course, many will say that they want to have some measure of control, or
autonomy, in their dying. The SUPPORT study helped us realize (or confirmed
empirically, for some) that many requests for particular kinds of care at the end of life
were being ignored.14 So, bioethicists have responded by defending dying patients’ rights
to act autonomously and to have their autonomy respected.15 But bioethicists have said
relatively little about how or for what purpose dying patients ought to exercise their right
to autonomy in dying. An endorsement of autonomy need not amount to refusal to say
anything about what might constitute a good death for a given patient, just as doctors
giving medical advice do not violate the autonomy of their patients. Indeed, this might
even enhance autonomy. While autonomy has some value by itself, the right of
autonomy in dying must surely be in the interest of something more than the intrinsic
13

This is not to say that the topic has been ignored. Rather, I will argue that, while bioethics has been
concerned with the circumstantial aspects of dying, it has paid considerably less attention to the personal
aspects.
14
The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, “A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill
Hospitalized Patients,” Journal of the American Medical Association 274:20 (1995): 1591-98.
15
Two of the more prominent bioethicists making arguments for autonomy at the end of life are Margaret
Pabst Battin, The Least Worst Death: Essays in Bioethics on the End of Life (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994) and Dan Brock, Life and Death (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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value of freedom. And there has been little discussion in the bioethics community of
what constitute good uses of autonomy.16 Thus, bioethicists concerned to help patients to
die well will see value in helping patients (and caregivers) to clarify their own
conceptions of a good death.
In this chapter I present four relatively substantial visions of what a good death
might look like. In doing this, I am attempting to say what many patients might do, or
want to do, with the freedom bioethicists have been so keen to secure for the dying. If
there are four—or more—defensible, yet substantially different conceptions of a good
death, then the concept of a “good death” is systematically ambiguous. Instead of talking
about “a—or the—good death” as if the term has a univocal, universally-shared meaning,
caregivers and bioethicists should learn to attend to which conception of a good death a
given patient holds. Only then can care for this patient be fully appropriate. And patients
should pay attention to and reflect on their own conceptions of what it would mean to die
well. Attending to this will empower them against a medical establishment that might try
to impose a conception of a good death and will enable them to prepare to pursue their
own vision of a good death. Embodying virtues, as I argue in later chapters, is one way a
patient could prepare to die well given her conception of a good death.
What sorts of ends or purposes should autonomous patients pursue in their dying?
This question can be taken in at least two different directions. One direction—my

16

Among bioethicists, Daniel Callahan has probably been the most attentive to this question. The
Troubled Dream of Life: In Search of a Peaceful Death (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2000) is his most comprehensive contribution. The question of what a good death might look like has been
taken up by bioethicists in a number of other places. See, for instance, Bioethics Forum 13:3 (1997) for a
series of articles by various bioethicists, including Callahan, David C. Thomasma, Richard C. McCormick,
Ellen McGee, Elise Ayers, Joan Harrold, and Joanne Lynn. Also relevant here is Richard O’Neil’s, “On
Defining ‘A Good Death,’” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1983): 9-17.
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primary aim in this chapter—is to suggest that this is a question the patient ought to pose
to herself. An unreflective exercise of choice can be as destructive of one’s deeper or
abiding interests as paternalism. So, in one sense, I mean for patients to reflect on what
might constitute worthwhile uses of their ability to act autonomously. A second direction
to take the question would be to ask whether there are normative features of a good death
that transcend individual preferences. For instance, the concept of a virtuous ideal
observer might give us some hypotheses about what these features would include: given
full information about various facts concerning life, dying, and death and given moral
and intellectual virtues that enable their possessor to embody wisdom about how to
respond to these facts, what sorts of purposes ought patients pursue with their autonomy?
In this second direction, the question is being posed from some perspective other than
that of individual patients. I will not focus on the second, normative approach in this
dissertation. Nevertheless, we do well to recognize that patients’ visions of a good death
seem to coalesce into some familiar conceptions transcending the various circumstances
individuals face and the individual ideals they articulate. I explore these below.
Circumstantial and Personal Features of Dying
When bioethicists address the question of a good death, they commonly focus on
a set of what I will call circumstantial conditions surrounding dying. These are
conditions that health care professionals might address to facilitate a good death. So, for
instance, Elise Ayers, Joan Harrold, and Joanne Lynn argue for the need to reorganize the
social support and care systems that can “ensure” that people die well and for the “need

15

to develop objective criteria to measure how well health systems deliver care.”17 Their
criteria include addressing physical pain and emotional suffering, supporting independent
functioning and autonomy, assisting with advanced care planning, providing aggressive
care near death where patients desire it, maintaining patient and family member
satisfaction, preserving a good overall quality of life, relieving family burdens, providing
an appropriate expectation about survival time, providing continuity of skilled care, and
offering bereavement services for survivors.18 This is a fine set of concerns; few would
deny the benefit that could come from such social support and health care. Following in
this vein, David Thomasma argues that health care workers have duties to provide many
of the items listed above in order to “ensure” a good death for patients.19 In attempting to
define a good death, Richard O’Neil identifies four components, the first three of which
are good timing for one’s death (neither premature or overdue), a good dying process in
which the patient is able to maintain control and a loss of dignity is prevented, and a
proper respect for the moral aspects of the patient’s dying, which includes most
prominently a respect for self-determination.20 If we conceive of a good death as simply
skillful handling of the circumstances of dying, then a good death is something that
health care professionals can deliver to largely passive patients.
17

Elise Ayers, Joan Harrold, Joanne Lynn, “A Good Death: Improving Care Inch-by-Inch,” Bioethics
Forum 13:3 (1997): 38-40, 39. Strikingly, Ayers, et al, state repeatedly in their essay that attention to such
measures will “ensure” a good death. Below, I will quote another bioethicist in the same journal volume
saying something similar. What strikes me in both cases is that such measures do not necessarily ensure a
good death, unless one defines a good death strictly in terms of such measures (which is implausible, as I
will argue below).
18
Ibid, 39-40.
19
David C. Thomasma, “Ensuring a Good Death,” Bioethics Forum 13:3 (1997): 7-17, 10-14.
20
Richard O’Neil, “On Defining ‘A Good Death,’” 12-14. O’Neil’s fourth component of a good death is
what he calls one’s “deathstyle” by which he means one’s ability “not [to] exhibit any important defects of
character related to the dying process” (15). This fourth component amounts to a counterexample to my
claim here that most focus in bioethics has been on circumstantial factors, although arguably O’Neil
doesn’t give it the focus it deserves.

16

But a good death includes more than preventing pain, maintaining independent
functioning, and preserving a “good” quality of life to the end. One could have those
things, as well as the others listed above and still not die well. Daniel Callahan observes
that there “may not be, and need not be, any correlation between a ‘bad’ external death
and one that is perceived by oneself and others as a ‘good’ death internally.”21 Callahan
uses ‘internal’ here to refer to “what one makes of one’s dying, that is, how a person
interprets dying as a part of life....”22 A better term may be ‘personal.’ What I call the
personal aspect of dying, how an individual interprets and responds to dying, is
something nobody else can go through with the patient. Others can attend to the patient,
but nobody can die with the patient. It is a highly personal activity, in at least that sense,
which can also make it seem lonely to some. Of course, two people could die at the same
time, but each person experiences her own death from a first-person perspective that
cannot be shared by anyone else. My dying is fundamentally mine in the sense that only I
can experience from a first-person perspective. And, where Callahan refers to the
external aspects of dying, I believe the term ‘circumstantial’ might serve better, while
avoiding questions about what such things as pain are external to.
I hasten to emphasize that doctors and health care systems have not been wrong to
seek to provide good circumstances for the dying. As I have noted above, we would be
foolish to deny the benefit we could gain in our dying from having such circumstantial
factors attended to by health care workers. Indeed, it seems that under all four
conceptions of a good death that I discuss below, at least some of the circumstantial
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factors would have a place in facilitating a good death. And health care workers certainly
ought to focus a good part of their attention and efforts here. But competent care by
health care workers at the end of life is not enough, by itself, to ensure a good death,
despite the suggestions by Ayers, Harrold, and Lynn, and Thomasma to the contrary.23
As Alasdair MacIntyre says, dying patients, if they want a good death, will have to take
some responsibility for themselves.24
Having all the circumstantial factors mentioned above in place does not guarantee
a good death, and lacking all or most of them does not completely eliminate one’s
opportunity to die well. The circumstantial, or external, factors are neither necessary nor
sufficient to assure a good death. Rather, Callahan claims, “whether we die a good or
bad death depends greatly upon the kind of person we are, or can become.”25 As he
points out, a number of people in Nazi death camps seem to have died good and
admirable deaths, despite horrible circumstances.26 Depending on one’s perspective on
the cause for which they died, martyrs and those who sacrifice their lives for others might
be examples to add to Callahan’s. An increasing number today are having the desirable
circumstantial features provided, but it is far from clear that this assures contemporary
23
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patients of good deaths.27 All of this suggests that a good death might have as much or
more to do with the attitudes, emotions, character traits, and other features of one’s
personality as expressed in dying, as it does with the presence or absence of any of the
circumstantial factors.
Although contemporary health care has progressed in the provision of
circumstantial features, we would still be wise to attend to the personal side of dying
because the circumstantial features are so contingent. One can hardly be assured of
having a pain and incapacity-free death, despite the best efforts of health care providers.
Further, as I argue above, the circumstantial features by themselves do not ensure that a
patient dies well. A conception of a good death will need to say more than how one
hopes the circumstantial features will pan out. Our judgments about good deaths ought
also to touch on the personal aspect of dying. How one conceives of a good death will
reflect something about one’s character, insofar as one’s character is indicated in part by
one’s interpretive schemes. With these thoughts in mind, let us look at some conceptions
of what it means to die well.
Control in Dying?
Talk of a good death cannot get very far in contemporary society without
considering the possibility of physician-assisted death (PAD) as a means to a good death.
For those willing to consider PAD as a means to dying well, what is it that they want in a
good death? Above all, the concern here seems to be for control in dying. Those in
question might also want to avoid pain, and a prolonged decline into any state of
27
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incapacity, with a special concern about incapacity that compromises cognitive function,
and they want to be able to avoid getting caught in the throes of what Callahan calls
“technological brinkmanship,” in which they opt for one treatment too many and find
themselves seriously incapacitated—and perhaps even legally incompetent—and very
dependent on others and on medical technology.28 Another concern seems to be to avoid
a “postmature” death. For example, a postmature death might be one in which one’s
body outlives the “person” it formerly served.
What makes a death I control good? This may be a way of coping with a fear of
the unknown. We don’t know what—if anything—follows death; we also don’t know
what the implications are further down the road for the treatments we opt for today.
Many have watched such treatments prolong dying and lower the quality of a loved one’s
remaining life; Callahan names the risks we take in accepting these treatments
“technological brinkmanship.”29 Beyond assuaging our fears of the unknown in dying,
maybe control serves a purpose of helping us psychologically to minimize the blow of
mortality. We know that neither we nor medical technology can overcome death, but we
can at least go on our own terms if we have control over the timing and conditions of our
death. Perhaps control simply serves the purpose of making sure that one can avoid any
of the undesirable ends or conditions mentioned above. We judge such control to be
good because it helps us to avoid what we identify as bad in dying, assuming we can
exercise our control in such a way as to successfully avoid the undesirable aspects of
dying.
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But our judgments about what is bad in dying would have to be relative to some
conception of a good death. Not everyone agrees about what makes a death good. Some
will opt for more pain in order to maintain lucidity with family and friends near the end
and others will opt for pain medication even if it renders them unconscious. Both want
control in dying, but the control serves the higher purpose of helping them to achieve
some aspect of their conception of a good death. An additional consideration suggests
we ought to look beyond control to particular conceptions as well. For many, a good
death will be partially defined by having the capacity and freedom (moral, political, or
otherwise) to exercise the kind of control in question. But as we have noted above, some
historical examples might make us doubtful that someone cannot die well in a situation
where he lacks control over the circumstances of his dying. Of course, I am not saying
that lacking control is desirable or that a death couldn’t be made better, in many cases, by
having some control over one’s circumstances. Nevertheless, we cannot reduce our
conception of a good death to having control over one’s dying. Generally, control at the
end of life serves the pursuit of some larger conception of a good death. I want to
examine some of those particular conceptions of a good death now.
Avoiding Death
One conception of a good death is a death I don’t have to think about. Many
people express a wish to die in their sleep, or suddenly (from a heart attack or stroke).
We may debate the prevalence of this conception, but more than one commentator has
echoed Laurie Zoloth’s claim that we live in a culture obsessed with a flight from mortal
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limits.30 Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death may well be the classic treatment of this
phenomenon.31 What exactly do we deny or avoid? Some may simply wish to avoid the
thought of death, the thought that they will die and that many of their commitments are
therefore of finite and temporal value (at least to themselves). Perhaps some wish to
avoid a prolonged awareness that they will die. In the extreme, knowing that you are on a
plane that is about to be intentionally crashed can be psychologically devastating. On a
more common level—though nobody’s death is common or typical to her—some may
wish to avoid prolonged awareness of their impending death, even if they can’t be as
certain about its proximity.
One may also wish to avoid or deny the thought of his decline, his dying process.
Perhaps we do so out of fear of the pain or loss of capabilities involved, or perhaps, in
doing so, we reveal a fear of the unknown: who knows what will happen to me when I
am dying? The recent interest in life extension technology suggests a third possibility.
We may hope to put off the thought of death and the experience of dying as long as
possible. This makes Benjamin Franklin’s comment that the day will come when “all
diseases may be prevented or cured, not excepting even that of old age, and our lives
lengthened at pleasure even beyond the antediluvian standard” look not as quaint and
naive as some will hope it should be.32 Sometimes even contemporary bioethicists
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express their endorsement of the idea of “the conquest of death.”33 To harbor the hope
that death can be conquered or put off is to justify, on this account of a good death, my
putting off the thought that I will die. Thus, a good death becomes one in which I
successfully maintain the perspective that death can be put off.
I have mentioned at least three kinds of hopes here. Some want to avoid the
thought of death and believe a good death would be one that catches them by surprise.
Others want to avoid a prolonged dying experience, based on fears about what this might
entail for them. So, they also think of a good death as being sudden or having a pace they
can control perhaps. And others might use hopefulness about the prospects of life
extension as a way to comfort themselves with the thought that death remains far off (and
maybe getting further off all the time). In all cases, though, the proponents of this
conception aim to avoid, in some fashion and usually for as long as possible, death and
what surrounds it. For adherents of this conception, a good death need not be reflected
on for long, or maybe even at all.
We ought to distinguish between physical pain and emotional or mental distress.34
I have implied this when I discussed avoiding the thought of death or the thought of a
difficult dying experience above. The most pressing issue need not be the physical pain.
A conception of a good death could entail accepting a certain amount of pain, or, more
likely, it could seek as much pain relief as possible. Additionally, different conceptions
33
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of death will have different postures towards the variety of emotional distress that might
accompany death. Having an ideal in mind in conceiving of a good death and realizing
that this ideal cannot be fulfilled can cause emotional distress. This type of emotional
distress is likely to be acute for those embracing the ideal of avoiding death if they find
themselves in circumstances in which the realization of their death becomes unavoidable.
Nevertheless, a considerable number of people appear to believe a good death would be a
death they hope they can avoid thinking about during their lifetime.35
Gerald McKenny offers an account of why people might adopt this conception of
a good death. In his book To Relieve the Human Condition, he argues that since the time
of Bacon and Descartes, we have increasingly viewed science and technology as having a
role—even a moral imperative—of eliminating suffering and expanding choice, of
relieving us of the whims of fortune and the binds of necessity.36 But suffering comes in
many forms—often with tradeoffs—and contemporary bioethicists generally spend
comparatively little time helping us to see which forms of suffering we ought or ought
not accept. We might accept a form of suffering or a limitation if it were an acceptable
part of our ground project.37 By ‘ground project,’ I mean one’s perspective formed by
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one’s view of what constitutes a good or worthwhile human life.38 This might encompass
many different, lesser projects.39 But bioethicists have often focused on securing our
right to choose. Most have said very little, if anything, about how our ground projects
might lead us to accept certain forms of suffering.
This leaves many today with a strong sense of entitlement to choose and perhaps a
sense of expectation that technology ought to be ever expanding their choices. But thus
far, technology has not overcome mortality, so the thought of it and the decline that
precedes it continue to lurk near our consciousness. Many have postulated that illness
intimates death. How does this help us to explain those who seek to deny death and
conceive a good death to be one that, if it must come, sneaks up on them? Perhaps this is
a person who does not know how the suffering that may be involved in dying could fit
into her ground project. Bacon’s and Descartes’s visions have been carried out to such a
degree that many do think that science and technology can relieve them of their various
burdens. This is not to say that contemporary individuals would self-consciously endorse
such a proposition. Rather, we are socialized in Western society, particularly America, in
such a way that we come to hold this as a tacit belief. We grow up with cars and central
heating and air conditioning and come to the unconscious conclusion that distance or
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climate ought never to impede us. Carl Elliot gives the name “therapeutic worldview” to
that ideology which “sees every human predicament as a problem to be fixed.”40 Beyond
overt predicaments, the existence of enhancement technologies suggests to many that
they can and ought to be “better than well” if they are not satisfied with “normal.”41 So,
some have formed outlooks based on ground projects in which most suffering and limits
have no conceivable place, because they are not acceptable means to anything else; the
outlook has no ends for which these could be appropriate means. This includes the
suffering that can accompany dying and also the inherent limitations of mortality.
On the surface it may appear that the pain and suffering that immediately
precedes death cannot serve any logical purpose because many suppose death is the end
of one’s existence. But even if such suffering has little instrumental purpose, it might at
least be expressive or indicative of one’s values and convictions. One example,
previously cited, might be choosing increased physical pain with mental clarity in order
to remain capable of conversation, as opposed to taking pain medications that leave one
comfortable but incoherent. Maybe the capacity for conversation serves little or no
instrumental purpose—the important conversations have already taken place—but
remaining coherent reflects a certain type of regard for those attending to one’s death. In
that case, how a patient responds to the pain serves some expressive purpose.
Of course, just about everyone believes that technology can and ought to relieve
some suffering. Which suffering we will seek relief for will be indicative of the place of
40
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suffering and its relief in our ground projects. How might those who accept the
conception of a good death discussed here think about the question of what suffering fits
with their ground project? The answer remains somewhat unclear because, as I have
suggested, those in this position generally seek to avoid the thought of dying and death.
The same people appear unlikely to conceive of suffering associated with death to have
any meaningful place in their ground projects. For them, technology ought to ameliorate
just about any suffering brought on by dying, if I am right to link McKenny’s claims
about technology with those who seek to “deny death.” Saying that no suffering at the
end of life fits with the outlook informed by one’s ground project suggests that no
amount or kind of suffering—including any suffering involved in facing one’s death—
can be conceived as having a legitimate place in one’s conception of a good death. Thus,
it is better to die in sleep or suddenly than to face a crisis for which one’s ground project
has few resources.
I have suggested that there may be a number of reasons why someone would want
to “deny death.” That is, different people may have different aspects of death and dying
they would seek to avoid. What unites these views is their common belief that some
prominent thought or experience associated with dying ought to be avoided.
Growth in Dying
Within the hospice movement, many have adopted the notion that a good death
would be one in which the patient grows in significant ways. The idea probably has its
origins in the work of Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, especially in her book Death: The Final
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Stage of Growth.42 More recently, Ira Byock has made the connection between dying and
growth explicit.43 In this conception, a good death would be one in which the patient
becomes open to learning (and does learn) new things about himself and others, eager to
reconcile with others, and able to attain a new, richer, and deeper outlook on life and
life’s purpose. These persons may want to leave, as a parting gift to survivors, the way
they conduct themselves in the dying period. They may want to leave a lasting and
positive impression in the face of sorrow. Perhaps the prospect of the stark finality of
death and the finite amount of time left motivates those accepting this view to learn and
grow. Byock says that we as a culture must move away from denying death “toward an
understanding of dying as a part of full, even healthy, living ….”44 Death simplifies
one’s life and clears away many superficial concerns. Growth involves accommodating
oneself to this truth. Becoming the sort of person who can do so enables one to die well.
One might suppose that this way of thinking of a good death calls into question
the value of one’s perspectives, attitudes, or actions at earlier times in life. Growth, here,
can be good because it is growth out of or beyond some lesser state. For those who
embody this view, dying affords us an opportunity to grow out of less mature
superficialities and is, at least partially, good for that reason. But not all who embrace
growth in dying will see such growth as a necessary corrective to earlier deficiencies.
The growth that makes dying good may be that which is developmentally appropriate to
that particular stage of life. Those who hope to grow in their dying may claim that the
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experience of dying, which cannot really be anticipated or approximated at any other
times of our lives, makes us open in new ways to lessons or truths that we might
otherwise walk past. The various stages of life offer different opportunities to grow and
so death can be good if we seize it as another period in which to grow.45
What does the growth in question aim at? Perhaps growth in dying can be seen
by those with this view as a way to redeem an otherwise tragic period of one’s life. That
one can grow in this time could indicate that the circumstances have not won out or
beaten down the patient. The circumstances have not rendered the patient a passive
victim. Of course, not all taking this view would think their prior lives have been so
tragic that they are in need of redemption through growth. As noted above, some may
see growth as an appropriate response to a new stage of life. Still others might find
growth to be the one intrinsically valuable activity that enables them to deal with the
potential sense of meaninglessness about death. Regardless of the aim of the growth, a
good death on this account would be one in which one becomes the kind of person who
can grow in dying and does so. Dying presents an opportunity to bring the narrative of
one’s life to a fitting conclusion, to tie together loose ends, and perhaps even to weave
some new strands into the story of one’s life.
Simply Dying
In contrast to the ambitions for growth in the above conception, some envision a
good death in relatively simple and unassuming terms. Those attracted to this conception
will view their deaths as simply the period at the end of the sentences or paragraphs that
have composed their lives. Death need not be a time to do anything spectacular; rather, it
45
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is simply an opportunity to end the sentence. Montaigne reflected this sort of perspective
when he commented that, “I want a man to act, and to prolong the functions of life as
long as he can; and I want death to find me planting cabbages, but careless of death, and
still more of my unfinished garden.”46 A good death will be simple, peaceful, and
without a lot of fanfare. Perhaps those inclined to this way of thinking will be attracted to
the view that the “sentence” is what it is as a whole and one’s death will not significantly
alter what has been written and one’s dying is no time to try to start to write a new
sentence. They view death as neither a monster nor a grand new opportunity. It is
simply the end of my time. Within this view, one might reasonably hope not to be
removed from the various spheres of society before death comes; one might hope to be
permitted to live while dying, and “living” often means “living with” others. Retaining a
place within both the larger human community and its more particular, local incarnations
might be a goal under such a conception. Daniel Callahan describes his ideal—a
peaceful death—in these, among other, terms: “I would like my death to matter to others,
… [to be] a rupturing of human community....” and, “I do not want to be abandoned,
psychologically ejected from the community, because of my impending death.”47 This is
because until death comes, one can still pursue—though perhaps only to some more
restricted degree—life. Even if one’s decline takes several years, as we have come to
expect in our society, those adopting the ideal envisioned here hope to remain a part of
their communities and to continue to engage in at least some life activities until death
comes. One needn’t grow to do so, or to die well. Rather, one can still contribute to the
46
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lives of others by one’s continued presence within the community. The mere presence of
those dying continues to enrich family members, friends, colleagues, and others just as it
has previously.48 Of course, one might aspire to simply die even if removed from one’s
community, such as by being placed in a nursing home. In this case, one would have to
imagine other ways of conceiving of what it means to live until one must die.
Sometimes those advocating for good palliative care at the end of life sound as if
they are endorsing the view I have labeled simply dying.49 Perhaps this conception of a
good death attempts to repudiate the idea of a good death. Death is what it is and is
unavoidable. At best we can clear away any obstacles that would make one’s progress
toward death uncomfortable, undignified, or otherwise harmful. When those obstacles
have been cleared, we can die in relative ease and simplicity. Whereas the notion of
growth in dying might hold out hope that someone could rewrite their history and perhaps
put a new slant on some of the less polished aspects of their lives, the notion of simply
dying seems to suggest that one’s life will indeed speak for itself. If there is a task
unique to this conception, perhaps it is for its adherents to reaffirm those values that have
come to shape their lives. And, one will probably die in a manner reflective of how one
has lived, which might well be true in any case.
For those who adopt simply dying as a conception of a good death, death might
simply be seen as the conclusion to what they hope has been a good life. To adopt such a
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perspective one need not deny mistakes made throughout one’s life. Although taking
such a perspective might mean that one has sought to admit to, apologize for, and deal
with such mistakes as they arose as opposed to waiting until one’s death is imminent to
address them. This could also distinguish simply dying from growth in dying.
Part of understanding a good death as simply dying might be the conviction that it
is proper for a good life to end. One might conceive of this more locally, as a means of
giving way to the next generation within one’s family or community. In fact, this
conception of a good death might thrive particularly where there are strong bonds of
community and tradition. MacIntyre comments that,
[t]he concept of a tradition is the concept of a relationship extending
through generations in which each generation finds the significance of its
activity a part of a history which transcends it. No generation can usurp
the place of another, and therefore for each there is a time to die. Death
is not to be fended off, it is at a certain point to be welcomed and
embraced.50
One might also conceive of this on a more global scale, as a means of not
consuming more than one’s share of resources. For whatever reasons, the person
occupying this perspective simply sees a good death as one in which any potential new
harms or threats that arise as result of dying are cleared away or dealt with as best they
can be. Perhaps this allows them to carry on with whatever life tasks they are involved in
until very near the end of life. Within this perspective, there might be room for those
with greater or lesser tolerance for various harms or threats, depending on what their
various ground projects could accommodate.51 But simply dying is different from
avoiding death because, for the former, the thought of death can be embraced; but even if
50
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embraced, it need not be made into more than the conclusion to one’s life. As noted
above, I think Daniel Callahan’s notion of a “peaceful death” comes very close to what I
have described here as simply dying.52
Christian Conceptions of Dying Well
Religious ideas often come up in discussions about what it would mean to die
well. Rather than survey the very diverse conceptions of a good death expressed by
various religions, I will limit myself to discussion of a variety of different conceptions of
a good death that can be loosely gathered under the notion of a good “Christian” death.
Two things seem clear in trying to do this. One, we can identify a number of different
Christian accounts of a good death. Two, people will disagree over the boundaries of
acceptably “Christian” conceptions of a good death. I will not try to identify a single,
orthodox view here. Nevertheless, in what follows, I will try to articulate some
conceptions of a good death that can be at least loosely gathered under the term
“Christian.”
Christian convictions suggest that death has two aspects.53 On the one hand,
death can be viewed a sign of sin, of fallenness and rebellion against God. The suffering
we often face in dying and the separation from loved ones that results from death reflect
this. On the other hand, death can be viewed as a doorway to a new quality of
relationship with God. It becomes a path that leads one to be able to experience God with
a kind of immediacy we don’t have in life as we know it now. Some understandings of a
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good death for Christians will take into account these two aspects. However, not all
place equal emphasis on both.
Sometimes Christians will focus on how the suffering that often attends to death
weighs down our lives. They might be tempted to think they ought to meet the
challenges of death in ways that imitate the responses of their non-Christian
contemporaries and which are in tension with other elements of the Christian tradition.54
Such thinking might lead to the conclusion that death is an evil which we must overcome.
A focus that places more emphasis on the negative aspect of dying characterizes this
conception of a good death.
On the other hand, Christians might be tempted to think of death as being of no
consequence for them. If one focuses primarily on the afterlife and the benefits one
expects there, one might conceive a good death as one in which that focus trumps any
particular difficulties faced at the end of life.55 Such a view does not appear to take into
account the distinction between death and dying. At an extreme, a nearly exclusive focus
on the positive aspects of death might lead to something like a Christian version of the
denial of death discussed above. One needn’t worry about death because all that matters
is what lies beyond it.
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Another possibility consistent with focusing on the positive aspect of death is that
Christians might adopt a version of simply dying as a conception of a good death. Such
Christians might view death as just a period at the end of the sentence and believe a new
sentence begins in the afterlife with God. Before the afterlife, one need only be faithful
and patient and keep on with life.
From early in the history of Christianity, many adherents have understood that
“life should never be clung to in desperation.”56 It is not a second god besides God, and
one commits idolatry if she clings to it too desperately.57 An implication of this is that
some conceive of a good death as one that happens strictly on God’s timing. I don’t
decide when I’ll die; God does. I cannot put off or hasten my death, and a good death
will be one which occurs when God says that it is time. This may lead to a kind of
theological determinism in which one believes the hour of death is set and unalterable.
(A documentary I once watched portrayed Confederate General “Stonewall” Jackson as
believing this, which may have accounted for his bravery in battle.) A Christian could
believe life ought not be clung to in desperation but still pray to avoid a sudden death, as
medieval Christians did and some contemporary Episcopalians do.58 At the personal
level, the patient hopes to be the kind of person who can meet God with a clear
conscience and repentant heart. A good death would be one in which she has had time to
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make peace with God and others, and some contemporary Christians believe it is
appropriate to pray for such circumstances.59
In addition to believing that life ought not to be clung to in desperation, the
Christian tradition has, generally, also condemned suicide. This contrasts with the other
conceptions of a good death, none of which conclusively rules out suicide. Suicide
suggests despair of God’s ability to act redemptively in one’s circumstances and implies
one’s need to take the course of life into one’s own hands.60 The despair or the
difficulties that lead one to despair become more determinative of one’s perspective than
convictions about God’s ability to act redemptively. Often Christians also see suicide as
a violation of the sanctity of life. For some, the sanctity-of-life claim leads to a
conception of a good death in which the patient does all she can to fight death until God
brings her home. On this conception, the sanctity of life means that a good death would
be one in which the Christian pursues all forms of treatment until there is nothing more to
do. A good death is a courageous fight. Doing otherwise means opting out of life too
soon.
In an attempt to balance the ideas that life ought neither be clung to in desperation
nor despaired of in suicide, 20th century theologian Karl Barth uses the biblical theme of
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Sabbath rest to suggest how Christians might conceive of a good death.61 The biblical
narrative portrays God as creating the world and then resting from his labor (Genesis 12). Biblical scripture uses the notion of Sabbath rest as a metaphor throughout to refer to
God’s calling followers to find fulfillment for their lives, to “enter into God’s rest”
(Hebrews 5). Entering into God’s rest means becoming the kind of person who can be at
home in God’s presence. For instance, in Aquinas the virtue of charity marks the kind of
person who is capable of friendship with God.62 This might be most vivid when viewed
in contrast. A person not at home in God’s presence will despair of God’s ability or
intention to act on her behalf. This tends toward an unbalanced focus on the negative
aspects of death, with anxiety over death itself displacing confidence in God’s presence
and providence. It will manifest a lack of trust in and gratitude to God. Restlessness
might also be characterized by preoccupation with oneself and with providing for one’s
own needs. By contrast, the restful are free to turn their attention to others, to attending
to and being with others. Such generosity reflects a sense of contentment that Christians
will claim can arise from resting in God—in both living and dying. Christians tend to
doubt that this attitude of rest can be achieved by individual efforts. Rather, for Barth,
Christians ought to joyfully, gratefully (and, paradoxically, actively) receive the rest from
their efforts that God offers.63
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The theological metaphysics that Barth assumes lends itself to understanding a
restful death as having a transcendent component. A restful death looks toward a kind of
completion that can be found only when Christians enter into God’s presence in the
afterlife. But another conception of good death as restful death might be immanent. This
conception could see the main point of Christian convictions as enabling one to find
meaning and die well in this life only. The rest that is to be achieved is rest in the here
and now. Perhaps the theological metaphysics becomes more symbol than reality on this
view, but for the “immanentist” it might have the same effect in producing rest.
There is a parallel between the Christian accounts of a good death discussed here
and the ideal discussed under “growth in dying.” But for the Christian accounts, a good
death involves a particular kind of growth, with a specific trajectory and aims. These are
informed by the metaphysical or symbolic claims (that there is a God, that we can only be
fulfilled by being in right relationship to God, etc.) which are a constitutive part of the
Christian tradition.
Conclusion
I have looked at four conceptions of a good death. If it is true that there are at
least four different accounts of a good death, we should not speak of ‘a good death,’ as if
there is only one, universally shared conception. Rather, we would do well to try to
understand what the concept of a good death means for the particular person whose case
concerns us. For health care workers, such an endeavor will heighten their sensitivity to
the particular concerns, needs, and ideals of a given patient. For bioethicists, this means
that we will want to join in or stimulate conversation concerning what it means to die
well. This conversation should go beyond discussion of the circumstantial aspects of
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one’s dying. We would do well to include discussion of the personal aspects of dying as
well.
Good deaths involve more than favorable medical circumstances, though the latter
have been more of the focus of bioethical discussions thus far. Considering the personal
aspects of good deaths both enriches the conversation and adds to the responsibilities of
patients. This is not a responsibility primarily to others. Rather, it is a self-regarding
responsibility. But this responsibility seems to go beyond adopting and pursuing selfcreated ends. Good deaths seem not to be as unique as individuals, though nothing I have
said implies that an individual couldn’t hold a unique conception. In depicting different
conceptions of a good death, I suggest that such conceptions generally cluster into a
number of widely accepted accounts. Perhaps not even all of these accounts are good
from some wider perspective.
This raises the question of whether there can be such a thing as wisdom about
dying well. Perhaps conceptions of good deaths are not just subjective but take shape
against a relatively more objective background. If wisdom is a kind of practical
knowledge of how to get on relatively well in life, then maybe dying well involves an
appreciation of that background context. For the purposes of this chapter I have sought to
catalogue prominent conceptions of a good death without placing judgment on them. If
we take into account a background context, we may conclude that not all of the
conceptions discussed here are wise. Some accounts of a good death may fare better than
others when we take into account the various challenges we face in our contemporary
medical context. I look at those challenges in the next chapter before revisiting, in two
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later chapters, the question of what it might mean to become the sort of person who can
wisely navigate the challenges of dying.
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CHAPTER III
THE CHALLENGES OF DYING
Introduction
Dying presents many challenges. Some of these challenges transcend time and
place, while others are unique to particular social contexts. Sometimes particular social
contexts exacerbate some challenge or other of dying. Because most desire good deaths
they will want to know the challenges of dying and how they may respond to them. In
this chapter I look at the most prominent of the challenges of dying in our social and
medical context with the aim of explaining how they make our attempts to die well so
difficult. I have already argued that we cannot think in terms of one univocal
understanding of a good death. Rather, many conceptions of a good death exist. Thus,
we need not assume that all of the challenges discussed below have equal relevance for
all conceptions of a good death. More likely, each conception of a good death will have a
somewhat different perspective on the significance of the variety of challenges I discuss
below. Therefore, the list of challenges discussed below is linked by the logician’s
inclusive ‘or.’ Not all of these challenges will be equally relevant to all. Nevertheless, at
least some of these challenges are prominent features of dying in our contemporary
medical context that have to be addressed by any conception of a good death. These
challenges shape the perceptions of dying held by almost all of us, regardless of our
understanding of what it means to die well.
The challenges surveyed here overlap in many ways. Loss of independence and a
corresponding increase in dependence on others can lead to suffering. Pain alters one’s
relationship to one’s body by breaking the immediacy we normally experience in the
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relationship between body and self. But, other forms of suffering or bodily decline, even
if not accompanied by pain, can also alter the body-self relation in similar ways. A
recurrent theme in this chapter is that how medical care is administered and what medical
care is considered appropriate and optimal can also be a source of challenges in dying.
On a loose use of the term ‘suffering,’ we might say that all of the challenges a patient
might face at the end of life can cause suffering, although I will consider suffering as one
particular kind of challenge. These overlaps suggest that I have broken down the topics
for discussion under the heading of “the challenges of dying” in somewhat artificial
ways. I’m not sure that any way of breaking down the topics would be completely
satisfactory. However, I have tried to organize my discussion of the challenges of dying
around two main themes, with a number of sub-themes and additional themes thrown in
as well. The two main themes I will discuss concern, first, a loss of independence and a
corresponding increase in dependence on others and, second, pain and suffering at the
end of life. But each of these headings contains some discussion that could fit under the
other theme. Overall, my aim is to provide an account of what it is about dying that
challenges us in our contemporary medical context.
Distinguishing Death from Dying
Before beginning to discuss particular challenges, I want to recall the distinction
between dying and death. Whereas death is an event that happens at one particular time,
dying is a process that takes place over a period of time.64 I focus here on dying and on
the challenges of dying. The thought of one’s future death would, of course, be a part of
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the dying process for most who undergo a period of time during which they are aware
they are approaching death. I will address the thought of death a bit below, but I focus
more on the decline that often accompanies dying. I seek to explicate the challenges
associated with this decline.
The paradigmatic dying person I have in mind is an older patient with some kind
of terminal illness and some measure of mental clarity and awareness intact. I leave
“older” ambiguous. The notion itself changes with advances in medicine. Most people
in a dying process are at the older end of “older,” although, of course, terminal illness
also affects people in their twenties and younger.65 Probably twenty year old terminal
patients will experience many of the challenges I discuss here. However, as noted above,
I don’t focus at all on any issues unique to terminally ill children. Not everyone has a
dying process. Some die suddenly of heart attacks or in car accidents. I am focused on
those patients who do undergo a process of dying. Indeed, many of the challenges I have
in mind arise only because dying is a process many undergo in the context of
contemporary American medicine. The majority of those undergoing that process, as I
noted just above, are older.66 My aim in this chapter is to focus on that majority of cases,
although I recognize that some deaths and some dying processes don’t fit the paradigm.
Likewise, I leave the notion of mental clarity and awareness somewhat ambiguous
as well. For those with no awareness, there are no challenges that they can perceive.
This is true by definition. Those with some measure of awareness will be more aware, by
65
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degrees, of challenges presented by their dying. My ultimate purpose is to articulate
virtues that are typically and primarily embodied by those with some capacity for
meaningful perception, reflection, and judgment. Thus, I want to focus here on
challenges experienced by those with some measure of mental competence.67
Loss of Personal Control and Increasing Dependence
Some feel that the loss of control or personal autonomy that comes with a
patient’s decline into death is the most serious challenge we face in dying.68 Many fear
the time when they will no longer be able to decide and act for and by themselves.
Sometimes this happens to those who are not dying. Spinal cord injuries leading to
paralysis can present patients with a similar set of challenges, although they are not
dying. But dying often involves a gradual loss of the capacities—both mental and
physical—that are necessary to be independent. Arnold Toynbee observes that “Death is
‘un-American’” because of the ways the reality of death challenges crucial articles of
“the American way of life.”69 If independence and freedom are the dominant American
values they are often portrayed to be, then the loss of control that attends dying may be
equally, or more, un-American than death itself. What Richard Zaner says of his mother
could easily apply to many contemporary Americans: “An intelligent, articulate, caring,
67
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and independent person throughout her adult life, she gradually found herself withdrawn,
depressed, isolated, and—horror of horrors in her own eyes—dependent on others, her
treasured personal freedom all but gone.”70 Americans have never seemed to be
especially good at acknowledging the ways we are dependent throughout our lives on
others to provide even basic life goods. But dying introduces new aspects of dependence
in areas where we have previously not been dependent (or haven’t been since infancy in
some cases).
Freedom and independence are, of course, important values. America has often
been characterized by its independent spirit, which probably had a lot to do with the
successes of national endeavors such as our westward expansion through the 18th and 19th
centuries. Moreover, we have structured our political economy to preserve high levels of
independence from interference by government and other institutions. Richard Handler,
commenting on Tocqueville’s perceptions of America, says, “[f]or Tocqueville,
individualism is the central cultural fact of the United States….”71 Handler goes on to
note that modern citizens see personal independence as one of the “positive corollaries”
of individualism.72 This individualism and independence has its positive side; however,
it seems that the kind of socialization we undergo, which causes us to hold such values in
high regard, also makes us vulnerable to a downside we may not fully experience until
we are dying. Social scientists have documented how our increasing independence from
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one another, as a society, has led to a corresponding increase in loneliness.73 We might
be able to avoid experiencing distress from that loneliness in large measure while we are
active and independent, but when we become incapacitated and dependent we will no
doubt find it harder to avoid the reality and consequences of such loneliness. In spite of
this, many Americans seem to hold independence and individualism in very high esteem.
Kierkegaard offers a description of a character-type who, in the words of one
commentator, recognizes “no binding authority or transcendent values that might limit
the freedom of the self.”74 For such a person, freedom and independence seem to be
ultimate values, central to the identities of those who value them in this way. While
Kierkegaard may be speaking about an extreme character, some Americans seem to have
such ultimate values and many Americans seem to fit this description to lesser degrees.
If so, this might help us to understand what many find so challenging about the
loss of independence and corresponding increase of various forms of dependence during
dying. To the degree that we value freedom and independence from others as intrinsic
goods, we are more vulnerable to challenges associated with the loss of the same.75
Those who value independence primarily as a means to other goods may well be able to
receive those goods from others, such as family. Patients who place high value on
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independence itself may find it hard to replace when dying erodes it. This might explain
why so many find this aspect of dying to be a challenge. But regardless of how one
values independence, its loss is surely an obstacle to face.
Loss of Dignity
Further, if we conceive of our dignity as persons in terms of our ability to be
independent in certain important ways—and arguably the ways in which we think it is
important to be independent have changed over time76—then an additional challenge
associated with the loss of control and increasing dependence will be a loss of dignity.
Even if being relatively more dependent on others is not an indignity from the perspective
of some absolute standard of human dignity, many perceive a loss of independence as a
blow to their dignity. This perception by itself constitutes a challenge to dying well
because the decline that marks dying so often includes an increasing dependence on
others and a corresponding loss of personal control. Thus, in the course of dying we
often lose, over a period of time, those things we believe contribute to our dignity. This
is not necessarily just a perception. The decline, after all, is real. When those we love
and will continue to love regardless of their condition become diminished and something
less than they were when at their full powers, there is something to mourn. Even if we
know that the life cycle includes decline, it is sad to see a person decline from the height
of her capacities. It is almost as if the person has fallen from the apex of the human
being’s telos, from the dignity of a human being at her full powers.77
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The loss of dignity as a challenge of dying well might also be described in more
particular terms than just a general loss of independence. Loss of mobility, of control
over bowel and urinary functioning, of energy and vitality, of the ability to plan for one’s
own future, and of the ability to live free of mechanical or other technologies frequently
accompany dying today. Many of these losses are considered to diminish the dignity of
the patient’s life, in some sense. Nursing homes, assisted-living facilities, or hospitals,
when they are a part of the end of life, limit possessions and control one’s daily
schedule.78 We frequently think of bodily control as a prerequisite to our normal
conception of dignity and struggle to accommodate that conception to those we meet who
lack such control (e.g. those with physical and mental disabilities, seizures, or other
control-diminishing capacities). When we become those people, we struggle all the
more. Some buck against the experience of lacking the energy to do basic tasks while
others respond to such conditions with lethargy or even depression. The sense that death
will mark a final horizon on one’s life can be accompanied by the experience, during
dying, of having less and less energy for and say over what one does with numbered
days. Finally, dependence on mechanical forms of technology can also threaten dignity.
Ventilators, for instance, inhibit speech and the ability to swallow, and they are so
uncomfortable that patients on them are often sedated so they don’t become anxious or
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distressed. They are one aspect of a dying experience that Elizabeth Kubler-Ross
describes as now being, “more gruesome in many ways, namely, more lonely,
mechanical, and dehumanized . . . .”79 The sight of someone on a respirator gives the
impression that the patient is being enveloped by a machine, that her independent
existence is being swallowed up by a mechanical entity. This is gruesome to those who
knew the patient in other, happier contexts. It may be that the gruesomeness of
respirators and similar medical machines is that they remove people from normal
contexts and throw them into alien setting where machines set the context. All of the
above conditions constitute a regular part of the dying experience of many, and each of
them can be perceived to threaten dignity in some way.
We ought to be clear about the sense in which such features of dying compromise
a patient’s dignity. My claim is not that dying patients lose dignity in some absolute
sense, that somehow the moral value of the lives of dying patients is less than that of
those who are more healthy. Rather, the sense in which people frequently mourn a loss
of dignity which precedes death, captured sometimes by PAD advocates in the phrase,
“death with dignity,” concerns, primarily, a perception about what conditions are fitting
for a human being. This perception might be fueled by the ways our culture has been
influenced by philosophers like Immanuel Kant. Kant conceives the dignity of humans to
reside in their capacity for moral agency.80 Dying, as I point out above, erodes our
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capacity for agency in a more general sense. While most Americans are probably not
self-conscious Kantians, Kant’s ideas have clearly permeated our culture to an extent, and
this could suggest that humans who are losing agency, even if this is not moral agency
strictly speaking, are also losing dignity. The loss of the capacity to impose one’s will on
the world, I am speculating, suggests to some that one is thereby less dignified.
Nevertheless, many Americans also believe human moral worth extends beyond our
capacity for agency. And this sets up a tension in our thinking. Because the dying
remain worthy of moral respect we sometimes bemoan the conditions contemporary
medical care and the diseases it is responding to put patients in. In this sense, we can talk
about dying as presenting a possible threat to the patient’s dignity and retain an
understanding of why this threat represents a challenge.
Increased Vulnerability
The above discussion implies that patients would do well to have advocates who
can testify to their continued moral dignity, even in a less capacitated state. This points
to another challenge the dying face, one that is related to the loss of independence but
merits special comment. Terminal patients are partially vulnerable as a result of their
condition. Illness makes us less able to think for ourselves. We can be “thrown off” by
the jarring nature of a bad prognosis or the realization that an illness will be a watershed
moment, changing our lives forever. When we are ill we are physically weak, and
therefore less independent, so we are vulnerable to being taken advantage of. We
become less compelling advocates on our own behalf. We carry the social stigma of

what respect involves, which gives a salient place to freedom and self-control, places a high priority on
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illness.81 And some of the vulnerability is a function of the unequal relationship that
exists between doctors and their patients. Much has been written on this topic.82 I will
only briefly comment on a few aspects of it. Doctors hold a good bit of social power and
can control a number of aspects of a patient’s life.83 The disparity between doctors and
most patients is true at any life stage, yet terminal illness seems to exacerbate the gap.
Doctors and other medical professionals often know more about many aspects of a
patient’s condition than the patient herself. This knowledge makes patients vulnerable to
exploitation or abuse, both of which may well be unintentional, as a result of the power
gap between doctor and patient. Of course, this need not always be the case. Edmund
Pellegrino suggests that patients’ vulnerability to doctors can sometimes threaten their
self-image, their sense of having a valid independent perspective on themselves and their
illness.84 This also makes patients vulnerable to a threat to self-knowledge. They are
vulnerable to the possibility of someone else speaking more authoritatively about their
own experience and its meaning than they can. The objectification of the patient and the
patient’s body would be one form that this relationship takes. Sally Gadow remarks that,
“The body that a patient experiences and that which a practitioner treats are seldom the
same.”85 Doctors, of course, frequently treat the body they have been trained to treat, one
captured and isolated in terms of medical data, numbers, and relevant performance charts.
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But this leaves patients vulnerable to objectification of their person and subsequent
potential loss of self-image. As Eric Cassell points out, an approach to disease that
objectifies the body and assumes that disease can and ought to be understood only in
terms of dysfunction or disruption in bodily systems makes patients vulnerable to a
failure on the part of medicine to address the particularities that make their illness
theirs.86 Thus, patients are, ironically, vulnerable to misdiagnosis and mistreatment,
sometimes by health care professionals operating under what they understand to be the
best current standards of medicine. From Cassell’s perspective, it is misdiagnosis and
mistreatment because the health professional fails to discern the particular form the
disease has in this patient and fails to treat this patient’s symptoms. The objectification
of the body reduces the patient to something less than what he is and treats only the part
that medicine has typically focused on. The object of concern to many physicians is the
body that contains a disease, but Cassell calls for care that treats persons with diseases
and not just bodies as malfunctioning objects. The problem might also be compounded
by an ambivalence medicine has sometimes shown—even in recent years—to providing
really good care at the end of life.87 In a trend that parallels the concerns raised by
Cassell, one observer notes that more recent medical texts spend less time discussing how
a patient might look or feel when dying of a particular disease. That is, these medical
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texts discuss diseases in the context of bodies, but increasingly ignore the wider context
of the persons in whom the diseases are manifest.
Further, patients are also vulnerable as a result of their dependence on technology.
They are vulnerable to others’ decisions concerning whether to grant them access to
technology, particularly more exotic forms of technology that are not considered to be
necessary for immediate life-saving purposes. An example of such decisions might be
those concerning organ transplants or, in earlier times, use of dialysis machines.
Technology also controls and limits the lives of those dependent on it as well. Dialysis
machines require frequent, regular visits; respirators impose many restrictions on
movement and speech. Each of these makes its user dependent in different ways, but this
dependence makes patients vulnerable in new ways. Technology-dependent patients are
vulnerable to being placed on someone else’s time schedule and, thus, losing control of
their time. They are also vulnerable to the successes and failures of technology. Finally,
they are vulnerable to complications that arise as a result of their treatment through the
use of such technologies. These complications might include additional physical
incapacities and illnesses or exacerbation of the symptoms of their existing ones.
Patients are not just vulnerable with respect to doctors or the medical
establishment. Illness makes them more dependent on family members and others, and
this makes patients more vulnerable to others’ decisions about their care and treatment.
The healthy, by virtue of their full capacities, can make decisions affecting patients. For
instance, family members of the dying sometimes make decisions based more on their
own needs and interests than those of the patient in their care. A son will decide he needs
a bit more time with his father before “letting go.” A daughter will find herself unable
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not to agree to one more round of treatment that her mother has long since become
comfortable with forgoing.
Pain and Suffering
Although the common phrase “pain and suffering” sometimes elides any
meaningful distinction between the two words, Eric Cassell has initiated an important
discussion about the difference between pain and suffering.88 Ultimately Cassell aims, I
think, to distinguish pain and suffering without separating them. He sees the two as
linked in important ways. But he worries that medicine has oriented itself to attend well
to one at the expense of the other. After discussing the distinction between the two, I will
take up consideration of pain, then suffering, and then look at some connections between
the two.
We can begin to get a sense for Cassell’s distinction by considering a series of
dichotomies: pain versus suffering; body versus person or patient; disease versus illness;
sensation versus perception; objective immediacy versus subjective meaning-making. A
simplistic understanding of Cassell’s distinction would assign pain to the physical or
bodily realm and suffering to the emotional or personal realm. This distinction
oversimplifies things because Cassell sometimes discusses the emotional or
psychological content of pain.89 We might also be dubious of this way of formulating the
distinction when we bear in mind that fear and anxiety have been documented to increase
pain, suggesting that one’s emotions can cause a certain amount of pain.90 This suggests
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that pain is not based purely in the physical realm, or that the “physical realm” is broader
than we have sometimes imagined. For Cassell, it also suggests that the longstanding
philosophical distinction between the mind and the body is not tenable. Nevertheless,
pain—when it arises—typically does so as a result of physical malady or dysfunction.
Persons with diseased bodies experience pain. Persons or selves, in themselves,
experience suffering.91 In Cassell’s words, “Suffering occurs when an impending
destruction of the person is perceived; it continues until the threat of disintegration has
passed or until the integrity of the person can be restored in some other manner.” Physical
symptoms might occur in the presence of suffering, but “suffering extends beyond the
physical.”92 We can be in pain without suffering; this would be to experience some kind
of unpleasant sensation. Suffering results from a perceived threat to one’s sense of self.93
I think Cassell is concerned here with a person’s sense of herself as a cohesive whole. In
that sense, his discussion of suffering doesn’t cover all the ways we use the term.
Someone might suffer guilt at moral failings that prompts him to pursue a more
integrated self; in the meantime, he might see such suffering as an integral part of who he
is at the present stage of moral development.94 Cassell clearly has a more specialized
sense of suffering in mind when he talks of a threat to my self, one which applies well to
91
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suffering as a result of illness, especially terminal illness. Pain, while unpleasant, doesn’t
initially threaten to undo my sense of self (though in time it might). Indeed, sometimes
pain is integral to one’s sense of self, if some difficult and painful task informs one’s
selfhood. Natural childbirth, for some mothers, functions this way. But suffering undoes
me. Cassell acknowledges that extreme or uncontrollable pain often leads to suffering,
but he wants to point out that one may have pain without suffering, and, more
importantly, one may suffer without pain.95 Thus, these two related challenges of dying
ought to be considered separately before being considered together.
If Cassell understands suffering as a threat to one’s sense of self, is there a sense
in which dying is suffering on a large scale?96 Unless one denies his condition, the
process of dying includes, in one way or another, the recognition that death—and with it
the end of the self in some sense—is near. Is dying inevitably suffering? For some, it no
doubt is. Cassell’s account sheds some light on the experience of those who are wracked
with grief at the thought that life, in which they have invested themselves in various
ways, will go without them after they are gone. Nevertheless, I don’t think the dying
must inevitably suffer. A fair number of people seem to aspire to, and achieve, a
peaceful death. This implies another limit to Cassell’s account. It may suggest a sense in
which some patients do not see their selves as threatened with disintegration upon death.
Those with certain religious convictions could obviously believe their self will not
disintegrate, even if their bodies do. Others lacking the convictions of traditional faiths
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may still see a sense in which they can carry on—or be carried on—in the lives of loved
ones or projects in which they are invested. And others, as I mentioned previously, may
welcome disintegration. Despite these exceptions, many do suffer in dying. Sometimes
that suffering arises from pain.
Pain
Pain, of course, has a proper and appropriate function. When it serves as an early
warning system, pain preserves us from further physical damage or harm. We quickly
remove a hand from fire as result of the pain we feel. But, when pain arises from disease,
particularly disease that has already been detected, it is no longer serving this kind of
function. The pain from cancer that is pinching a nerve doesn’t give us new information
we can use, other than to seek treatment for the disease. Thus, this kind of pain verges on
being senseless. Few find any use for pain like this.
Is pain an issue the dying still face? One might think that modern medicine can
successfully treat and block pain. However, evidence suggests that pain remains an issue
for the chronically—and terminally—ill.97 One response to severe pain is terminal
sedation. However, this alleviates pain at the expense of denying the dying patient any
opportunity to interact with loved ones at the end of life. For those who don’t want to be
sedated out of community, this option is unappealing. Further, doctors sometimes harbor
suspicions about patients’ reports of pain, or fear creating addiction in patients.
Sometimes patients remain unaware of what more can be done to address their pain. For
these reasons, pain continues to be a challenge the dying might face.
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What is the nature of the challenge of facing pain? Elaine Scarry has addressed
this issue in some detail.98 She begins her book by qualifying what it, or any book on
pain, can do. Scarry claims that physical pain, which is her primary focus, is
inexpressible; the words we use to describe our own or others’ pain do not really do the
pain justice.99 What she’s saying here probably rings more true as one’s pain becomes
more severe and enduring. The more severe and enduring pain becomes, the less
confident we will often feel that we have adequately given voice to our experience. The
pain of a pin prick can be adequately expressed, because it is relatively minor and shortlived. But Scarry’s thesis applies much more readily to the pain of pinched nerves in the
spinal cord, nerves which are tweaked with almost every movement. We can talk about
this pain, but we can’t really articulate exactly what the experience and difficulty are for
those who face it. Having acknowledged this, Scarry goes on to offer the following
claims about pain. First, despite its inexpressibility, or the incompleteness with which we
express our most severe pain, “[t]o have pain is to have certainty.”100 We don’t doubt our
pain, unless, perhaps, we find it called into question by others for whom our pain is not so
certain. Ironically, while pain is a certainty for those who experience it, claims about
pain by others have a measure of dubiousness to them.101 We have to trust those
reporting their pain. If their body language does not confirm their report, doubts creep in.
Thus, one aspect of the challenge of pain in dying is that while the pain is indubitably real
for the patient, it is open to question by others—particularly by health care professionals
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who might fear, sometimes with very good reason, that they have something at stake in
acquiescing to all requests for pain treatment.
Pain changes my relationship to my body. Under “normal” circumstances we
experience our bodies in terms of what Sally Gadow calls “primary immediacy.”102 The
immediateness with which we are our bodies under such circumstances means that we
don’t act “with” our bodies; rather, the body’s acting is our acting, claims Gadow.103 But
pain breaks the immediacy with which our bodies carry out our volitions, intentions, and
actions. Other experiences of physical limitation might prove to be equally disruptive,
but I will focus on pain for now. Pain makes our bodies alien to us and creates an
independent voice for them.104 When in pain, the body and self are set at odds with one
another.105 Scarry points out that the root word for ‘pain’ is poena, from which we also
derive the word ‘punishment.’106 This surely rings true in our experiences with severe
pain. Suddenly we feel as though our body has taken on an agenda of its own and is
punishing “us.” Whereas previously we lived our body—and had no trouble integrating
our bodies into the “we” that we understood as our identity—now our identities are
somewhat set against our bodies, which seem to be both asserting and inflicting
themselves upon us.
This kind of experience can be prompted by things other than pain. Aging also
causes our relationship to our body to change in similar ways. However, this experience
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can be repeated many times in the course of a person’s life. Gadow argues that part of
the human response to a disruption of our “primary immediacy” is to seek a kind of
reconciliation, a new, if somewhat less immediate, harmony between body and self.107
Amputees, for instance, often learn new ways of being and acting in the world, such that
their relatively less capable bodies become, in different ways, the amputee’s acting.
Those who are not amputees sometimes marvel at what amputees do with available body
parts. For example, I am aware that some hand or arm amputees can write, type, or play
guitar with their feet. More commonly, all of us learn to accommodate ourselves to new
limitations imposed by the effects of aging on our bodies. Such reconciliations could
occur throughout one’s life. Indeed, few of us get very far beyond our teen years before
we begin to experience a disruption in the immediacy of body and self. And most do
seem to achieve some kind of reconciliation. Though, at some point the disruptions may
overcome a person’s ability to reconcile. This may be a typical experience for the
elderly. For the dying, I think, the challenge of facing this disruption in the relationship
between body and self is heightened and magnified. To experience my body as dying is
to face a new form of disruption. Scarry defines ‘dying’ as being the realization that my
body can be killed or die; and she points out that physical pain often “intimates” that
death is near.108 To experience my body this way greatly reduces the prospects of
achieving reconciliation of the self with the body. Therefore, we might think of dying as
the final, and thus potentially most severe, disruption of self and body. This makes the
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pain we face in dying—the pain that often prompts this disruption—that much more of a
challenge to face.
Scarry lists the attributes of pain that make this disruption possible: pain’s “sheer
aversiveness” and alien-ness to me; its dissolution of the psychic boundary that normally
“protects” us—by means of mental comfort—from threats outside of us; its “solitude of
absolute privacy with none of the safety;” its capacity to destroy language and thereby
threaten the trust between those in pain and those attending to them; its capacity to
destroy, or severely limit, our perception; its resistance to objectification, so that it can be
named and dealt with; and, finally, its totality.109 “Pain begins by being ‘not oneself’ and
ends by having eliminated all that is ‘not itself.”110 Pain cripples identity and agency.
Pain comes in degrees, and, again, I think Scarry’s claims increase in veracity as pain
increases in severity and duration. The “sheer aversiveness” of a blister doesn’t compare,
except by matters of degree, with the sheer aversiveness of a decreasing lung capacity
brought on COPD (Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder).
That this is true helps us to reconcile Scarry’s discussion of pain with Cassell’s
claims about suffering. Pain, in varying degrees, disrupts the relationship between self
and body. Pain, as a challenge we face in dying, threatens the cohesiveness of our selves,
particularly by setting the body at odds with the self. However, suffering, Cassell argues,
threatens to destroy the self, to destroy one’s sense of identity. Subject to the qualifiers I
discussed above, suffering is a challenge in dying because in suffering we fear that our
whole self is in danger of disintegration. Ironically, Scarry points out that physical pain
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sometimes temporarily relieves mental suffering by making us less aware of the latter.111
Sometimes perceiving a disruption of body and self, secures the knowledge that there is a
self. That would be a consequence of the certainty of pain. But, as Cassell points out,
eventually severe or prolonged pain will lead to suffering, particularly if the patient fears
that the pain can’t be controlled.112
Suffering and the Medical Response
One of the burdens of Cassell’s book, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of
Medicine, is to argue that medicine currently fails to live up to its ancient responsibility to
relieve suffering because of how it conceives disease, illness, and suffering. If true, this
charge represents a first challenge of those who suffer while dying: while being treated
for their diseases and pain, they may not be treated for the suffering that arises from these
conditions. But this claim must be qualified by some additional considerations. First, we
may not want medicine to take on the burden of relieving all suffering. We might think
that medicine ought to have moral limits in the sense that it ought to refrain from
imposing an understanding of well-being which its aims to relieve suffering presume. As
I indicated in Chapter Two (and will discuss more in Chapters Five and Six), someone’s
ground project or his conception of a well-lived life, might lead him to believe that the
moral cost of relieving some suffering is simply too high.
Or, we might think medicine ought not become an institution merely committed
to ameliorating any perceived experience of suffering. This is a contested area in the
philosophy of medicine. One example can indicate the extent of controversy: should
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medicine relieve the suffering of those who believe their physical sex does not match
their perceived gender? Some see no place for medicine in such practices; others see it as
a legitimate extension of medicine’s commitment to relieve suffering. The point is that
patients’ claims of suffering may extend far beyond what medicine typically sees itself as
committed to relieving. Second, some believe institutions other than medicine would be
better suited to relieving some forms of suffering. Various churches, for instance, might
claim that the suffering associated with the contemplation of mortality is their domain
and medicine is ill-equipped to deal with it. In addition to alternative institutions,
personal responses, such as embodying virtues relevant to meeting the challenges of
dying—such as suffering—are another way one may face one’s suffering without
needing or expecting medicine to seek to relieve it.
Cassell might be willing to concede these qualifications. His central concern, I
think, is to argue that medicine does not relieve all the suffering that it appropriately
should. Indeed, he is concerned about suffering that arises from the fact that medicine
dichotomizes bodies and persons, diseases and suffering. Cassell offers the description of
35 year old breast cancer patient to illustrate his case.113 Cassell doesn’t give her a name,
but I’ll call her Joan. Joan receives excellent care for her disease and for her pain. Yet
even as this excellent care is being provided, Joan receives little or no treatment for her
suffering. Because the timing of her relapses coincides, she thinks, with times when she
has become hopeful and eager to go on living, she fears her desire to live, she fears the
effects of certain treatments (including disfigurement, loss of hair, and loss of libido, and
isolation), and she perceives certain social and personal threats concerning what her
113
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future will look like. All of these threaten Joan’s sense of identity and therefore cause
her to suffer. Cassell’s point in discussing this case study is to show how Joan can be
well cared for by medicine’s current best standards, but not be cared for at all where her
suffering is concerned. He thinks this is a function of the way medicine orients itself.
“Disease theory,” around which medicine organizes its care, suggests that
diseases such as breast cancer have a physical basis and that proper treatment of the
disease involves addressing the disruption in the structure or function of physical
systems.114 But Joan’s suffering results not from her physical systems directly; rather, it
comes from her perceptions as a person, as an individual. Her medical care has focused
on treating her malfunctioning body, but it has ignored the repercussions of her diseased
body for her whole self. That Joan’s suffering is somewhat unique to her is an important
point for Cassell. Disease theory teaches doctors to see patients in terms of the
similarities of their physical dysfunctions and symptoms.115 But Joan’s suffering reflects,
at least in part, on her as an individual. (I say in part because I can imagine other breast
cancer patients having a similar set of concerns causing suffering, though Cassell is
surely right that each individual patient’s particular matrix of concerns and fears is
unique to that person.) Contemporary medicine rarely seeks to know or address the
causes of a patient’s suffering. Thus, one challenge of facing suffering in dying is
medicine’s inability or unwillingness—given its current form—to address suffering in a
robust way.
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An alternative challenge might arise were medicine to respond to Cassell’s thesis
seriously. If medicine did begin to systematically seek to address patients’ suffering, as
Cassell wants it to, then some patients might be vulnerable to having their understanding
of their suffering subsumed under a totalizing understanding offered by the institutions of
medicine. Thus, patients might have their suffering, which on Cassell’s argument is an
expression of their person, addressed in terms they find foreign and even threatening.116
Put simply, some may wish to have their suffering addressed by institutions other than
medicine. For those who take this perspective, as I am inclined to, a challenge associated
with suffering in dying might be that medicine is seeking to impose a false relief on it.117
Suffering
How medicine addresses suffering might present a challenge for the dying, but
what is the challenge of suffering itself? Cassell’s account, which has in many ways
defined suffering within the field of bioethics, claims that suffering is a function of
persons who perceive, or fear, that their person—their identity—is threatened. As
Cassell notes, suffering has a temporal element to it. Suffering is about the patient’s
perception of her future.118 Indeed, Cassell’s understanding of suffering may be entirely
prospective. We can’t suffer when we are dead, he thinks, but we can suffer as we
anticipate our death. In particular, the fear is that future events or conditions will destroy
my sense of identity. This resonates with Scarry’s claim, in her subtitle, that pain

116

Something like this concern has been expressed by Stanley Hauerwas, in a lecture at the University of
Tennessee in June of 2001, and by Ivan Illich in Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (New
York: Bantam Books, 1976).
117
In Chapter Six, I discuss how Christians, in particular, might look to resources other than those provided
by medicine for relief of their suffering. Of course, someone needn’t be a Christian to believe she has
resources for dealing with suffering that are beyond or different from those offered by medicine.
118
Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 35.

65

“unmakes” us.119 Pain, which is often a cause of suffering, can become so intense that
we fear it is uncontrollable. At that point, Cassell—echoing Scarry—claims, the
uncontrolled pain will undo us, will take away our identity by making the pain so
immediate, perhaps, that nothing else can be.
Pain is not the only way we can suffer. Because memory is central to one’s sense
of self and identity, the realization that one’s memories might be, or have been, destroyed
would cause, for most, suffering.120 This helps us understand the kind of suffering
encountered by those facing progressive degenerative brain diseases, such as
Alzheimer’s. In this case, the fear will not be unfounded. Whereas I might suffer
because I doubt I can withstand chronic pain much longer, I could be wrong about my
ability to withstand the pain. In this case, the suffering would be based on a misplaced
fear. But if I am diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, the prospective fear of loss of my
sense of identity is not misplaced. If I do not die before the disease takes full effect, then
I will suffer not just from the fear of loss of self, but also from the actual loss of self.
Could I suffer from that, from having lost a sense of self? Perhaps the best way to
interpret Cassell at this point would be to say that what the Alzheimer’s patient suffers
from is a lack of cohesive or coherent sense of self. To have end-stage Alzheimer’s
disease is not to lack all sense of perspective. Rather, it is to suffer from a lack of unified
and coherent perspective. I suffer from the vague sense that I ought to know those in my
room. I suffer from a belated realization that it is my wife whom I have struck, whereas
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earlier I was confused about her presence. In these ways, I suffer—in a way consistent
with Cassell’s sense—from a memory-eroding disease.
The case of Alzheimer’s suggests another aspect of suffering which Cassell
discusses. A sense of self derives in large part from social relations, and social relations
break down somewhat in the face of memory loss. I define who I am, in part, by my
relationships to those around me. Cassell argues that chronic illness tends to remove
sufferers from good standing in their social worlds. Whereas modern medicine—with
disease theory as its organizing principle—tends to fare relatively well in treating acute
illness, it fares less well treating chronic illness, particularly in regard to the suffering
involved.121 Medicine generally fails to predict or relieve the suffering associated with
chronic illness. But this may be due, in part, to the special challenges of chronic illness,
which are related to the socially-derived aspect of the self. Drawing on Arthur Lovejoy’s
claims about the social elements of human nature, Cassell notes that persons tend to have
a desire to be approved of (“approbativeness”) and a desire to be considered superior or
worthy of imitation (“emulativeness”).122 These define, in part, our understanding of
how to relate to others. But the chronically ill often fail to meet just these kinds of
standards because of their conditions. Concerning Lovejoy’s second element, if we
desire to be considered superior, then someone must be inferior by comparison. One
class of people who typically receive that designation in our social context is the elderly.
In our society, taking many medications, especially painkillers, having one’s weaknesses
on display, and having one’s bodily functions—or lack thereof—on display cause many
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others to withhold their social approval.123 This leads to suffering—to a sense of threat to
oneself—when chronically ill patients internalize this lack of approval. Self-conflict
results from a person’s desire for social approval which conflicts with the chronically ill
patient’s uncooperative body or mind.124 Gadow’s discussion of the disrupted harmony
between body and self is relevant here. But another important part of this aspect of the
challenge of dying well comes from one’s social circumstances. Those chronically ill
who face a long decline toward death will be vulnerable to suffering from social
disapproval. In a previous section, I noted that illness carries a social stigma, and this can
be a source of great suffering. This might be mitigated by a more intimate social
community—one’s family, perhaps, or a community of fellow sufferers. Of course, these
same people might contribute to a sense of social disapproval, and their disapproval may
prove more devastating than that of relative strangers. Either way, the threat, or reality,
of being at odds with the broader community remains a cause of suffering.
Suffering challenges us in many ways. How we respond to the challenge of
suffering is also fraught with some difficulties of its own. Stan van Hooft points out that
many respond to suffering by trying to find some meaning in it in an effort to make it
“bearable or acceptable.”125 This project doesn’t always succeed, which raises the
specter of meaningless suffering. However, even if successful this project is in tension
with the claim that justifying the suffering of others, or oneself, by giving it meaning and
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purpose “is to denigrate the other by making him a means to some purpose.”126 The story
told about the purpose of the suffering takes a privileged place over the sufferer who is
just a piece in a larger puzzle, a means to some larger end. In this latter approach, the
suffering must be meaningless in order not to threaten the “authenticity” of the sufferer.
Suffering challenges us both by possibly being meaningless and by the possibility that we
should somehow not want it to be otherwise.127
Suffering via Pain and Pain via Suffering
I would like to conclude my discussion of pain and suffering by briefly
considering the interplay between the two. I have already mentioned one connection
which is fairly straightforward. Cassell points out that uncontrolled pain, or pain that we
fear is uncontrollable, leads to suffering.128 We suffer from a belief that we cannot
maintain our sense of self under this pain but that the pain will not be ameliorated. The
elemental experience of pain “like this” is inconsistent with our perceptions of who we
are or hope to be. Or, perhaps a patient fears a future—maybe permanent—in which his
identity is very closely connected with the pain he is currently experiencing. In a case
like this, pain leads to suffering.
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But suffering also causes or exacerbates pain. Cassell calls to our attention the
way that fear, panic, anger, or suffering may aggravate our pain.129 He attributes this to
the meaning we assign to our pain. If we interpret the pain as having an especially grave
significance—the recurrence of cancer, or a heart attack—the pain is more severe.
Cassell points to Dr. Henry Beecher’s observations during World War II concerning
severely wounded soldiers who would be sent home for recovery versus those whose
wounds would not take them out of the fight. The former, observed Beecher, seemed to
experience less pain.130 The fear of returning to a battlefield fraught with dangers seems
to have affected soldiers’ perceptions of pain. As a kind of fear, suffering can also
exacerbate pain and make it more severe.
The Length of Dying
Another challenge of dying in our contemporary medical context involves time.
Advances in medicine, sanitation, and immunization have brought increasing life spans,
but these advances have also led to a longer dying period. A historical contrast illustrates
this point. James C. Riley reports that in the period 1600 to 1870 dysentery, cholera,
influenza, plague, smallpox, typhoid fever, and tuberculosis were the main causes of
death.131 With diseases like these, the longest one was usually sick was eight weeks.
Many diseases killed, if they were going to be fatal, much sooner than that.132 Daniel
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Callahan reports that death from infectious disease with “rapid onset and quick crisis”
was the norm for this historical period and earlier.133
Today we have very different fears about our dying. Cancer, on average, takes
around three years from time of detection to kill, if it is fatal. When Alzheimer’s disease
is detected, it will take around seven years to kill. Likewise, heart conditions and
diabetes can take many years to do the cumulative damage that leads to death.134 The
contrast between 130-400 years ago and now is striking. For many of us, this means we
can anticipate a prolonged period of dying. We will have more time to face all of the
other challenges discussed in this chapter. And, we will have to navigate the murky
waters between living with a condition and recognizing that we are dying from it,
something our earlier ancestors very rarely faced.135 So a prolonged dying is another
challenge we face. Associated with this, we might fear that we could die “too late.” A
“postmature” death would be one in which a patient senses that her life’s work has
finished but her life lingers on. This is not so much a challenge of dying as of entering
the end stages of life and finding that one’s death does not correspond with one’s
preparedness to die. In general, the challenge we face here is that our dying will likely
take a long time. Statistically, we can certainly expect to be dying for much longer than
those from earlier eras. Thus, as noted above, we can expect to deal with all of the other
challenges that make dying well difficult for longer periods of time.
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“Technological Brinkmanship”
Daniel Callahan coined the term “technological brinkmanship” to describe the
challenge of using technology as long as possible to preserve a good quality of life
without pushing one’s use of it into a realm where the patient is harmed.136 This is not so
much about dependence on technology, discussed above. Rather, this is about a patient’s
decisions about how far to go in engaging technology. The challenge comes in that a
patient could opt for one treatment too many. For instance, the use of a respirator up to a
certain point might preserve one’s chances of leaving the hospital at a later date. But at
some point, the possibility of being weaned from the respirator vanishes and one is
trapped. Some fear a time when technology will no longer be serving them but will have
taken on ends of its own. At this point, the technology preserves life against the patient’s
wishes or entraps the patient in a way of life that—if it could have been anticipated—
would have been avoided. The sense of being trapped could take a number of forms. If a
patient believes PAD not to be a morally legitimate option, she may also be leery of
discontinuing life-preserving technology when it seems to be effectively preserving (even
unwanted) life. If a patient passes a “natural” point for forgoing technology in hopes that
her condition will improve, she is effectively betting that it will or must accept that it
won’t and that her dying is being prolonged by the partial effectiveness of medical care.
The care is good enough to preserve life but not in the form or at the level of capacity that
the patient hoped for. The concern of technological brinkmanship may not be so much
about legal rights to refuse treatment as it is about a patient’s sense of where she is in the
dying process, her psychological outlook on it. The challenge for patients whose care
136
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requires the use of medical technology is to discern the proper limits of such technology.
Of course for some patients there will be no such limits, but many will want to stop using
medical technology some time before all possible options have been exhausted and the
patient has been caught up in the technology.
Some might seek to circumvent the challenges of technological brinkmanship by
writing advanced directives, but this presents challenges of its own. The act of trying to
identify how far I will want to go in my use of technology presumes that my wishes and
interests will remain stable. Donna Dickenson argues that this presumption is dubious at
best.137 In particular, she argues—and points to empirical evidence supporting the
claim—that we cannot successfully know our wishes concerning the use of various
technologies at the end of life in advance of actually living that stage of our lives. But, of
course, if we wait to make such decisions we run the original risk of going too far and
winding up legally incompetent and technology-dependent. Thus, technological
brinkmanship and attempts to evade it with advanced directives present yet another
challenge to the dying.
Other Psychological Challenges
Elizabeth Kubler-Ross brought to popular consciousness the psychological
challenges that surround dying. She discusses denial, isolation, anger, desperation, and
depression as typical psychological attitudes the dying face.138 Rosenfeld, et al, add
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hopelessness to the list of psychological challenges the dying may face.139 Each of these
can be difficult to bear. In some cases such psychological responses might represent a
“normal” human reaction to mortality. In other cases, such responses might result from
the particular ideals we hold as a culture and as individuals. When dying challenges
ideals or ideas I consider to be central to who I am, it may be natural to respond with
anger, denial, or depression.140
Additionally, one might suffer, in Cassell’s sense, from the threat to one’s identity
that can accompany such psychological responses. A sense of isolation and depression
might certainly cause one to fear the loss of her sense of identity. How one responds to
such suffering is not always obvious. Anti-depression and anti-anxiety medications can
effectively relieve clinical depression for many, but they sometimes leave one with a
sense of confusion about one’s true self.141 How ought I respond to my mortality? Is this
response an expression of me or is it the drugs talking? Would the value of retaining
what I think of as my “true self” outweigh the challenge of dealing with sadness that may
verge on clinical depression? Such questions constitute an additional kind of challenge at
the intersection of our psychology and our dying.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have surveyed the variety of challenges that patients can face
when dying in our contemporary medical context. While not every patient will face all of
them, I believe most patients will face at least some of these challenges. A patient’s
perception of a condition as a challenge might depend on his conception of a good death.
How one conceives of a good death will obviously affect what look like obstacles to
achieving that good death. The kind of person a patient becomes in her pursuit of a good
death will also affect her perceptions and experiences of the challenges of dying. To
embody certain virtues would be to dispose oneself not to notice or perceive as a
challenge a condition that might greatly vex someone else with a different set of
dispositions. Virtues are one way of responding to the challenges of dying. In the next
chapter, I will discuss emotion-dispositions and virtues in order to show how they are the
kind of feature of moral psychology that could enable a patient to respond to the
challenges of dying. In the chapter following the next, I apply those claims to an
examination of specific virtues and sets of virtues that can enable a person to achieve a
good death, given her conception of what it means to die well.
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CHAPTER IV
EMOTIONS AND VIRTUES
Introduction
This dissertation deals with virtues and their role in pursuing a good death.
Having looked at different conceptions of a good death and at the challenges patients face
when dying in our contemporary social and medical context, I will now begin to explain
how virtues could help us to die well. In this chapter, I look at some characteristics of
virtues that I will draw on in the next two chapters when discussing how virtues can
actually help a person to die well. This chapter argues for some theoretical claims
concerning virtues and the role that emotions play in them.
In what follows, I stake out a position concerning virtues and, in particular, the
roles that emotion-dispositions play in virtues. Emotion-dispositions are dispositions to
have certain emotions. Those who embody virtues will also embody emotiondispositions that are a part of the virtue in question. For example, to have the virtue of
patience is to also have emotion-dispositions such that the agent experiences emotions
consistent with the actions for which the virtue of patience calls. I shall argue for two
main theses concerning emotions as a part of virtues. My first main thesis in this chapter
is that these emotions constitute a leading benefit to the virtuous agent. I offer some
arguments to try to make this claim clear and compelling.
My second main thesis in the chapter is that emotions facilitate practical wisdom
and enable us to make practical judgments. Emotions, as a kind of perception or
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“appearing as” (this is Aristotle’s description142), have a number of roles in the moral life.
One role of emotions is to enable the virtuous agent to appropriately perceive situations,
relative to the agent’s other moral convictions. Assuming they are proper to the virtue in
question, emotions attune the agent to morally salient features of a set of circumstances.
This attunement is relevant for making wise practical judgments about how to act or
respond.
Virtues and Vices
Much of what I will say concerning virtues and the relationship between emotions
and virtues applies equally well to vices. Both virtues and vices are character traits which
are partially made up of dispositions to have certain emotions. While the moral
psychology I will describe applies equally well to most virtues and most vices, a typical
expectation in moral philosophy is that we should be able to distinguish between them.
In this section I will offer a formal distinction between virtues and vices that serves to
define, formally at least, each of them. Because it is only a formal definition of a virtue,
this account will be unsatisfying in some ways. It will not tell us which actual traits are
virtues and which are vices. In Chapter Six, I will briefly discuss the prospects of making
more substantive distinctions between virtues and vices when considering engagement
between moral traditions.
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The formal definition is this: Virtues are those traits that are constituent in being,
or aids to becoming, the sort of person that one believes will tend to live a good human
life and/or admires for any of a variety of reasons.143 Vices, by contrast, are constituents
in being, or aids to becoming, one of what may be a variety of kinds of people whom one
believes cannot live well and/or one finds unadmirable.144 Vices may also be traits that
hinder one from achieving the sort of character one believes will tend to enable one to
live well and/or one finds admirable.
By way of comparison, I would like to briefly discuss some other conceptions of
virtue and how they are similar to and different from my own. My definition borrows
from Aristotle, so I will begin by considering his view and then go on to consider some
views held by contemporary philosophers who also borrow from Aristotle to one degree
or another. Aristotle says that, “every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state
and to perform their functions well.”145 I take this to contain some central claims for
Aristotle about what a virtue is. A more commonly cited definition of virtue for Aristotle
may be found a few pages later where he says that a virtue “is a state that decides,
143
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consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that
is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it.”146 The
“state that decides” and the suggestion that reason accords with how the “prudent person
would define it” both seem to me to depend on the virtuous agent being “in a good state”
and functioning properly. The prudent person who decides well is the one who is in a
good state, so I take a lot of the weight of Aristotle’s definition of virtue to fall on that
concept. That concept (being in a good state) can be interpreted in terms of two other
concepts Aristotle employs. The first is the notion of the fine or the noble (kalos), as in
Aristotle’s claim that a brave person must be “moved by the fine, not by compulsion.”147
The other concept is happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia), which Aristotle associates
with living well.148 His conception of the fine seems to define, in part, the kind of person
he believes could be happy. My own definition of a virtue is broadly in line, I believe,
with that of Aristotle, although I do not narrow my focus in this dissertation, as Aristotle
perhaps does, to one particular understanding of a well-lived life. I take the concepts of
the fine and of happiness to be ingredient in most people’s conceptions of a well-lived
life, although there will, as I acknowledge, be many different conceptions of them.149
The concept of the fine may track more closely with my claim that virtues are
constitutive elements in a person one finds admirable, and the concept of happiness may
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track more closely with my claim that virtues enable one to become the kind of person
that tends to live well. However, as in Aristotle, I think these concepts often overlap in
terms of their practical implications for adopting moral exemplars, about which I will
have more to say later.
Alasdair MacIntyre writes, in many ways, as a contemporary Aristotelian. His
definition of a virtue is as follows: “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession
and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to
practices and the lack of which prevents us from achieving any such goods.”150
MacIntyre’s definition occurs within the context of a discussion of a number of other
concepts, namely practices and internal goods, which fill out his definition. Without
going into much detail about these interrelated concepts, we can say that MacIntyre is
also engaged in a neo-Aristotelian project. The practices he is most interested in are
those he believes are related to a well-lived life. For instance, he discusses friendship as
a practice, which Aristotle also esteems highly in his conception of a good human life.151
While MacIntyre draws on a variety of interrelated concepts to build up a definition of a
virtue, he clearly means to use this definition in the service of conceiving of, and arguing
for, an understanding of a well-lived human life. My own definition does not make use
of his sub-concepts but more generally asserts the place of virtues in living well by
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making them constituents of the kind of person who tends to live well and/or is
admirable.
Rosaline Hursthouse is another neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist. She defines a
virtue as “a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well.”
She breaks that definition down into three sub-theses about virtues: “The virtues benefit
their possessor;” “The virtues make their possessor a good human being;” and “The
above two features of the virtues are interrelated.”152 Hursthouse’s first sub-thesis
suggests that she believes the virtuous can live well. Her second sub-thesis suggests that
in order to live well (because she claims the two sub-theses are interrelated) one must
become a certain kind of person. My own view parallels hers in that I separate becoming
the kind of person one believes tends to live well and the well-lived life. I discuss the
connections and disconnections between these two concepts in a number of places below.
A good human being may also be an admirable one, as in my definition above. And, as I
noted just above in my discussion of Aristotle, I, like Hursthouse, believe that being a
good or admirable human being and flourishing are interrelated. Hursthouse may think
that interrelation always applies (since she offers no qualification on sub-thesis three),
whereas I endorse the claim that sometimes the admirable moral exemplar does not
flourish in the short-term, and may not flourish for indefinite periods of time. I revisit that
theme below.
Christine Swanton pluralizes many different aspects and aims of virtues. She
defines a virtue as follows: “A virtue is a good quality of character, more specifically a
disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent
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or good enough way.”153 Swanton later qualifies this definition by arguing that virtues
must respond in a plurality of ways to a variety of different kinds of object.154 Thus,
what makes a character trait a virtue is not one thing (such as that it promotes flourishing)
but a variety of different things. When I claim that a virtue is a trait constituent in being
the sort of person one believes will tend to live a good human life and/or one admires, I
have sought to make room for Swanton’s claim. Although I allow that there are many
different conceptions of the kind of person who will tend to live well and/or be admired
held by many different people, I assume that at least some, maybe many, of those
conceptions will allow for the kind of pluralism for which Swanton argues. Everyday
people seeking to become good and live well are perhaps more inclined to recognize a
plurality of values and kinds of recognition, as Swanton argues for, than theorists
attempting to make tidy moral theories. In saying that I adopt a conception of the kind of
person I believe tends to live well and/or admire, I am saying that I adopt a conception of
a person who has a variety of different aims the sum total of which add up to usually
tending to live well. But, as I discuss below, I may have moral aims that do not directly
benefit me. They are a part of my conception of the kind of person I aspire to be, and I
aspire to be that kind of person simply because I find such a person admirable.155 On
some occasions—maybe many occasions under certain circumstances—I acknowledge
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that the variety of different moral convictions that are a part of my conception will not
necessarily lead directly to flourishing. I may still “live well” in some sense that depends
on my convictions about the kind of person I should be, the kind of person I could not
imagine not being. But I do not flourish in a straightforward, everyday sense of the word.
I take it that something like this conviction is shared by Swanton.
My own definition requires further unpacking. First, we should distinguish
between the virtuous person and the well-lived life. I claim that, generally, people adopt
and pursue a conception of the kind of person they believe will tend to live well and/or
admire. So, part of the reason for adopting and pursuing a particular conception will be
that one believes this enables her to live well, although later I will discuss some issues
related to adopting a moral exemplar as someone one finds admirable. Being virtuous is
no guarantee of living well because, as Aristotle notes, the virtuous agent would also
need some external goods.156 Aristotle, however, cautions against placing too much
focus on one’s fortunes concerning external goods because, although human life “needs
these added,” “activities in accord with virtue control happiness.”157 Some conceptions
of a well-lived life might strictly equate being virtuous with living well, but I think most
conceptions understand contingency to be a fact of life and so make the more modest
claim that the virtuous tend to live well. This raises the question of how to assess the
condition—from a eudaimonistic perspective—of a virtuous agent who, on some
conception, does not appear to be living well. That is, he does not appear to be happy or
flourishing. I will address that question later in this chapter.
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The contingent connection I have drawn between being virtuous and living well
may suggest that there is a standard for living well that stands apart from, even above, the
virtues. It may seem that someone could live well without having any virtues. Following
Aristotle, I will reject this claim. As the above quotation from Aristotle shows, he
believes that happiness results from activity in accord with virtue, and I agree. While the
external goods might be necessary, for most, to live well, they alone would not be
sufficient.158 We require virtues as well, and I have defined virtues as those character
traits that enable us to become the kind of person we believe will tend to live well and/or
admire. In saying this, I am claiming that living well requires that the agent be personally
engaged in pursuing goods rather than being the passive recipient of them. Virtues are
the names we may assign to the form one’s character takes on because the moral agent
believes that someone with this form of character is the kind of person who can live well.
My claim is that eudaimonism is, in large part, about what kind of person one is. The
virtues are descriptors of that kind of person. Another way of saying this is that virtues
are constituent elements in the agent’s becoming the sort of person she believes can live
well. The virtues are virtues, in part, because they make someone—or, define someone
as—the sort of person who can live well. The moral agent begins with a conception of a
certain kind of person (who can live well and/or is admirable), and then asks what virtues
define that person. In conceiving of, or reflecting on, the kind of person who can live
well, the moral agent may consider a variety of different aspects of this person’s
character. Highly respected people are usually respected for a variety of different
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reasons. What makes a moral exemplar attractive is her overall character as well as the
implications this has for the kind of life she will tend to lead.
In Chapter Five, I will discuss the necessity of personal engagement for dying
well and offer some arguments for why this personal engagement is necessary. As I have
defined them, virtues are the shape one’s character takes when one pursues a well-lived
life. We cannot control much of what happens to us, but we can exercise some control
over the kind of person we become.159 Virtues identify an individual’s aspirations
concerning the kind of person she hopes to become in the course of living life. Virtues
are necessary in the sense that an individual’s character will take some shape that
contributes to the overall quality of her life. However, virtues are necessary but not
sufficient. The word ‘tend’ in my definition indicates my agreement with Aristotle that
external goods are often ingredient in enabling a person to really live well. Having
virtues tends to enable someone to live well; lacking virtues tends to militate against
being able to live well. My use of the word ‘tends’ is meant to peel apart two concepts
that might otherwise be run together. On the one hand, there is the kind of person the
agent aspires to be. On the other hand, there is the life that this “kind of person” lives.
The moral agent aspires to be a certain kind of person in part because of the kind of life
she believes this person tends to live, but she can have other reasons as well. These
reasons would involve a moral agent’s finding an exemplar admirable. Below I will
discuss how one’s metaphysical convictions or one’s adoption of a moral exemplar could
also inform one’s convictions about the kind of person one ought to be. But at least part
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of the attraction is that this is the kind of person one believes tends to live well. The
virtues are constituent elements in the “kind of person.” I claim that becoming a certain
kind of person—with the virtues constituent in being this kind of person—tends to enable
one to live well.
A wide variety of traits of character or personality might contribute to becoming
the kind of person who can live well.160 However, I will focus on a few features that
should strike most readers as the features most relevant to virtues as character traits.
These are dispositions to act (including habits or regular practices), emotions (including
dispositions to certain emotions and to the feelings that often—but not always—
accompany such emotions), patterns of perception (of situations, persons, events,
narratives, etc.), and a capacity for moral imagination.
The Distinction Between Virtues and Vices
The formal distinction between virtues and vices assumes a number of claims that
should be made clear. First, eudaimonism in ethics is concerned with living well, or
living a good human life.161 I have a particular concern here for someone’s becoming a
particular kind of person—achieving a certain character—such that one will tend to live
well. The best we can hope for in pursuing eudaimonia is that we should become the
kind of person we believe is capable of living well and that luck, or providence, should
go our way as well. But we cannot control the latter; we only have influence over the
160
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former. Bad luck may hinder one from achieving certain aspects of a well-lived human
life. Some have conceptions of a good life and an accompanying vision of good
character that are more dependent on the hope (or optimism) that misfortune does not
befall them. In my chapter on good deaths, I discussed one conception—avoiding the
experience of death—which depends heavily for its success on the outcome of events that
are beyond any person’s control (such as dying suddenly in one’s sleep). Other
conceptions of a good life (and death) focus more on resilient character and, while they
don’t wish for misfortune, individuals who accept those conceptions could handle it
better and, perhaps, have sought to become the sort of person who could handle it
relatively well. The Stoics are a relatively extreme example in history of the latter. To
one degree or another, though, all must reckon with the fact that much of our lives is not
in our control. Our vision of what kind of person it would be good to become is often
influenced by this fact.
A second claim to call attention to in my formal distinction concerns the place of
virtues in the character of individuals hoping to live good human lives. In some cases,
virtues will be constituent parts of that vision of a certain sort of person. For instance,
many would probably agree that some version of patience (both with oneself and with
others) constitutes part of the kind of person who can live well. Embodying patience as a
virtue entails a kind of graciousness and respect toward others who for a variety of
reasons “impose” on us. If part of a well-lived human life involves having this kind
regard for others, then that value is captured in the moral agent’s becoming a certain sort
of person—namely a patient one. The character trait is a component of the kind of
person he aspires to be. In other cases character traits might only be aids to achieving
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such character. For instance, although some would see inquisitiveness as a character trait
constituent of a good life, others might see it only as a means to some other end.
Inquisitiveness might only be useful to some insofar as it leads them to pursue what are
eventually settled convictions about certain important matters. By contrast, others see
inquiring about and rethinking important matters throughout their lives as an important
component of a well-lived life. On that account, inquisitiveness would be a constituent
feature of this person’s conception of the kind of character necessary to live well.
I suspect that more often than not virtues are those traits that we think of as
constituent elements of our conception of the kind of person we believe would tend to
live a good human life and/or admire, rather than merely a means to becoming that sort of
person or living that sort of life. On some occasions it might be tempting to see virtues as
merely useful, as good character traits for getting us other things that we want (such as a
well-lived human life or a good death). This suggests that virtues are merely means to
what it is that we really value. But this view of virtues is reductionistic. Most of the
time, what we think of as virtues are those traits that characterize the sort of person we
believe tends to live (or die) well. This places the focus first on the kind of person we
seek to become, and second on the life that we live as a result of pursuing and becoming
that sort of person. We can have relatively greater control over our becoming a certain
kind of person than we can over the kind of life we live as a result. Although the kind of
person we seek to become is informed by our beliefs about the life this kind of person
tends to live. To put this claim in terms of the concerns of this study, a good death is one
in which we become a certain sort a person who we believe is capable of dealing with,
and will in fact tend to deal with, death well. If this is the case, virtues are not merely a
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means to achieving something else, such as a “good death.” Rather, a good death is one
in which we embody the character we believe will tend to enable us to die well. On my
account the virtues are not only useful as a means to another end; they are part of the end.
In some sense, the virtues characterize the end.
A third comment on my distinction between virtues and vices involves the idea of
moral formation. Nobody spends their whole life having already become the kind of
person who can live well. Indeed, most people for whom moral growth and development
are important spend much of their lives in the process of undergoing such formation.
People growing into physical and developmental maturity often begin to form, or
unconsciously assume from influences around them, ideas about the kind of person it
would be good for them to be. They then spend much of their lives pursuing and refining
that vision. Those most attentive to the shape of such growth will take an interest in how
various habits, practices, discrete actions, and other sorts of activities shape them as
persons. Certain habits, practices, etc., as well as encounters with new exemplars of the
kind of life we think is worth pursuing will cause us to alter some aspects of our vision.
MacIntyre uses the term ‘quest’ to describe a journey of moral formation in which what
the seeker is after is not yet “adequately characterized.”162 However, I believe many
people have a more concrete vision of the kind of person they would do well to become
than MacIntyre suggests with his “provisional conclusion about the good life for man”
which is that the good life is one “spent in seeking for the good life for man….”163
MacIntyre’s “provisional conclusion” suggests that a good life is about always seeking
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and refining one’s understanding of what it means to live well. This presumes the seeker
has some idea of what is worth further consideration and what is worth refining. Thus,
one’s conception of a well-lived life, however provisional, must include something more
concrete than the formal claim that a good life is one spent looking for the good life.
Perhaps one way to read MacIntyre on this point would have him saying that a well-lived
life is one where the agent is consciously or unconsciously refining her vision. The
continual “seeking” MacIntyre describes may just be refinement or extension into new
territory of some original conception.
Where do people get their original conceptions of the kind of person who will
tend to live a good human life and/or be worthy of admiration? The moral traditions that
people grow up in and around can do a great deal to influence a person’s perception what
this ideal type of person might look like. The sense in which I discuss moral traditions
here is that of local instantiations (and variations) of what are often—though not
always—larger, historical traditions, which often inform people’s perception of and
outlook on the world and inform people about what it would mean to live well in the
world. Religious traditions certainly inform many people’s conceptions of the kind of
person who could live a good human life. Small towns and close knit communities
sometimes embrace “traditional” ways of living and in doing so give local instantiation to
(at least parts of) some larger tradition.164 Political affiliations and activities, educators,
and apprenticeships might also play a role in shaping a person’s vision of the kind of

164

A discussion and example of this can be found in the collective work of Wendell Berry. Berry is an
agrarian farmer-writer who is keenly aware of and a strong proponent for a particular body of “local
wisdom.” For a non-fiction discussion of this, see Wendell Berry, What Are People For? (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990); for a fictional account of similar themes, see Wendell Berry, Jayber
Crow (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 2000).

90

person they would do well to seek to become. To a certain degree various habits or
practices we are socialized into also shape us and set limits on our mental horizons
concerning worthwhile lives.
Linda Zagzebski offers the notion of moral exemplars as a source of our ideas
about what would be a good sort of person to become. Her suggestion could apply to any
of the above cited sources. As she says, “[w]e do not have criteria for goodness in
advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness.”165 She likens her argument for the
primacy of moral exemplars for our understanding of moral goodness to Kripke’s and
Putnam’s arguments for the theory of direct reference in order to fix the reference of our
words. For Kripke and Putnam, gold is whatever that is, even if we don’t yet know its
essence.166 Her “direct reference” theory of goodness is especially on target concerning
the formation of conceptions of a well-lived life and of the kind of people who could live
them. For our understanding of this kind of goodness, personal exemplars are especially
relevant.
Moral Exemplars and Eudaimonia
Zagzebski’s work contains two ambiguities on which I would like to comment in
order to clarify aspects of my own position. She cites empirical evidence from
psychologists concerning the degree to which humans learn through imitation.167 The
psychologists are making descriptive claims about how much humans do in fact learn this
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way. Zagzebski seems to want to draw from this claims about how humans ought to
learn their concepts of moral goodness. Thus, there is an ambiguity between the
descriptive and normative claims. Zagzebski touches on this ambiguity when she claims
that, since we all learn a great deal through imitation anyway, we might as well imitate
the best exemplars we can find.168 This, after all, is what makes us think of them as
exemplars in the first place. Why would someone seek to imitate a person whom they
don’t find to be attractive in some sense? The descriptive and normative claims blend
here. We don’t just learn through imitation; we learn through imitation of those we take
to be good exemplars. Of course this raises the question of which exemplars we ought to
follow. Zagzebski is happy to acknowledge a kind of pluralism concerning moral
exemplars. However, she also believes that the best way to adjudicate disputes among
moral traditions (though she does not use that term) represented by moral exemplars is
for the exemplars themselves to engage in discussion.169 She likens moral exemplars to
ideal agents (akin to ideal observers), and argues that, since each embodies a kind of
practical wisdom relative to a particular tradition, these exemplars are best suited to
engage in conversation aimed at resolving disagreements between traditions.170
Zagzebski’s work also implies a possible ambiguity concerning whether moral
exemplars are appealing in a eudaimonistic sense—that is, the exemplars are attractive
because they are living good all-around lives—or in a more restricted “moral” sense—in
which the exemplars are attractive because they so successfully embody “moral”
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principles.171 Virtue-based approaches to ethics have often contained this ambiguity.
Virtues can enable their possessors both to live “morally” and to live well.172 But there
may be occasions where a tension arises between those two results. On those occasions,
the “function” of the virtue might become ambiguous.
I am imagining this latter ambiguity would occur to Kantians for whom the
“counsels of prudence” and the “commands of morality” are sometimes different.173 I
want to embrace this latter ambiguity by saying that for many a good life is, at least
partly, a “moral” life. In the words of Jeanine Grenberg, “[s]urely, whatever one’s
account of happiness, it is reasonable to expect that achievement of virtue would be
considered one important component of it. Failure to achieve any level of moral
competency would, in any event, be a genuine obstacle to happiness.”174 What makes
moral exemplars eudaimonistically attractive is, at least in part, their commitment to
“moral” ideals, in the form of virtues that constitute a portion of their character. While

171

In this paragraph (and below) I will put the term ‘moral’ in quotation marks when my use of it is more
akin to that of someone like Kant. For Kant morality concerns objective, categorical duties we have to
ourselves and others. My own understanding of morality is more general and encompasses (more or less)
everything that might be included within a discussion of what would enable humans to live well.
172
These two aspects of virtues are taken up in Gregory W. Trianosky, “Rightly Ordered Appetites: How to
Live Morally and Live Well,” American Philosophical Quarterly 25:1 (January, 1988): 1-12. Trianosky
argues that virtues can enable the virtuous to live morally and to live well.
173
This distinction is discussed in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. See Immanuel
Kant, Practical Philosophy, Mary J. Gregor, trans. and ed. and Allen Wood, intro. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996). There Kant distinguishes “rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or commands
(laws) of morality. For, only law brings with it the concept of an unconditional and objective and hence
universally valid necessity, and commands are laws that must be obeyed, that is, must be followed even
against inclination. Giving counsel does involve necessity, which, however, can hold only under a
subjective and contingent condition, whether this or that man counts this or that in his happiness;…”
(69/4:416).
174
Jeanine Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue
(New York: Cambridge UP, 2005), 22-23. I agree with Grenberg in the quote cited but would like to note
that part of what makes these matters complicated is the fact that different approaches to morality will have
different understandings of the moral domain. In other words, the difference between moral and “moral”
virtues is not an uncontested one.

93

we might be dubious of the overall attractiveness of strict “moral” saints,175 moral
exemplars can be attractive because they balance “moral” concerns with a broader
concern to become the sort of person who can live a good overall life. Nevertheless, this
dissertation is more focused on achieving a good death than pursuing a “moral” death.
While many conceptions of a good death will incorporate “moral” concerns, my focus is
not primarily on the “moral” concerns. Nevertheless, I am committed to the claim that
the virtues, as constitutive elements of one’s becoming the sort of person who will tend to
live and die well, are necessary (if not sufficient) to die well on most accounts of a good
death.176
Thus, the two apparent ambiguities in Zagzebski’s work which are discussed here
are related in the following way. We tend to imitate people we admire or whose lives we
find attractive. But in many cases, part of the attractiveness of these exemplars is their
“achievement of virtue” because a lack of “moral” competency would seem to hinder
happiness. The “moral” aspect of exemplars is part of what attracts us to them. Why
does the “moral” aspect of exemplars continue to be part of our attraction to them?
Ultimately, this question leads us back to the metaphysical origins of value, about which
there are many disputes. This topic is beyond the focus of this study. However, for my
purposes here, it is enough to point out that a great many moral exemplars are admired in
part because of our attraction to the specifically “moral” aspects of their character. Not
all exemplars are hailed for their “moral” character. It may be that some would want to
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pursue a vision of a good life (and death) that ignores, disregards, or discounts the
concerns of others. And for some conceptions of a good life, it may even be possible to
discount altogether the shape of one’s character. On such a conception, a good life
consists of good external circumstances that I am lucky enough to fall in to. But I believe
most people believe that their identity, the kind of person they become, is a necessary
part of their living a good life. That’s to say that most people probably have some limit
on what identity- or character-deforming activity they’d be willing to take up in order to
secure good external circumstances.177
To throw one’s hat in with those in the history of philosophy who have endorsed a
eudaimonistic ethic is to open oneself to an objection which has special relevance to this
project.

The eudaimonistic approach may be helpful for answering questions such as

“Why be moral?” But it has some theoretical liabilities as well. Kant is a useful dialogue
partner here in identifying a significant liability. Jerome Schneewind points out that,
although he has sometimes been taken to do so, Kant does not ignore happiness or
eudaimonia. Although Kant believes that “moral worth is the supreme good,” he does
not believe it is “the perfect or complete good.” The latter “requires that happiness be
distributed in accordance with virtue.”178 Of course experience tells us (and Kant) that in
fact happiness is not distributed this way. For Kant, this leads to an opposition between
the “counsels of prudence”—what would lead to eudaimonia or happiness—and the
“command of morality”—what I must categorically do, whether it would lead to my
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happiness or not. When we are forced to choose, Kant believes we ought always follow
the commands of morality. They are categorical commands, and do not depend on our
desiring to do so, or perceiving them to be in our interest. Kant’s response to this issue
can also be reconfigured as an objection he has to approaches to ethics which do not
follow this route. The general objection is this: assuming that one does not say that the
“moral” thing to do is whatever is also prudent for my personal happiness, how does the
eudaimonist deal with conflicts between “prudence” and “morality” (to borrow Kant’s
terms)? More particular to this project, can one’s commitment to embodying certain
virtues ever lead to a more painful—an unhappier—death than one might otherwise
experience? For example, assisted suicide might address many (though not all) of the
potential challenges to dying. But if one’s commitment to one’s virtues leads one to
resist this option, then is there a conflict between virtue and prudence (as Kant uses the
latter term)? How do we explain the possibility of conflict between virtue and prudence,
and how can we explain why someone might choose to maintain virtue in such a
circumstance if the original reason for seeking out such virtues was because they would
help one to live well? In this case, the implications of the same virtues means that one
will live less well than one who has no such scruples.
This objection gives me an opportunity to distinguish between my own
conception of the place of virtues in a well-lived life and other possible positions. I have
claimed that virtues are those traits constitutive in or necessary for becoming the kind of
person who will tend to live well and/or is admirable. Aristotle famously claims that a
good life will require, in addition to virtue, an element of good luck, what he describes as
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external goods beyond our control.179 But we cannot have any assurance that such luck
will come to us. Rather, all we can do is become the sort of person we believe tends to
live well and/or find admirable, assuming some luck comes to us. The point is that in
emulating a moral exemplar I am endorsing a certain kind of person, a kind of person I
think it is good to be. This is different from merely seeking to live a happy life or
seeking good life circumstances. The connection between this kind of person and living
well is that generally I believe such a person is best disposed to live well. However, as I
have discussed it above, my admiration for the moral exemplar goes beyond the kind of
life they lead. I admire and seek to emulate the person not just their life. Having become
such a person, I cannot change my character on a whim. Personal change involves, for
the “deepest” aspects of our character, a kind of conversion from being—and seeing the
world—one way to being and seeing something very different. Because people cannot
simply change who they are and how they see the world to fit with what is advantageous
at the time, there will sometimes be a sense of conflict between how someone’s virtues
dispose him to see the world and what look, at least in the short-term, like prudent actions
to the contrary.
Still, unless we are Stoics for whom it is purportedly a matter of indifference how
life circumstances play out, part of what attracts us to moral exemplars is the connection
we believe exists between the kind of person one is and the kind of life this enables one
to lead. A Stoic might say that maintaining such character guarantees that one will live
well by definition. But I am not endorsing that claim. My construal of the situation
would be something like the following. I am committed to achieving a certain sort of
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character, and I would like to have certain things go my way in life such that I can live
out that character in relatively favorable conditions. However, I understand that life will
not always present such favorable conditions. I may live in social or political conditions
that are in tension with my own conception of a well-lived life, or I may just have bad
luck and fail to secure the external goods Aristotle thinks we need to flourish. Will I
forego commitments entailed by my character in order to pursue or maintain maximally
favorable conditions? No; for the deepest held commitments, I cannot realistically
conceive, in terms of my immediate psychology, of being other that the kind of person I
am seeking to become. Thus, I am prepared to endure less than favorable conditions—I
am prepared to pursue virtue despite its “imprudence”—because I cannot imagine being
other than that kind of person.180 This helps us to understand how a eudaimonist could
make sacrifices for moral reasons, or even become a martyr. This construal also helps us
to understand how a eudaimonist could be prepared to undergo certain forms of suffering
at the end of life.
The above account requires two further things in order to be successful. First, we
need clarification of how the moral agent initially forms and then retains her convictions
about the kind of person she believes she ought to be, even if the social conditions around
her don’t support it. She cannot have gotten these convictions by the more direct route of
asking, “What kind of person is likely to flourish in this society?” Second, we need
clarification of the sense in which we are still talking about living well or flourishing if
one’s convictions about character put one at odds, practically speaking, with the
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dominant values in the surrounding society or one’s current circumstances. Concerning
the first question, I will appeal, again, to Zagzebski’s notion of a moral exemplar. If a
moral agent grows up with and forms her sense of the kind of person who can live well
under the influence of one or more moral exemplars, she will have acquired a sense of the
kind of person she ought to be regardless of how well rewarded such a person is in her
society. This is to say that the moral exemplar is admirable whether or not she is
rewarded for it. MacIntyre’s notion of the “quest” suggests that such a conception will be
subject to critical reflection. Presumably, some of the most stable and enduring
conceptions of flourishing moral agents will be supported by metaphysical claims.
Aristotle, for instance, defends his claims about the kind of person who can flourish with
references to human nature.181 Likewise, Aquinas grounds his conception of the good
person in God’s character, a position that Linda Zagzebski has recently defended.182
Human nature and God’s character form metaphysical foundations for two different
conceptions of the kind of person one ought to be in order to live well. Social conditions
or bad luck might not support such a conception, but the fact that it is a metaphysical
conception—a purported truth about the nature of reality, regardless of whether that truth
is widely acknowledged—means that moral agents might believe such a conception is the
right one or the only true one to pursue even if it doesn’t lead to flourishing in the short-

181

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a24, 1167b29, and 1170a13
Aquinas’s view is indicated in passages such as Summa Contra Gentiles, Vernon J. Bourke, trans.
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), III.1, cc. 18-22. Zagzebski’s claim is defended
in Part II of Divine Motivation Theory, pp. 185ff. Both Aquinas and Zagzebski suggest an account of
flourishing in which an agent’s ability to flourish depends on her becoming the kind of person who is
capable of friendship with God. On Aristotle’s account of character friendships, on which both Aquinas
and Zagzebski draw, friendship requires some likeness of character (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book
VIII).
182

99

term or near future.183 If the agent believes the metaphysical claims that support the
conception of the flourishing agent to be true, then she will believe that she could not, in
good faith, seek to be otherwise. As noted above, there are two sets of reasons to seek
virtues. One set of reasons concerns the conviction that the kind of person I seek to
become tends to live well, but the other set of reasons concerns either a commitment to
certain metaphysical claims or a strong commitment to emulate a valued moral exemplar.
While the metaphysical account might provide the best explanation for why someone
would retain a conception of the admired agent under adverse conditions, I think we
should recognize that sometimes people maintain their loyalty to a conception even
without strong metaphysical claims. For instance, a son might be so shaped by his
father’s example that he cannot seriously contemplate being otherwise, even if he realizes
that his current social circumstances rarely reward such a person.184
Whether through metaphysical or more mundane sources, the moral agent in
question believes she ought not be other than the kind of person she is seeking to become.
Yet her circumstances don’t reward her, so in what sense is she flourishing?185 The
answer to this question will take us into the central theme of this chapter which is the
place of emotions and emotion-dispositions in virtues. I will offer an answer to this
183

To speak of social conditions supporting a conception of a good person or a good life is to speak of
social conditions which reinforce one’s individual convictions. That is, the convictions are widely shared
and readily agreed to. Under those conditions, there would be little cognitive dissonance concerning
holding such convictions.
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When I say that he “cannot seriously contemplate being otherwise,” I mean to say that he doesn’t see
acting “out of character” as a realistic option psychologically. He cannot imagine being who he sees
himself to be and doing something contrary to this self-image.
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view. Recall from above that Kant believes that the perfect or complete good would require that happiness
be distributed according to the merits of one’s virtue. Kant believes this is not the case on earth but will be
so in the afterlife. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral
Philosophy, trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 214-20.
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question that relies on a sketch of a theory of the nature of emotions that I will develop
more fully below.
A longstanding tradition in philosophy sees emotions as a kind of perception.
Aristotle describes emotions as a kind of “appearing as” in his Rhetoric.186 As a kind of
perception, emotions shape our ways of experiencing the world. Someone with a strong
disposition to anger has his experience of the world and life events shaped by that
emotion. If Freud is right about the possibility of suppressed emotion, this can be true
even when the person in question doesn’t consciously feel her emotions. Even in this
circumstance, the emotion shapes our experience, this time doing so at a subconscious
level. Emotions also encapsulate certain of our moral values. Robert Roberts opens his
book on emotions with a lengthy quotation from Anthony Trollope’s novel The Prime
Minister which describes an unsavory character. Roberts then observes that “Trollope
here unmistakably sketches a man of momentous moral defects, just by indicating his
patterns of emotional responsiveness….”187 Our emotional responses indicate the things
that we value: what makes us angry, what makes us joyful, what makes us sad, etc. Thus,
certain of our core convictions about how to value the world are carried in the forms of
perceiving the world that we commonly call emotions. Many of these emotions are a part
of various virtues as well (and some virtues may just be dispositions to experience certain
emotions appropriately). For instance, many will agree that a man who does not become
angry upon learning that his wife has been assaulted or that his child has been abused is
morally defective. Somehow, other things being equal, anger would be part of a morally
186
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Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 1.

187

101

appropriate response to such news because we assume that the man values his wife and
children in a way that colors his perception of what’s happened to them.
Part of what a moral agent might learn from a moral exemplar is patterns of
emotion. Imitating the practices of the exemplar will very often lead to having the same
patterns of emotional response. Parents of young children will know that their offspring
regularly imitate not just the actions of the parents (and other role models) but also the
emotions. Thus, the moral agent, who takes from the exemplar a conception of the kind
of person who can live well and/or is admirable, will also likely take from the exemplar a
pattern of emotion-dispositions which will reinforce, support, and in some ways
encapsulate the values shared by agent and exemplar. The values contained in the
emotion-dispositions will shape how the moral agent perceives the world. All of this
suggests that a moral agent who embarks on a course of moral development toward
acquiring a set of virtues she believes will enable her to live well will also have her way
of perceiving the world and her place in it shaped by the emotion-dispositions that are a
part of the virtues in question.
This puts us in position to answer the question we started with: how can a moral
agent flourish in adverse social conditions or with bad luck? The moral agent’s character
is shaped by her virtues and so her identity is also strongly interwoven with the values
captured by her emotion-dispositions and virtues. Such an agent could not, on pain of
denying her identity, seriously imagine being other than the kind of person she is. Her
values, emotion-dispositions, and identity form an internally coherent whole, and one
important ingredient in flourishing is the degree to which she can maintain the unity of

102

this whole.188 If this conception of the kind of person who tends to live well and/or is
admired is supported by the metaphysical claims discussed above, then she still has
reason to maintain this conception even in the face of adverse circumstances.189
Consider two examples to illustrate this. Once a year Sports Illustrated magazine
devotes its regular feature “Faces in the Crowd” to “men and women who embody the
ideals of sportsmanship.” The following account was offered of Halsey Copp of Poland,
Maine: “Halsey, a senior and member of the Poland Regional High golf team, assessed
himself a one-stroke penalty when his ball rolled from its original spot as he was
preparing to putt during the state championship—even though the roll was unnoticed by
competitors and officials. His team lost the Class B state title by one stroke.”190 Copp
does not flourish in the sense that he wins a state golf title. He achieves no recognition
for his sports abilities per se. However, is there another sense in which he does flourish?
Without knowing anything further about Copp or his decision to assess himself the titlelosing stroke (perhaps he agonized over the decision or only assessed himself the stroke
because he thought he would be caught if he hadn’t), we can imagine a version of Halsey
Copp who cannot imagine not maintaining his integrity in these circumstances, who
188

This statement requires some qualification. One cannot flourish if one’s conception of a good person is
called into question by any circumstance which may undermine one’s ability to live well. However, this is
not to say that flourishing moral agents, as I’ve conceived them, could never reexamine their views. When
reexamination is called for would be a judgment the agent has to make, and these are tough judgments to
make precisely because we make judgments partially on the basis of emotion-based perceptions which are a
part of our identity.
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In addition to the metaphysical claims supporting one’s conviction that she ought to seek to become a
certain sort of person, there is another consideration. Empirically, it is simply a matter of fact that people
can’t just change large portions of their character quickly. Thus, if I form my character and then find
myself in circumstances where I won’t tend to flourish, I don’t really have open to me the possibility of
simply seeking to become a different sort of person in the moment. But this will, of course, depend on the
original strength of my character. Weak character is that which does change in adversity. As I say in the
previous footnote, an agent must make a judgment about when she seek to strengthen her character and
when she should consider revising it altogether, even if this will take time.
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could not celebrate a victory he didn’t earn with integrity, etc. In this sense, the imagined
Copp flourishes in that he maintains the coherent whole discussed above. His actions are
consistent with his values, emotion-dispositions, and identity. He may agonize over
having lost the title, but his emotions are such that he can be happy with himself for his
decision and his integrity.
A second example comes from the movie Black Hawk Down, which is based on
true events. During a 1993 raid gone bad, a US military helicopter is shot down in hostile
Mogadishu, Somalia. Some soldiers in another helicopter notice some of the crew are
still alive as a crowd of Somalis are moving in. They request—two different times in the
movie—permission to be dropped off to defend the crew of the downed helicopter. The
commanders refuse at first and tell them that they don’t have the resources to support
such a maneuver, meaning it would be a nearly “suicidal” mission. The two soldiers,
mindful of the Army creed about not leaving a fallen brother behind, again insist on being
put in to do what they can. They are granted permission and both die fighting off
Somalis, although their actions saved the life of the one crew member who had survived
the crash. My interpretation of their actions is that they could not imagine not doing what
they could to rescue fallen comrades, even at the expense of their own lives.191 Their
emotion-dispositions led them to perceive the situation in such a way as to make it
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I have used the language “could not imagine not doing…” in describing both Copp’s and the soldiers’
situation. Obviously, this is not literally true. No doubt each of them is cognitively capable of imagining a
world in which he did otherwise. The sense in which I use the phrase appeals to the sense of identity held
by each of the actors in these examples. I have hypothesized that each held so strong a sense of the kind of
person he is or was that doing other than what they did was not an option in these circumstances. The
demands of their character were such that other options were excluded for this kind of person in this kind of
situation. It would be too identity-damaging to do otherwise.

104

exceedingly difficult for them to remain in their relatively safe position while their
vulnerable comrades’ lives were threatened.
These two examples suggest a kind of “internal” or intra-personal flourishing that
can occur despite unfavorable external circumstances. Copp and the two soldiers flourish
in that they continue to maintain their identity and character despite adverse conditions.
They flourish in the sense that they act in accord with their conception of a good, or
admired, person. If they have good reasons (metaphysical or mundane) for believing that
the kind of person they have sought to become is a good kind of person to be, then they
can flourish in the sense that they successfully embody the desired character under
adverse conditions. Each of them might wish, other things being equal, to be able to
manifest the same character and identity in other circumstances where they might also
flourish in an external or circumstantial sense. But having found himself in this set of
circumstances each seems to realize that doing other than what his character and identity
demand of him would lead to a loss far worse than what the circumstances present.192
Emotions and Virtues
The account I have just offered concerning “internal” flourishing can be explained
in terms of emotions. Copp and the soldiers may struggle in some sense with what their
moral values call upon them to do, but they do not suffer from a certain kind of emotional
dissonance. Their convictions about the kind of people they ought to be such that they
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The case of the soldiers, in particular, indicates how we might understand the case of the martyr. The
martyr does not seek death, but she believes that when she is forced to choose between her life and core,
identity-forming convictions (many of which may find their expression in her character), she ought always
to choose to remain faithful to the latter. Preserving her life at the cost of faithfulness to those convictions
would be so damaging to her identity that she will not accept that “deal.” Martyrs flourish (and are often
venerated) in that they remain faithful to their convictions and their identity even in the face of highly
adverse circumstances. I believe something similar is true of Copp and the soldiers.
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can live well shape and are at least partially contained in their way of perceiving the
world. I have argued that these perceptions are related to emotions and emotiondispositions. In what follows, I discuss and partially defend an account of emotions and
then apply that account to support two claims about the place of emotions in virtues. My
two claims are these: well-formed emotions constitute a leading benefit, for the moral
agent, of having virtues, and emotions facilitate and are an important component in the
making of wise practical judgments.
Emotions
What are emotions? A long tradition in philosophy has viewed emotions as forms
of perception. Aristotle described fear, a typical emotion, as “a certain sort of pain and
disturbance out of the appearance of an impending bad thing.”193 The perception of some
object as dangerous or “bad” is the emotion of fear. Emotions have intentional objects;
there is something the emotion is about, something that prompts the emotion. Often, but
not always, we feel our emotions. We can feel them in our minds—in the form of
psychic pain or pleasure—and we can feel them in our bodies, as when, for example, fear
causes the heart to race, the palms to sweat, the stomach to tighten, etc. William James
tried to argue that the object of an emotion (what we perceive) is the changes we typically
experience in our bodies.194 But many recent emotion theorists have disagreed with
James by noting the strong cognitive component of emotions.195 In a section titled, “Why
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Emotions are Not Bodily States,” Robert Roberts identifies a number of the reasons many
contemporary theorists have rejected James’s claim: bodily states are not about anything
the way that emotions are, bodily states do not always have the kind significance for
human lives that emotions do, and distinctions among bodily states are nowhere near as
discriminating as our ordinary language is about the differences between emotions such
as envy versus anger, or resentment versus pride.196 While bodily states are certainly
associated with and connected to emotions in important ways, the recent focus on the
cognitive aspects of emotion has attempted to relocate the central focus of emotion
theories.
Cognitive approaches to emotion theory might go too far, however. Robert
Solomon and Martha Nussbaum have both argued that emotions either are or are partially
made up of judgments.197 Robert Roberts argues against this view. He offers an account
of what judgments are and then discusses some claims that contradict the view that
emotions are or are partially judgments. For instance, “the propositional content of some
full-fledged emotions is not assented to by the subject of the emotion” as would be the
case with a judgment, “the very same judgment that is supposedly identical with an
emotion is sometimes made in the absence of the emotion,” and “emotions are subject to
voluntary control in a way that they would not be were they judgments.”198 These
arguments presume a conception of what judgments are, which Roberts argues for and

196

Roberts, Emotions, 152-54.
Robert C. Solomon, “On Emotions as Judgments,” American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1988): 183191 and The Passions (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1977) and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of
Thought and The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
198
Roberts, Emotions, 84. The arguments are fleshed out on pp. 89-103.
197

107

uses to defend the claim that emotions as a kind of perception are not necessarily
judgments.199
What then does it mean to say that emotions are a kind of perception? According
to Ronald de Sousa, “Emotions are a species of determinate patterns of salience among
objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies.”200 Emotions are a way of
perceiving a situation or a set of circumstances and making meaningful sense of it. In a
similar vein, Roberts defines emotions as “concern-based construals.”201 Roberts defines
construing as attending to or dwelling on some aspect of a situation.202 It is to see one
thing in terms of another.203 In organizing such things as perceptions and inferences so
that they are meaningful, emotions do not simply project an interpretation onto a canvas
that is open for whatever we care to project onto it. To see one thing in terms of another
is not simply to lay our projected meaning onto an otherwise random field of information
or impressions. Rather, a construal is, as Roberts points out, a characterization of the
object of our attention.204
Connecting Emotions to Virtues
At this point, I would like to draw a connection between emotions and virtues and
then, by way of a comparison, identify some ways that the virtuous benefit from the
emotion-dispositions that are a part of their virtues.
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For the fully virtuous, according to Aristotle, virtues involve both actions and
emotions.205 Further, Aristotle notes that the feelings that are a part of virtues should
conform to certain standards. “But having these feelings at the right times, about the
right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the
intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue.”206 The virtuous will be
disposed not just to act but also to feel in certain ways, appropriate to the virtue in
question. Thus, they will have emotion-dispositions which are appropriate to the virtue
in question.
But Aristotle also discusses some other conditions of character. Three, he says,
should be avoided: vice, incontinence, and bestiality. The contraries to these are virtue,
continence, and what he describes as a heroic, divine sort of virtue.207 I want to focus on
the contrast between virtue and continence, both of which, Aristotle thinks, are worthy of
some praise. In particular, I want to argue that a way to conceive of the difference
between the continent and the virtuous is that the latter have well-formed emotiondispositions which the former lack.208 When I speak of the virtuous having well-formed
emotion-dispositions, I mean that they have an internally consistent set of dispositions
that cohere with their judgments. The continent have emotions, but these are not
necessarily consistent with one another and do not cohere with their judgments about or
knowledge of what they ought to do. In focusing on two morally praiseworthy states I
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am setting aside the possibility of being immoral or amoral for now. Below, when I talk
about how the virtuous benefit from their emotions, it will be in contrast to the condition
of continence. A separate argument altogether may be necessary to show why the
virtuous live well as compared to the vicious. In this dissertation I am not making that
type of argument since, for now, I am willing to consider a plurality of different
conceptions of a good life and a good death.
The continent perform the right action, but do so from a state different than that of
the virtuous. “The continent person seems to be the same as one who abides by his
rational calculation….” He “knows that his appetites are base, but because of reason
does not follow them.”209 One way to articulate the difference between the continent and
the virtuous is in terms of emotions. As noted above, being virtuous, for Aristotle,
includes have the right sorts of feelings felt in the right sorts of ways. The virtuous have
feelings that are consistent with their actions and judgments about what to do. When he
discusses the continent, Aristotle focuses on the continent person’s ability to rationally
calculate and know the right thing to do even though his “appetites” and the emotionperceptions on which they are based don’t support that conviction. So, while continence
is worthy of some praise, it is clearly a stage of moral development below that of full
virtue.
What marks the difference? Aristotle’s account suggests the difference lies in the
emotions and the emotion-dispositions. Even if it is not fully faithful to all the different
aspects of Aristotle’s moral psychology, we can imagine a way of distinguishing two
stages of moral development (continence and virtue) in which the central difference lies
209
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in the area of emotions. Given the account of emotions that I have laid out above, we can
envision a virtuous person whose emotion-dispositions lead her to perceive or construe a
situation in which virtue is called for in very particular ways. The concerns incorporated
into her construal of the situation will shape how she perceives the situation and her place
in it. This will result in a kind of coherence between the virtuous agent’s actions and
emotions. To have a virtue, on this account, is to perceive a situation in a particular way
and to act in a way that is consistent with one’s perception. However the continent, who
may know the right action to perform, lack such perceptions of the situations.210 This
would be one way to account, in part, for the “appetites,” or contrary desires, that
Aristotle says the continent must not follow.211 They know the action is correct, but they
don’t have the perceptions (shaped by the right concerns) to “see” the situation as the
virtuous do. To put this in terms of Roberts’s account of emotions, the continent lack the
concerns which shape construals, or, if they have those concerns they only have them at a
distance. We might say they know of the concern but don’t actually fully own or
embrace it. So, they must exercise a measure of willpower in order to act in a way
contrary to their perception of the situation.
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Virtues, Emotions, and Benefits
This account can be used to highlight some ways that the virtuous benefit from
their emotion-dispositions. To discuss some of those benefits, I will use the following
story. Imagine two characters, Alan and Beth, who, at different times, find themselves
behind an elderly person in the checkout line at the grocery store. The elderly person is
moving very slowly and shows no particular concern about wrapping up his interchange
with the checkout attendant in a hurry. Imagine, too, that this is taking place in the early
evening just before Alan and Beth are, individually, due to go home to prepare supper for
guests. Alan is continent while Beth is virtuous. Both of them know that the situation
calls for them to act patiently. Alan self-consciously avoids tapping his fingers
impatiently and letting out exasperated sighs although he feels like doing so. He
perceives the situation impatiently, but he acts patiently. He knows that the elderly
deserve respect and that one way to show such respect is by not becoming, or at least not
acting, impatient. He knows this, of course, not on the basis of his emotions which cause
him to perceive the situation as Beth does. Rather, he knows this because he has been
told, and believes, that he ought to act patiently towards the elderly. He hopes, over time,
to become the sort of person who sees the elderly shopper with patience, but for now he
doesn’t. So, he does the next best thing and acts patiently.
Beth, by contrast, really is virtuous. She knows that the situation she faces calls
for the virtue of patience and her patient actions flow from the emotions that are also a
part of this virtue. She has taken up and internalized the concerns central to the value of
patience as a virtue and these concerns inform and shape the way that she perceives the
elderly shopper. Her actions follow accordingly. In some sense, there is a difference
112

between Alan’s and Beth’s actions. Beth’s actions are characterized, in part, by the
emotional state from which they arise, whereas Alan’s actions are in tension with his
emotions. Thus, Beth’s are patient actions, while Alan is acting patiently. But for our
purposes here, imagine that to all appearances the outward act or set of acts is the same
for both of them. The difference lies in their emotions and emotion-dispositions.
“Borrowed” Motivation
How does Beth benefit from her emotions? Because Beth is disposed to have
emotions consistent with the overall value of patience, she can more or less directly
perceive the goodness of the patient actions called for. Her perception, in terms of
emotions consistent with patience, motivates her to patient action. Zagzebski, who
articulates an account of emotion similar to, though not exactly like, the one I have
discussed above, says that “[a]n emotion is motivating because of the combination of its
affective component and its intentionality.”212 She notes that both Hume and Aristotle
believed that the affective component is necessary to motivate action.213 Roberts also
agrees that emotions are motivating. An emotion, he says, “serves as a sort of lens in
which general concerns are focused into more specific desires, and as a sort of rational
stimulus by which disposition concerns become occurrent desires….”214 The “affective
component” is bound up with the perception, which is shaped by concerns the moral
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agent has.215 In light of this, we can say that Beth derives at least a significant part of her
motivation to act as she does from the emotions which are a part of her virtues.
Alan, by contrast, must “borrow” his motivation. He knows what he ought to do,
but he does not feel it the way that Beth does. Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to
say that Alan may be feeling any of a number of different conflicting emotions. In any
case, what he lacks is a unified set of emotion-dispositions related to the virtue of
patience. Lacking this “affective component,” he has to muster other sources to replace
this as his source of motivation. He might be motivated to perform good acts in hopes
that habitual good acts will shape his emotion-dispositions.216 But then he is borrowing
from his general desire to grow morally in order to be motivated to act well on this
occasion. And while he is still undergoing this moral development, his motivation to
perform this act does not stem from the emotions associated with the virtue in question.
Thus, this action is somewhat artificial compared to Beth’s. Alan may simply exercise
willpower. In doing so, he is doing what a more virtuous agent like Beth perceives to be
the right act to perform. In any case, he lacks the emotional formation that would enable
him to perceive (and to feel) that this action is a good one to perform. So, he “borrows”
his motivation from those who do.
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But Beth is clearly in a better position compared to Alan here. She faces no
internal dissonance between what she knows she ought to do and how she perceives, or
feels about, the situation. She has no intra-personal conflict here, as Alan does. Her
motivation is her own in the sense that she perceives and feels the goodness of what she
also knows she ought to do. So, she benefits from the emotion-dispositions that are a
component of her virtues.
It may be that someone could have a mix of good and bad emotions and
accompanying motivations. Such a person would not necessarily need to borrow
motivation from someone else. He would have the motivation along with contrary
motivations. How does Beth stand in comparison to this person? I tend to think that
Beth is still better off because she is unified in a way that allows her to avoid emotional
dissonance, or conflict between her emotions (which do the motivating). Certainly she is
better off if she desires to be so unified and avoid the conflicting motivations found in
this other person. The other person whom I have imagined will, at least, need some
strategy and skills of will power for managing these conflicting motivations.217
Unity of Self and Character
The above argument suggests that, in addition to Beth’s benefiting from the fact
that she “owns” her motivation as opposed to having to borrow it from elsewhere, Beth
also benefits from a kind of intra-personal unity. She benefits from being a unified self,
and she faces little or no disharmony or conflict within herself. But before exploring this
benefit, I would like to offer a few qualifiers. First, we do well to recognize that unity of
self should be measured on a relative standard, not an absolute one. Complete unity is
217
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hard to come by. We might think that in a world fraught with many seemingly
competing and incompatible goods that complete unity of character would be undesirable
or artificial. Second, this standard does not necessarily distinguish between the virtuous
and the vicious. Some vicious agents may be as unified as the virtuous are. As noted
above, my attempts to articulate the benefits that the virtuous derive from their emotiondispositions are in the context of a comparison between the virtuous and the continent.
Thus, I am not, by appealing to this standard, attempting to distinguish the virtuous from
the vicious. I am only trying to show that the virtuous benefit from their emotiondispositions in a way that is not open to the continent who lack the proper emotiondispositions.
The ancient philosophers thought of unity of character as a key ethical standard.
If one’s foundational moral beliefs are incoherent or inconsistent, this introduces division
within the self which leads to a loss of singular identity (assuming that one’s value
commitments are part of the constitution of the self).218 While the ancients offered some
complex metaphysical arguments for the unity of goodness, I will not explore those here.
I am inclined to think that if this benefit has traction today, it will be because of how the
benefit plays out in the virtuous agent’s life. Commenting on ancient ethical theories,
Julia Annas observes that, “[t]here is also a push towards unification that comes when the
agent articulates why he is virtuous.”219 Achieving a relative unity of character and
identity is one reason why one might pursue virtue, and it also constitutes a benefit to the
virtuous agent.
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Gregory Trianosky describes something like unity of self this way: “To have wellordered affections, a mind ‘well-compos’d and easy within itself,’ is just to find upon
reflection that one has positive higher-order feelings towards one’s own emotions.” By
contrast, he describes a lack of such unity as follows:
To have first-order emotions that consistently and substantially
conflict with one’s higher-order feelings is to lead a seriously
divided affective life. A life in which one’s feelings about the
world and about others are a constant source of anxiety, anger, and
resentment against oneself is to that extent not a life we prize and
encourage from a removed or general point of view….220
Trianosky appeals to a set of “higher order feelings” as a perspective from which to
evaluate our first-order emotions. We might think of these as second-order perceptions
of our perceptions. He describes unity of self or character in terms of a coherence
between our basic (or “first-order) emotions and the “higher order feelings” that perceive
those basic emotions. The unified self perceives the various objects of emotion in the
self’s affective, perceptual world in a coherent fashion. The concerns taken up in one
kind of emotion-disposition cohere with concerns taken up by other emotion-dispositions,
as well as with other beliefs, attitudes, commitments, and convictions (other aspects of
character or personality). And, when one reflects on (or perceives) her concerns and
emotion-dispositions, she can construe them in a “positive” light because they have the
kind of coherence among themselves I’ve just described.
All of this has a positive ring to it. It seems right to say that a person who
embodied this kind of internal coherence would flourish relative to those who lack it or
have less of it. And Trianosky has described this unity of self in terms of emotions and
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feelings. Can we draw a closer connection between the idea of unity of self or character
and the emotions that make up at least part of a person’s character? The idea is that if
Trianosky is right to talk about unity of self in terms of internally coherent emotions and
perceptions of those first-order emotions, then at least some of the benefit we gain from
being unified selves arises from having internally coherent emotions. In other words,
how closely connected are the concepts of a self and emotion?
Roberts offers the following attempt to draw a close connection between the two.
He begins by pointing out that “[a] self is a construct of agential powers, mental and
physical dispositions and attributes, relationships (personal and nonpersonal), and past
actions and relevant events.”221 In addition to being centered in a particular body and
mind, the self “has relational and narrative properties”.222 A good biography of a self
will tell some external facts about the person in question (where she was born, what she
looks like, who she’s related to, etc.), but it will also probe deeper for the cares, concerns,
convictions, etc. that make the person who she is. Close to the center of the self, claims
Roberts, is “a set of organizing cares—attachments to persons, interests in projects, the
concern to survive, the concern to be well thought of….”223 These concerns are, of
course, very often captured in emotions. If I have concerns regarding my children, often
that concern manifests itself in my having certain emotions towards my children. Roberts
says, “Being concern-based construals, a person’s anger, hope, gratitude, or
embarrassment gather together, focus, and actualize some concerns (which may be
central to the personality) in terms of some concepts and models for viewing the world
221
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(which are often of ethical relevance). The subject’s emotions embody her projects,
attachments, and commitments….”224
Of course, someone might object that certain beliefs and convictions could also be
at the core of one’s self, and those need not be emotions. By way of response, we might
question the degree to which such a belief or conviction is really at the core of one’s self.
We talk about a person who really feels the weight of his convictions, and in doing so we
imply that deeply held convictions will be felt. They will form our way of perceiving or
construing the world. But concerns taken up consistently in that sort of way become
emotion-dispositions insofar as they lead us to construe our world in light of those
concerns. This implies that emotions are at, or near, the core of the self. Another
response to the objection would be to concede that some, though not all, of the elements
at the core of one’s self might not be emotions at all. For my purposes here, it is enough
if some significant part of my identity is constituted by my emotions. Roberts’s account
suggests just that.
So far I’ve assumed something that should be made explicit. I’ve assumed that
the moral concerns taken up in the full inventory of virtues held by the virtuous person
are consistent with one another. They form a coherent whole. This would seem to be a
safe assumption to make of the best conceptions of complete virtue. If that’s true, the
person who embodies such virtues enjoys a greater unity of self because the emotions that
partially constitute such virtues form an internally coherent personal perspective on the
world and what is valuable in it. That is, the person enjoys a unity of self or character
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that arises from having well-formed emotions vis-à-vis her virtues. This is supported by
the assessment of Julia Annas:
the intelligent person [her term for the practically wise person] will not
have to fight his feelings, for in any area his disposition to make
certain judgments will have developed along with his disposition to
have appropriate reactions. And since in obvious ways having the
appropriate attitude favours the making of the judgments, and vice
versa, the person with developed practical intelligence will be a person
whose attitudes and emotions are in harmony with his judgments….225
Someone might ask why we should want to be unified selves. Perhaps it
simplifies the affective life, but at the cost of perceiving reality in its multi-orbed light.
As I noted earlier, the world is filled with competing goods, and we might think the wellformed person will be the one who feels properly ambivalent about her commitment to a
variety of incommensurate goods. I agree the world contains many different kinds of
competing goods, and I think a well-formed person ought to be able to appreciate this,
even feel the weight of it. Still, I believe that those with virtues benefit from having the
kind of emotional formation that comes with those virtues.
One possible objection to this might come from the perspective that we ought not
want to be unified selves, but rather that we ought to be divided selves, divided according
to the diversity of goods and practices to which we find our different selves attracted.
Richard Gale portrays William James this way. The “divided self of William James” is
part scientist, part moral agent, part mystic, and part artist.226 The contrast here is
between Gale’s portrait of James as a divided self, motivated in part by a Promethean
desire to “have it all” and my claim that the virtuous benefit from unified character, even
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if such character allows the virtuous to appreciate a diversity of goods.227 Should we
aspire to be divided selves or unified selves pursuing a diversity of goods? I claim we
ought to pursue the latter to the degree we are able. Below I will offer an argument
aimed at securing that conclusion. Even if this argument is not finally persuasive, I
would like to note that the unity in question would still be a benefit to those who find it
attractive, even if I cannot prove that the unified are objectively better off.228
Emotions, Practical Wisdom, and Unity of Character
To explain why, I’d like to offer an argument about how emotions facilitate wise
practical judgments. Practical wisdom involves being able to discern the good in this
particular circumstance. Practical wisdom is assisted by the other virtues.229 The other
virtues contribute an ability to perceive particular goods in that those virtues involve
emotion-dispositions which constitute a way of construing, or giving order to, the
situation where some good is in question. Emotions work, Ronald de Sousa believes, by
limiting for a time and focusing the range of information to which we attend.230 This is
something that the most logically consistent and information-rich machine could never
do. Logic works as a set of parameters on our thinking, but it never guides us positively
in terms of how to focus our attention. “No logic determines salience: what to notice,
what to attend to, what to inquire about.”231 Thus, the morally relevant emotions that are
part of virtues function as a kind of attunement to the various goods related to the virtues
and emotions in question. They limit and focus our attention. This enables the virtuous
227
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to make wise practical judgments and thus, to live well. “Acting in the light of a
conception of how to live requires selecting and acting on the right concern.”232 While
not crediting emotions with the role I am proposing, John McDowell clearly recognizes
the importance of the function in question for practical wisdom. “It is by virtue of his
seeing this particular fact rather than that one as the salient fact about the situation that he
is moved to act on this concern rather than that one. This perception of saliences is the
shape taken here by the appreciation of particular cases….”233 McDowell claims that the
perceptions in question are not codifiable; they are not the result of following discrete
rules for action. Rather, they are critically habituated patterns of perception which the
virtuous embody via the emotion-dispositions which make up a part of their virtues and
which the virtuous use to make wise practical judgments.
To be a unified self is to have virtues and emotion-dispositions that enable one to
perceive one’s good from an internally coherent, unified perspective. One will still
appreciate multiple and competing goods but do so from a coherent, unified perspective.
For example, imagine that I believe that each of the following contribute in one way or
another to what will amount to a well-lived life for me: my commitments to my marriage
and children, my own ongoing moral and spiritual development as a person, my physical
fitness and well-being, various kinds of friendships and different forms of community,
my professional development as a philosopher, etc. Most days I can’t fit all of these in to
the degree that I’d like. That’s my concession to the concern that the world contains
competing goods. But I think I’d be better off to the degree that I could see, appreciate,
232
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and make judgments about these various goods from the unified perspective of being this
particular unified self. By contrast, I might live in such a way that I identify myself more
with my professional ambitions when those are going well and I’m fighting with my
wife, or I identify myself more with my running when that’s going well and my kids
don’t seem especially interested in me or appreciative of my efforts with them. That kind
of person is shifting and has an inconsistent perspective from which he sees the value of
each of these competing goods. Similarly, if William James cannot judge from a unified
perspective how to invest himself, if scientific knowledge looks more valuable to the
scientist James but mystic awareness looks more valuable to the mystic James, then he is
ill-equipped to make such a judgment. From the perspective of practical wisdom, of
actually making judgments that balance diverse goods, we are better off to the degree we
are able to embody a unified perspective. That unified self can be described in terms of a
set of coherent emotion-dispositions. Virtuous agents flourish to the degree that they
embody such emotion-dispositions.
A critic advancing the most recent objection might come back with the response
that even if we do not desire it to be so, the character of late modern and postmodern life
demands that we be divided selves. Most contemporary societies and cultures shape us to
be divided selves by the nature of the kind of socialization they impose upon us. Thus,
we have to embrace ourselves as divided selves. That may be. But if it is true, two
things follow. First, to the degree one is a divided self—that is, to the degree that one is
not “one”—she must give up any aspiration to a unified and coherent inquiry into and
pursuit of a conception of what is good for her over time. Such a moral agent lacks any
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unified “I” that can pursue what is good for that “I.”234 So be it, the divided self (selves?)
might reply. But if this is the case, then, Alasdair MacIntyre argues, the divided self must
also recognize that she cannot participate in a conversation about why this is good or bad
for her.235 The divided self cannot inquire into, offer, or defend any account of her good,
because she lacks a stable perspective from which to do so. Alternatively, I am inclined
to think it is more apt to describe us as single selves pursuing diverse goods, in which
case the virtuous benefit from the unity of character that allows them to have a singular
perspective on those diverse goods.236
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the virtuous benefit from having the kinds of
emotion-dispositions that are constituent in many virtues. Such emotion-dispositions
enable moral agents to “own” their motivation and to embody the kind of unified
perspective that enables wise practical judgments. Thus, a key part of living a good
human life is having the emotion-dispositions constituent in the virtues the moral agent
needs in order to enable her to become the sort of person who is admired and/or tends to
live well. Emotions are perceptions that are based on, or shaped by, concerns of the
moral agent. Emotions shape the way an agent perceives the world and her place in it.
They help her to identify those goods she ought to pursue and dangers of various kinds
that she ought to avoid. Emotion-dispositions such as these, along with the virtues they
are often a part of, enable the moral agent to manage the challenges of living and of
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dying. In the next chapter, I will argue specifically for the claim that virtues can enable
their possessor to die well, given a particular conception of what it is to die well.
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CHAPTER V
VIRTUES AND DYING
Introduction
In this chapter, I examine and argue for the claim that virtues can enable patients
to die well. I begin by distinguishing having a good death from dying well and argue that
we can think of dying as a practice, or at least a part of a practice. Thus, a good death can
be more than just something that happens to a patient, but can be something the patient
actively pursues. Virtues enable patients to more successfully pursue good deaths. Next,
I look at some virtues that I argue have relevance to a broad variety of conditions near the
end of life and to a variety of different conceptions of a good death. Finally, I look at the
particular conceptions of a good death examined in Chapter Two, “Conceptions of a
Good Death,” to see how different virtues could enable adherents of particular
conceptions to die well.
Dying as a Practice?
When asked how they want to die, undergraduate bioethics students will
frequently say they’d like to die painlessly, quickly, in their sleep, and with no previous
incapacity. Such a death might require no virtues at all. What if someone got such a
death? Should we say that they died well? Perhaps; or perhaps we should say that they
had a good death, as opposed to dying well. This distinction is aimed at clarifying the
sense in which we could say that virtues enable one to die well. If informal surveys of
bioethics students are accurate, then many would say that the person I’ve just described is
fortunate to have died the way she did. However, Aristotle claims, “[b]ut surely it is
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quite wrong to take our cue from someone’s fortunes. For his doing well or badly does
not rest on them. A human life, as we said, needs these added, but activities in accord
with virtue control happiness….”237 Happiness, according to Aristotle, is an “activity of
the soul in accord with virtue” and not strictly the result of fortune.238 Someone might
respond that Aristotle is quibbling over words, that in our everyday, ordinary sense of
‘happiness’ the person I described above could, if they could somehow view it from a
distance, say that theirs was a happy death, that they died well. At the very least, they
could say that they were not unhappy in their dying. I am willing to concede that such a
person had a good death. But I want to distinguish this from dying well and from the
kind of happiness one might enjoy if he died well. After discussing this distinction, I will
offer some reasons to pursue dying well as opposed to simply hoping to have a good
death.
The distinction mirrors the distinction between what happens to the agent and
what the agent does. When Aristotle says that happiness is an activity of the soul in
accord with virtue, he implies that it is some kind of active engagement with the world.
Dying well, as opposed to having a good death, implies a kind of active engagement with
one’s dying. Such an active engagement might be a candidate for what Alasdair
MacIntyre calls a practice. He defines a practice as follows:
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
237
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powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended.239

Let’s unpack this definition. A practice is form of social activity. So, for instance,
Americans are in the practice of driving on the right and running facing traffic. But
MacIntyre uses the word to refer to more complex activities than just where we drive or
run. He lists playing football and chess, designing architecture, farming, scientific and
historical enquiries, painting, and music as examples of complex practices.240 What
distinguishes these activities as practices in MacIntyre’s sense is that they have a
complexity concerning the ways we might excel in engaging in them. Players of football
or chess engage in an ongoing conversation about how best to play either of these games.
If we think of good deaths in terms of having a good death, then they are clearly not
practices, since they are not activities really. Having a good death involves only having
certain circumstances happen to you. Of course, you might do some things in hopes of
increasing your odds of having a good death. I have an acquaintance who is probably
only half joking when he says that his high cholesterol diet is aimed at enabling him to
have a massive heart attack and die quickly. Still, doing things like this won’t guarantee
you will have a good death and such activities don’t seem to be connected to their
purported end in the kinds of ways that would indicate they form a practice.
Is dying well a practice? I’d like to suggest that it is, in some sense, or at the very
least that it could be if we as a society were more attentive to our mortality (as other
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societies have been).241 When MacIntyre introduces the notion of practices, he uses
complex, but discrete, activities as examples. His examples constitute aspects of a life.
But, in some sense, living a whole life should count as a practice on MacIntyre’s
definition. It is social—our embodied-ness makes us dependent on others and most
desire social engagement beyond what is necessary for survival. It has a complexity
concerning the ways we might excel at it. We frequently hold up individuals as having
lived well and examine the ways their character and the various discrete practices that
made up their lives contributed to their lives overall. However, it is not any one discrete
activity, or even a discrete cluster of activities in the way that playing football or
designing architecture is. That MacIntyre chooses to focus, initially, on discrete activities
is a reflection, I think, of his concern that we are not in a position to talk about excellence
in the overarching practice of living a human life.242 According to MacIntyre, we live
amidst the fragments of a variety of different conceptions of and approaches to ethics and
are not, at the point he is writing in late 20th century Western society, equipped to begin
with reflection on the good of whole lives. Thus, he starts with discrete practices.243 But
such an approach does not disqualify the activity of living a human life, as a whole, from
being considered a practice. And if that is the case, then perhaps dying—the last stage of
241
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the life lived—is a practice or at very least a part of one. It, too, is social, and we can
discuss ways that some excel at taking on the challenges of dying where others fail to
excel. As it turns out, we do not currently engage in much discussion along these lines,
but I think that to be a practice the activity must only be the kind of activity about which
we could engage in collective deliberation about excellence. If a patient does not have
the good fortune of having a good death, in the sense discussed above, then she will have
good reasons to actively engage with the activity of dying. In the best cases, such activity
would constitute a practice aimed at achieving a good death. The virtues that can enable
one to die well, then, would be virtues that enable the patient to gain goods internal to the
practice of dying.
There are at least two reasons why the distinction I have been articulating
(between having a good death and dying well) matters. First, the chances, as many who
take the time to reflect upon it know, of having a good death such as I described above
are not good. Statistically, few die that way in contemporary Western societies.244 Just
about every adult can tell a story of a grandparent, parent, aunt or uncle, or some other
close relation or friend who died in a way decidedly other than what I have described
above as having a good death. Thus, virtues are relevant because they can apply to a
wider range of potential scenarios in which one might die. It might be that in a society in
which many or most people died quickly and without pain or incapacity the virtues would
not be relevant to having a good death. Perhaps they might still be relevant to living well
but not to dying well. That this is the case suggests that the way that I argue for the
244
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relevance of virtues to dying is contextualized. I will be looking in this chapter at the
way that virtues can help us to die well in the setting of contemporary medical
technology and society. In other, different contexts the relevance of virtues to dying well
might be very different, and it might even be nonexistent.
The second reason I have sought to distinguish having a good death from dying
well is that embodying virtues relevant to one’s dying might make even a fortunate death
better. Of course, virtues would be of no relevance to a sudden death. But even in a case
where a patient died relatively quickly and without serious complication, virtues might
equip that person to deal with the psychological and existential challenges they could still
face in an abbreviated form. Indeed, becoming aware that you will die very soon—what
many in contemporary American would consider to be a very fortunate death—might
carry challenges of its own, even if it is an atypical death. From the perspective of those
who embrace the Growth in Dying model of a good death, for example, dying presents an
opportunity for which virtues are necessary if the opportunity is to be fully seized.
Arguably, on any conception of a good death, one’s dying could be viewed as an
opportunity for which virtues—different ones on different conceptions—are necessary or
at least beneficial.
How Do Virtues Help?
How does having virtues help one to die well? The central claim of this
dissertation is that virtues can enable one to die well in the appropriate circumstances.
How does that happen? The answer to that question may be as varied as are the virtues
that are relevant to dying. Different virtues will help a patient to die well in different
ways. However, one basic kind of way that a variety of different kinds of virtues will be
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relevant to dying well concerns how they cause us to perceive and relate to basic aspects
of embodied life. To explain this, I would like to draw on Rosalind Hursthouse’s
discussion of the connection of virtues to the moral question of abortion.245 Setting aside
complex metaphysical questions about the moral status of the fetus, Hursthouse thinks
that virtues ought to shape the moral agent’s comportment to “the familiar biological
facts” of how humans conceive, gestate, give birth to, and parent their offspring, thereby
continuing the human race.246 When we gather such familiar facts, Hursthouse believes,
we are in a position to ask the following question: “How do these facts figure in the
practical reasoning, actions and passions, thoughts and reactions, of the virtuous and the
non-virtuous? What is the mark of having the right attitude to these facts...?”247 A
central theme in the discussion that follows Hursthouse’s posing of these questions is the
kinds of emotions one ought to have towards the “familiar biological facts.” In other
words, how do one’s virtues cause one to perceive, emotionally, these facts of biology?
How does the moral agent relate to or interact with these facts?
Hursthouse’s organizing question implies a kind of relationship between the facts
of biology and the emotions one has in response to them. Her discussion also implies
that there are proper and improper ways to feel about these facts.248 My discussion of
emotions as “concern-based construals” above suggests that we are not simply passive in
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responding to these facts.249 Rather, we organize our perception of such facts around
concerns we embody. In a sense, we interpret the facts through the lens of concerns and
values that shape our identity. Thus, our emotions towards such facts reveal a great deal
about us. Hursthouse’s idea is that we can and should talk about appropriate and
inappropriate sorts of ways of relating to these facts. She suggests this is a distinctive
aspect of virtue-based ethical theories.250
Dying and death also involve some familiar biological facts, interwoven—as in
Hursthouse’s example—with some facts about the state of medical technology and its
capacity to respond to and act on these facts. At some point in the human life cycle we
are no longer growing into maturity but are declining from it. Our physical and cognitive
abilities eventually begin to erode, and we can expect this erosion to continue, sometimes
faster, sometimes slower, until death. Medical technology can slow this decline
somewhat but cannot stop it. Eventually, if we do not die suddenly from some other
cause, we will acquire some disease or condition that causes us to die. At some point in
this decline, it makes sense to say that we are dying, though that point may not be clear in
every case. Following Hursthouse, we might ask how these facts ought to figure in the
formation of virtues and emotion-dispositions. How should one perceive and respond to
these facts? What sort of moral development of one’s character should a moral agent
pursue in the light of these facts? Presumably, virtues that tend to enable one to live well
will take into account these facts. Ironically, Aristotle, whose name is probably most
closely associated with virtues in the history of philosophy, might not have fully taken
249
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these considerations into account.251 That might have been, however, because in his day
people died quickly and most didn’t have to go through the kind of dying process most
face today. Setting aside Aristotle’s aspirations to live a “pro-immortal” life of study and
contemplation,252 how ought humans respond to basic facts about the human lifespan and
its decline toward death in particular? Different conceptions of a good death will imply
different ideas about how to perceive and live with these facts. Within each conception
of a good death will be a set of ideas about what kind of person one ought to become—
what sorts of traits ought to define you—with respect to these facts. Below I will look at
the conceptions of a good death I examined earlier to see what sorts of virtues they imply
concerning our response to human decline and dying.
The difference between Aristotle’s ideal life of study and contemplation and the
idea of a conception of a good death marks another distinction. Aristotle’s vision
suggests how humans might flourish under quite ideal conditions, conditions that mask or
obscure our mortality.253 The idea of a good death requires us to think in terms of
flourishing under conditions as they exist for humans. That is, biological constraints like
mortality are among the basic facts, as Hursthouse discusses, which must be taken into
account in conceiving of a good life and death.
One point of this section is to reinforce the claim that virtues don’t benefit a moral
agent the way a hammer benefits a carpenter. They are not tools to be used
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instrumentally. They do not have some kind of “exterior” relationship to the person who
hopes to die well as a result of having them. Rather, the person who hopes to die well is
shaped by virtues that are relevant to meeting the challenges of dying. There is an
“internal” connection between the future patient and the virtues in question. The virtues
come to shape who she is, such that she can die well. In some sense, the virtues relevant
to dying are markers of the kind of person one becomes in response to the challenges of
dying.
At this point, I would like to consider some virtues or sets of virtues that seem to
have broad relevance across different conceptions of a good death. Some virtues, by their
nature, appear to be especially relevant to human dying. Of course, different conceptions
might specify or develop these virtues and their implications in different ways. Beyond
that, individuals holding different conceptions of a good death might differentiate still
further what the implications of such virtues are.
Virtues that Apply to Most Deaths
I suspect that some virtues or kinds of virtues can help their possessors regardless
of the conceptions of a good death they hold.254 Later I will examine virtues that are
especially relevant to particular conceptions, but for now I would like to look at some
kinds of virtues that can apply more broadly. Such a project lends itself to the possibility
of some false starts, however. One of the most significant ones concerns the use of a
virtue or virtue-concept across moral traditions and conceptions of a well-lived life.
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Courage(s)
At a level of generality, a broad variety of traditions might appear to agree on the
value of a virtue. However, the specific practices and perspectives which inculcate and
mark the expression of this virtue are sometimes very different. Martha Nussbaum
wrestles with such issues in her essay, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian
Approach.”255 She believes there are some common “spheres” and some “features of our
common humanity” that suggest virtues that are not relative to any particular moral
tradition. Nussbaum discusses the “sphere” of “[f]ear of important damages, esp. death”
as one that necessitates the virtue of courage.256 She later describes, as a “feature of our
common humanity,” mortality, about which she says, “No matter how death is
understood, all human beings face it and (after a certain age) know that they face it. This
fact shapes every aspect of more or less every human life.”257 Her account suggests that
courage will be a relevant virtue for just about all humans, since “more or less” every
human faces mortality. Courage is a preservative virtue.258 It is a virtue aimed at
preserving the agent’s moral and/or practical commitments and convictions in the face of
dangers and threats. What are some of the commitments that courage preserves? In
some cases, it can preserve our lives against the threat of death, so it preserves a
commitment to go on living. To that degree, its application may be “non-relative.” Of
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course, even this assumes something that seems not to be true: that all people will regard
their lives as worth preserving in every case. Martyrs or people who believe they have a
duty to die in order to avoid consuming resources needed by family members serve as
examples to the contrary.259 However, beyond that, it seems there is a diverse set of aims
for which people might seek courage as a preservative. This diversity extends to our
concern with avoiding death. In Chapter Two of this dissertation, I discuss different
conceptions of a good death, which introduces an element of diversity into how people
come to terms with, or evade, their mortality. Different people might use courage to
preserve different aims or in service of diverse convictions about how to spend their
remaining days.
At a general level, we can say that courage benefits the dying because it enables
them to preserve aims, values, and convictions that are threatened by any number of
different challenges of dying, such as pain or a loss of control of key aspects of our lives.
Thus, courage and other virtues that function like it to preserve various goods are relevant
to a broad variety of challenges of dying. However, someone looking closely at the
particular aims, values, and convictions of patients with different conceptions of a good
death may find that courage preserves different things and even means, in practical terms,
different things to different people.260 Thus, one danger in attempting to talk about
259

John Hardwig, “Is There a Duty to Die?,” Hastings Center Report 27:2 (1997): 34-42. A key qualifier
here is “in every case.” Martyrs or those with a duty to die might, other things being equal, want to
preserve their lives. It is only under particular circumstances that they believe other considerations
override a commitment to living. Betsy Postow has suggested to me that an example of someone who does
not, in any case, want to preserve her life would be a convict who, out of remorse for her crimes, wants to
be executed.
260
Lee Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1990) is an example of a close analysis of a particular virtue (courage) as it
is understood by two thinkers with a quite a few differences. Yearley tracks how Aquinas’s and Mencius’s
different conceptions of human flourishing affected their understanding the virtue of courage.

137

virtues that can help almost anyone to die well is that what sounds good at a general level
will be less valuable or accurate at a more specific level, such as at a level where different
conceptions of a good death are distinguished.
Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence
Courage is an example of a virtue that can be relevant to most deaths. But, as I’ve
noted, what it means to practice courage may vary with different conceptions of a good
death which suggest different goods the patient might want to preserve. Just as dying
often threatens our connections to various goods, dying also often presents us with
increasing levels of dependence on others. As I discuss in Chapter Three on “The
Challenges of Dying,” one common feature of the dying process in contemporary
medicine is the patient’s increasing dependence on other people and technologies. If we
set aside those who die suddenly or from a disease with a very rapid onset, almost every
patient dying today will face a steadily increasing loss of independence and a
corresponding increase in dependence. Thus, virtues which enable someone to bear with
increasing dependence or which constitute responses to this phenomenon will help the
terminal patient to die well.
What Alasdair MacIntyre describes as “virtues of acknowledged dependence,”
would appear to be candidates for such a role.261 MacIntyre begins his discussion of
these virtues by observing that a strict contrast between self-interested and altruistic
behavior causes us to ignore or forget shared goods. If I assume my actions either aim at
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my good or at someone else’s, I miss those goods that can only be shared between us.262
Shared goods form an important part of the basis for communities of various kinds.
Friendship, for instance, both is a shared good and depends on the friends’ being able to
share certain goods between them, if they are to be able to distinguish their relationship
from a merely contractual relationship.263 The concept of shared goods introduces the
notion of the Other into one’s moral framework. Whereas I can think and act from a
more individualistic perspective when contemplating self-interested goods, I can only
contemplate shared goods if I open myself to the possibility of another person being
involved. Virtues of acknowledged dependence are aimed at acknowledging others.
Gratitude, for instance, “involves a truthful acknowledgment of dependence” on
others.264
MacIntyre contrasts the grateful person with Aristotle’s magnamimous person.265
Aristotle describes the person marked by the virtue of magnanimity as being “ashamed
when he receives [good from others]” and able “to remember the good they do, but not
what they receive….”266 MacIntyre comments that such a person labors under “an
illusion of self-sufficiency.”267 That this is an illusion should be clear for many reasons
but especially to anyone who has watched another person dying in a contemporary
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medical context where each new complication seems to bring a new form or degree of
dependence. Increasing dependence is a characteristic feature of most instances of dying
in our setting, so virtues that help us to acknowledge this would seem to be universally
relevant. Aristotle’s magnanimous person is not well-suited to being confronted with
dying. A person with the kinds of commitments the magnanimous person has would
have to hope to die quickly or somehow not be confronted with his dying. A person with
this “virtue” might be a candidate to embrace the “Avoiding Death” conception of a good
death. By contrast, someone who can acknowledge her dependence on others stands a
better chance of dying well.
What does it mean to acknowledge dependence here? Recall that Hursthouse
claims that part of what characterizes a virtuous person is her emotional comportment,
her relationship to certain biological facts (in her case concerning abortion). To
acknowledge dependence in dying would be to have the kind of emotion-dispositions that
enable the dying patient to perceive her growing dependence on others in a relatively less
troubled fashion. Her feelings would not be disturbed by the growing reality and
realization of dependence on other persons and technologies. Of course, these comments
should be set against a backdrop in which we assume some understanding of appropriate
levels of dependence and independence. Someone who is all too happy to “depend” on
others for what he refuses to do for himself does not qualify—on my assumption above—
as embodying virtues of acknowledged dependence. Acknowledging dependence on
others is hard for those who have been used to being able to care for themselves. The
virtues of acknowledged dependence, if they are to be understood as virtues, must be part
of a larger constellation of virtues, some of which are aimed at enabling us to be
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appropriately independent in various ways and at various times in our lives.268 Gratitude
is one example of a virtue of acknowledged dependence. It opens us to the other and
allows us to gladly acknowledge our dependence on that other. Gratitude involves the
agent’s emotions as well. There’s “more to it than just saying thank you.”269 To be
grateful is to act gratefully but also to feel gratitude on the appropriate occasions. The
grammar of gratitude presumes that we are gladly in another’s “debt.” In terms of
emotions, to be grateful is to perceive another’s kindness, generosity, or aid in the light of
a desire to have some aspect of my life interwoven with that of another. Friends are glad
to receive gifts—they are grateful—not just because they now don’t have to go out and
buy what was given but also because of how a gift knits two lives together. In this sense,
gratitude is a virtue of acknowledged dependence.
I am not suggesting just that dying patients should be grateful to their medical and
familial caregivers in order to die well. Rather, my claim is that those who are
characterized by a virtue like gratitude, which is one of the “virtues of acknowledged
dependence,” are so constituted as to be able to acknowledge the other, to be relatively
peaceful or glad about being in another’s debt, and to be generally comfortable with their
dependence on others. Embodying a set of virtues shapes a person’s perspective on
herself, others, and the world. Even when a grateful person is not actively expressing
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gratitude, her perspective is shaped or characterized by embodying the virtue.270 That
gratitude is a virtue that characterizes persons is suggested by a consideration of our
ordinary language and intuitions concerning its use. We speak of “debts of gratitude.”
However, they are not like other debts: those owed a debt of gratitude normally don’t
demand payment, debts of gratitude can’t be paid by third parties, and one can be
pleasantly disposed to be in another’s debt of gratitude, but we don’t often feel that way
about ordinary debts.271 These considerations indicate that gratitude is more about a
comportment of my character towards the actions and intentions of another than about
some strict exchange. Gratitude marks a person before it can be characteristic of an
exchange.272 Grateful people will, it seems, have been emotionally comfortable,
extenuating circumstances not withstanding, with dependence as a phenomenon
throughout their lives.273 Thus, when the level of dependence increases at the end of life,
they are already disposed to receive this in a relatively better manner than the kind of
person, such as Aristotle describes, who has avoided conscious recognition of his
dependence and is prone to perceive it in a negative light.
As with courage, gratitude—as a representative of the “virtues of acknowledged
dependence”—strikes me as being widely relevant across a variety of different
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conceptions of a good death. But different conceptions and different individuals may
come to different judgments about the particulars of gratitude. How one acknowledges
dependence might vary with other commitments she has concerning a well-lived life and
a good death.
Other-Centering Virtues
Gratitude is at least partially an other-regarding virtue. However, the distinction
between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues has been over-stated.274 My account
suggests that while gratitude is ostensibly focused on the other and benefits the other to
some degree, it ends up providing a benefit to the possessor of the virtue as well. Those
who are grateful are better disposed to acknowledge and be at peace with their increasing
dependence on others at the end of life. Thus, they benefit from being grateful. But
ironically, the grateful benefit from their virtue by being at least partially other-regarding,
by thinking of others and their contributions rather than oneself. This seems to be a
feature of some other virtues as well, which might be gathered with gratitude into a class
we could call other-centering virtues.275 As I’ve suggested in the discussion so far, there
might be considerable overlap between the “virtues of acknowledged dependence” and
other-centering virtues. But as with preservative virtues like courage and virtues of
acknowledged dependence like gratitude, other-centering virtues seem to benefit dying
patients across a broad spectrum of conceptions of a good death.
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Those who are dying will in some ways want to be focused on themselves. We
would find it awkward if a dying person always and only wanted to talk about others and
their plans, as if there would be time later to catch up on the dying individual. Such
behavior might cause us to speculate that this person is avoiding the thought of death or
hasn’t come to terms with and wants to be distracted from it. This will not enable one to
die well, except perhaps on the “Avoiding Death” conception of a good death. Success
on this conception will depend on the patient’s ability to maintain a focus on something
besides dying. But a person who is too focused on himself also seems to be a poor
candidate for a good death. For one thing, such a person would not seem to be in a good
position to acknowledge others and their role in his life. Thus, such a person could not
embody the virtues of acknowledged dependence. But he would also not be in a good
position to wrap up and bring closure to important relationships.276 Second, intense selffocus might only heighten the perceived suffering concerning the ending of my life. Eric
Cassell argues that suffering (as distinguished from pain) “occurs when an impending
destruction of the person is perceived….”277 If the borders of my concern stop at my self,
then death takes everything with which I am concerned.278 Such a perspective might well
intensify the anguish of dying.
By contrast, a person who has concerns beyond herself, who is invested in
relationships with others and is characterized by virtues and emotion-dispositions that
carry those concerns, will be better situated to face her own demise. Things she values
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will continue on after her death, and she can take some comfort from that while she is
dying if she embodies other-centering virtues.
My example of an other-centering virtue that can enable a person to die well is
humility. As with some other virtues, humility is open to misconstruals that could render
it questionable as a virtue. Humility is sometimes associated with servility, particularly
among those who are concerned about humility’s religious origins.279 Jeanine Grenberg
surveys recent assessments of humility as a religious virtue in which commentators
describe the humility in question as “overreaching,” “laughable,” and “pessimistic.”280
Indeed, confusing humility with servility does not benefit the moral agent.281 However,
humility can be rehabilitated, and a qualified form of it need not depend on any particular
religious convictions nor need it involve any loss of self-respect. Gabriele Taylor claims,
to the contrary, that, “[b]eing virtuously humble does not mean losing one’s human
dignity and self-respect. The humble will still ‘have their pride,’ still think that a certain
kind of treatment is due to them, and that a certain kind of behavior on their part is due to
others.”282 The properly humble will not lack self-respect. However, they won’t ground
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their self-respect in a comparison with others aimed at putting others down.283 Rather
than using comparisons as a means of boosting self-respect and self-esteem, the properly
humble regard themselves as having a kind of basic intrinsic worth which they share with
others. Grenberg describes humility as “that meta-attitude which constitutes the moral
agent’s proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but capable and
dignified rational agent.”284 Thus, the humble don’t rely on comparisons with others to
shore up their own esteem. Nor do they have to be preoccupied with the concern that
someone else may be bettering them in some respect. Rather, they are freed up, by virtue
of their humility, to enjoy others.
I suggest above that those who embody other-centered virtues put themselves in a
position to die relatively well. Humility is one of these virtues. Humility enables one to
maintain a balance of perspective between the value of one’s own life and self and the
value of others as well. The humble can be happily invested in the well-being of others
without concern that this somehow undermines their own worth. They can rejoice in the
pursuits and successes of others. Thus, in the dying phase of life, the humble can take
some joy from the presence of valued others and from the fact that goods they value will
go on, even if they won’t. Perhaps the humble see their lives as being part of a “story”
that is much larger than they are as individuals. As individuals, they have a place in that
story, but given that they are only individuals among a larger throng, they have no more
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than a place in that story. That the dying patient will no longer be able to participate in
the lives of these others is certainly cause for sadness. However, this sadness differs
considerably from that of a moral agent whose preoccupation with himself leaves him
without a perspective that enables him to enjoy relationships with others for their sake
and not his own.
Practical Wisdom
The last broadly applicable virtue I would like to discuss is practical wisdom.
Practical wisdom as a disposition or capacity to make judgments about what is good for
the agent (and others) in her particular circumstances will be relevant to many different
kinds of decisions, about treatment and other things, at the end of life. Most patients will
either have to make such decisions, delegate them to a surrogate decision-maker, or
tacitly accept the suggestions of doctors, who will at some point very near the end of life
often become less inclined to go forward on their own judgment because it becomes
increasingly clear to them that there are value judgments at stake in what medical course
to take. To the degree that a patient seeks to die well—and not simply hope to have a
good death—he will need to be an active participant in such decisions. In Chapter Three
on “The Challenges of Dying,” I discussed a challenge associated with many different
kinds of end of life decisions. “Technological brinkmanship” names the challenge of
using technology as long as possible to preserve a good quality of life without pushing
one’s use of it to a point where the patient is harmed.285 A respirator might be useful as a
transitional therapy for someone hoping to later leave the hospital, but over time it could
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become a technology that traps the patient in the hospital long after she has conceded her
life. Thus, a danger of going too far in such brinkmanship is that patients will have their
lives prolonged and intertwined with technologies that prevent them from, among other
things, meaningful regular contact with loved ones. Most patients will not have given
much thought to which treatments they might want to pursue at the end of life. And, they
often expect the doctor to initiate discussion of these issues.286 Practical wisdom, in this
case, would not necessarily take the form of having already made these decisions.287
Rather, it would be a wisdom about which will be the most important factors to consider
and what kind of weight to give to each of them while in the midst of dying.
Practical wisdom concerning when and how to engage or disengage technology
would appear to be an important virtue for those who hope to die well. The well-formed
moral agent will have the variety of virtues and accompanying emotion-dispositions
which enable her to perceive salient aspects of her condition and her technological
options. Virtues must be indexed to a conception of a well-lived life or a good death.
The nature of the virtues in question will shape how one perceives her condition. By
doing this, they contribute to the function of practical wisdom because practical wisdom
relies, in part, on the perceptions that inform judgments. So, as indicated under the
discussion of courage above, practical wisdom is a broadly relevant virtue but one with a
shape and implications that will depend on the conception in which it is in service.
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But regardless of which conception of a good death informs the patient’s practical
wisdom, a good death will clearly require some proactive decision making on the part of
the patient. This can’t be done by formula or by following a set of guidelines; it may
often be the case that one’s own guidelines set earlier in life, maybe in the form of an
advanced directive, will be unhelpful or no longer relevant. Consider how practical
wisdom might be relevant to one particular kind of decision. Most terminally ill patients
express or have expressed a desire to die in their homes, but in fact relatively few do.
Further, the leading factor in determining whether a patient dies at home or in the hospital
is not what his desire is but instead is determined by the availability of hospital
services.288 If dying well includes, for many, dying at home—and there are good reasons
why it might—then achieving that aim will require an ability to perceive and/or seek out
information on where one is in the dying process. But this is something doctors
sometimes don’t know. So, it might also involve making judgments about the relative
merits of the services one receives in hospitals as opposed to the goods one can achieve
in the home. Avoiding going too far in technological brinkmanship may require the
patient seeking a good death to make a relatively uncertain judgment. Practical wisdom
is the virtue aimed at making good judgments in such situations.
I have been discussing here and in the sections above some virtues and kinds of
virtues that I believe are relevant to most kinds of deaths and will be of service to patients
with different conceptions of a good death. I have also noted that how each of these
virtues is specified might differ with different conceptions of a good death. Now I would
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like to discuss the particular conceptions of a good death I have identified and look at
how various virtues might facilitate such good deaths.
Virtues and Avoiding Death
If there is a conception of a good death for which no virtues are relevant, this
might be it. Practical wisdom and courage of some kind might be useful here, but the
virtues of acknowledged dependence seem alien to the perspective in question here.
Those who embrace “Avoiding Death” hope not to experience death or dying. As I
discussed in Chapter Two, they will seek to avoid or deny the thought of death, the
prolonged awareness of their own decline, and maybe the experience of death itself.289
This conception of a good death was prompted in my thinking by what I frequently hear
undergraduate bioethics students say when asked how they would like to die. Most often,
the majority of the students in a class will say, essentially, that they hope to avoid
engagement with the thought or activity of dying. They want death to take them while
they sleep with little, or ideally, no decline prior to death. These students seem to be
representative of many others in our society, so I claim that some—certainly not all—
people envision a good death to be one that they avoid and don’t have to confront.
In part, I think this conception indicates one way of responding to the experience
of having seen someone die in our contemporary medical context. Despite some
successes in improving medical care at the end of life, many still observe deaths they
would like very much not to repeat.290 So, one way to manifest this desire is by
imagining a death that avoids all one takes to be bad about dying today. But virtues are,
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in part, character traits aimed at enabling us to respond to challenges presented in the
normal course of living.291 What those avoiding death mostly hope for is a set of external
conditions. Avoiding death involves some measure of personal response, as I discuss
below, but it also trades heavily on maintaining a hope for a particular set of external
circumstances, a set of circumstances which avoids many of the challenges of dying.
This conception is characterized by one’s hope—a very unrealistic one, it turns out—that
such challenges won’t need to be engaged.
Nevertheless, there might be some virtues useful for maintaining this stance of
avoidance. It seems virtues of forgetfulness would be most relevant here. Aristotle’s
magnanimous persons hope “to remember the good they do, but not what they
receive….”292 The magnanimous person might set a precedent for a realistic conception
of virtues of forgetfulness.293 Surely the magnanimous know, in some sense, that they
must receive. They don’t have a literal form of selective amnesia. Rather, the
magnanimous seem to be more eager to dwell on the good they do. That forms a part of
their self-concept, whereas what they have received from others does not. Something
similar might be said of those who avoid death via virtues of forgetfulness. Their selfconcept revolves around issues that do not include a consideration of their mortality, so,
on this account, it is a virtue to be forgetful or “unmindful” of such considerations. The
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virtuous, on this conception, “forget” in the form of a kind of selective focus or
concentration. In a similar fashion, those seeking to avoid death, might cultivate habits
of perception that enable them to keep the reality of our mortality from becoming a part
of their self-concept.
Because so much about the dying experience of most patients in contemporary
America would seem to go against habits of perception meant to shield their possessor
from the thought of mortality, adherents to this conception of a good death might also
find useful virtues of will power. Such virtues could involve such things as
psychological technical skills of self-management and/or management of inclinations.294
Such skills would seem to facilitate embodying and maintaining virtues of forgetfulness.
In his short story “The Death of Ivan Ilych,” Leo Tolstoy portrays a character who
seems to exemplify and desire such virtues.295 In the story Ilych, a middle-class Russian
bureaucrat, suffers what appears to be a minor injury while fixing some drapes in his
home. While the seriousness of the injuries to his internal organs only becomes clear
later, Ilych continues to hold on to the notion that he is okay long beyond what seems
warranted by the increasing severity of his symptoms. He says, “It’s a good thing I’m a
bit of an athlete. Another man might have been killed, but I merely knocked myself, just
here….”296 Despite growing evidence to the contrary, “Ilych made efforts to force
himself to think that he was better.”297 Even when his condition becomes so severe that
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he can no longer avoid the thought that he is likely to die soon, he finds himself
unaccustomed to the thought and unable to fully grasp it. So, he tries to manage his
thinking about his condition in a way that is conducive to his convictions about how best
to live. “He tried to get back into the former current of thoughts that had once screened
the thought of death from him. But strange to say, all that had formerly shut off, hidden,
and destroyed, his consciousness of death, no longer had that effect. Ivan Ilych now
spent most of his time in attempting to re-establish that old current.”298 Presumably the
virtues of forgetfulness would be a central part of the character of a person who managed
to hold on to this conception of a good death. Such a person would be well adapted to
maintaining, perhaps even in the face evidence to the contrary, what Ilych calls his
“former current of thoughts” in which his own death plays no part.
A good death on this conception does not result from not dying (though some fans
of life extension technologies might actively embrace such a hope); rather, it results from
not thinking about or confronting it. What is striking about a patient whose last words
are, “I’m going to beat this thing” is not that he didn’t beat the disease but that he
maintained that attitude toward the disease to the end of his life. He died with that
conviction. To that end, the virtues of forgetfulness seem useful. Such a person would
be characterized by a cultivated perspective that allows no place for dying or death. Such
a perspective fails not if the person actually does die, but if the person can no longer keep
the thought of mortality at bay, can no long maintain her connection to something like
Ilych’s “former current of thoughts.”
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Virtues and Growth in Dying
This conception of a good death views dying as a new opportunity for growth.
The growth may be from some “lesser” state, since dying can make one more focused
and attentive to serious matters, or it may just be growth as a normal developmental
process. Some might view growth in dying as a way to redeem an otherwise tragic
period of life; others might see growth as being intrinsically valuable and worthwhile for
that, even if no other, reason. What virtues might coincide with such aims? Courage will
enable the patient to take up issues and concerns that may have been long buried or
undiscussed.299 Many will have accumulated, in the course of their lives, some relational
disharmony. The task of initiating reconciliation as a form of intra- and interpersonal
growth will take courage. Aristotle describes a version of truthfulness which is aimed at
honesty in social relations.300 Such truthfulness, marked by a willingness to look
honestly at oneself and one’s relations with others, would seem to be a relevant virtue for
the tasks of growing toward reconciliation. Hope, or hopefulness, marks a patient’s
confidence that such tasks are worth taking up, since to others they may not appear
worthwhile or may just feel futile since the end is the same. Love, in the sense in which
it is conceived as a basic regard or concern for the well-being of the other, will motivate
such a endeavor. The dying patient might view a good death to involve, in part,
facilitating growth for others as well. “The sharing of genuine emotion, the talking about
things that matter, either at the bedside or after a death, can bring families that have
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become distant from each other closer together.”301 Curiosity, inquisitiveness, and
openness, which all facilitate growth at other times in life, will be equally relevant in
dying. Openness, for instance, would involve a disposition to see change and new
challenges in a positive light. Such openness would look for the good in the new instead
of focusing on the loss of the old.
Of his own father Seymour’s dying, Ira Byock remarks, “[a]t that moment he
stopped resisting his physical dependence and turned toward it, as if acceptance of his
naked, utter vulnerability was the next landmark on his route out of life.”302 In the
context of this conception, the virtues of acknowledged dependence could constitute a
kind of gift to loved ones who are, in some cases, eager to provide care at the end of life.
One patient Byock describes is gently scolded by her children, “[l]et us be your children,
let us love you.”303 But this kind of being loved is surely something we grow towards
because most of us spend so much of our lives not needing to depend on others for the
things in question here. Thus, the virtues of acknowledged dependence, such as gratitude
for care rendered or for a loved one’s presence during dying, become means for
achieving the aims of those holding this conception.
How might growth as a conception of a good death inform one’s use of practical
wisdom? If a patient has goals for her growth, the accomplishment of these tasks might
inform how she makes use of, or forgoes, medical interventions. Someone who is eager
to see a relationship grow beyond some disharmony might opt for less pain medication
than others in order to maintain a clearer head for conversation. Likewise, when one’s
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goals for growth are completed, this might indicate to a patient that this is an appropriate
time to forgo new treatments and move toward receiving only palliative care.
Unlike the virtues of forgetfulness, which would appear to be unique to
“Avoiding Death” as a conception of a good death, the virtues discussed here under
“Growth in Dying” are not unique to this conception. Rather, the “Growth in Dying” as a
conception of a good death informs how and to what end these virtues are relevant. The
virtues I’ve discussed enable the patient to be or become the kind of person who can
grow during the dying period.
Virtues and Simply Dying
To simply die is to have one’s death be no more than the end of one’s life. Those
who embrace this conception seek to live until they die. In Chapter Two, “Conceptions
of a Good Death,” I suggest that such a conception relies heavily on the concept of being
a part of a community. Sometimes extended families function as communities, though
that is increasingly rare in the Western, industrial social context this study presumes.
Daniel Callahan says of his own prospective death, “I do not want to be abandoned,
psychologically ejected from the community, because of my impending death.”304
Remaining a member of a community is a way of living until one dies, and this is what it
is to simply die. This conception does not necessarily advocate growth nor does it
recommend avoidance of death. In fact, an understanding of trans-generational
community will allow one to make some sense of the fact of one’s dying. However, a
patient can, on this conception, simply continue with whatever tasks she is able to do, and
when she can perform no further tasks, she can simply remain with those she has lived
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with. Such a person can be careless in a way about her dying, because, on this
conception, death is simply the end of a life; it is no more than a part of a life.
On such a conception social virtues would seem to rank very highly. Gratitude
and generosity, a sense of justice within (and beyond) one’s community,305 and caring
will all contribute to the fostering of a community in which the patient seeks to live and
die. Such a community might place a high premium on the virtues of acknowledged
dependence as a way of embodying the acknowledgment that the members of the
community live intertwined with others. The judgments of practical wisdom will take
into account the patient’s place in her community. A proponent of simply dying might
opt for treatments that allow him to remain as active as possible within his community.
And, such a patient might forego treatments or even hospitalization if these become an
impediment to remaining meaningfully connected to his community.
While “Avoiding Death” and, to a lesser extent, “Growth in Dying” are common
conceptions today, “Simply Dying,” particularly the version of it that relies heavily on
the patient’s being a member of a meaningful community, is less in evidence. That may
be one reason so many find it hard to die well in this culture. That fact may also be a
symptom of contemporary society, including contemporary medicine, both of which
seem to presume the relevant unit of consideration is the individual. Nevertheless, an
example of simply dying can be found in the story “Fidelity” by Wendell Berry.306
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“Fidelity” tells the story of the dying of 82 year old Burley Coulter of rural Kentucky.
Coulter is a farmer who continues to work the farm with his extended family even when,
by his own admission, he is no longer doing them any good. As his disease worsens, his
concerned family members take him to the hospital in Louisville. There, however, they
find their sense of community threatened by the fact that their visits to the hospital only
“enact again a strange rite of offering themselves where they could not be received.”307
The family members’ angst at this rupture of community is intensified by Coulter’s
hallucinations that he is still with them on the farm: “Boys, why don’t you all wait for me
yonder by the gate. I’ve got just this one last round to make, and then we’ll all go in
together.”308 When his angst gets severe enough Danny, who is Burley’s son, “kidnaps”
his father from the hospital and takes him back to the farm so that Burley can die on his
land and in his community. Since Burley’s removal from the hospital was done at night
and unofficially, a detective is assigned to find him. Detective Bode says, “Here was an
old guy resting easy in the best medical facility money could buy. And what happened?
This damned redneck, Danny … came and kidnapped him out of his hospital bed in the
middle of the night.”309 One of the members of Burley’s community, in the midst of a
long-winded explanation of what Danny has been up to, simply says, “Some of us think
people belong to each other….”310 The contrast is with a notion that people belong to
institutions, such as medicine.
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Those who espouse “Simply Dying” seek to remain clear about the purpose of an
institution such as medicine. It ought to serve the ends of the community to which the
patient is connected.311 Thus, patients will seek to embody virtues that help them to
remain integral members of their community and that help them to discern the use of
medical care as an aid to community. Practical wisdom will be one of the relevant
virtues here. Temperance both in its own right and as an aid to practical wisdom will also
be relevant. Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma describe what they call “medical
temperance” as a response to “technology gone amok [in the form of] life-prolonging
technology.”312 Their discussion focuses mainly on medical temperance as a virtue for
doctors. However, the concerns they raise, combined with a social and legal climate in
medicine that encourages doctors to do all they can until the patient declines, suggest that
patients who want to simply die might do well to embody temperance. In this case
temperance would be an aid to practical wisdom concerning the use of medical
technology. As the story of Burley Coulter illustrates, temperance can be subversive of a
social order. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that “genuine virtues are dysfunctional to any
but the best form of common life.”313 Because simply dying, as I have developed it here,
depends heavily for its conception of a good death on being rooted in a community, this
conception will require virtues such as temperance and practical wisdom to keep its
common life from being disrupted by medical technology that no longer serves the needs
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of the community and its members, but rather subverts them. This is what Berry aims to
convey in the story “Fidelity.”
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have looked at virtues that I believe can facilitate a good death
on any conception and under a broad variety of medical circumstances. And, I have
looked at three of the conceptions to see how particular virtues might play a role in
pursuing a good death on the terms of the conception in question. Some of these virtues
are particular specifications of virtues I argued are relevant to a broad variety of
conceptions of a good death. And some of these virtues are unique to particular
conceptions of a good death. I have tried to show how such virtues enable their possessor
to more successfully pursue her conception of a good death. In particular, I have tried to
show how each of these conceptions involves its adherent becoming a certain kind of
person such that she could die well under that conception. In the next chapter, I will give
extended consideration to the final conception of a good death identified in Chapter Two.
The “Good ‘Christian’ Death” as a representative of a variety of different ways that
religious convictions might inform one’s conception of a good death will be examined
there.
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CHAPTER VI
CHRISTIAN VIRTUES AND DYING
Introduction
Although any of the conceptions of a good death discussed earlier might be
combined with religious convictions, these convictions often suggest particular
conceptions of a good death that are unique to the religion in question. In this chapter I
will look at one way of conceiving of a good death from within the Christian moral
tradition. I do not claim this is the only legitimate religious conception of a good death;
indeed, a claim of such legitimacy seems best judged from within the tradition in
question. Nor do I claim this is the only Christian conception of a good death. While I
will try to ground my claims about how to conceive of a good death in the Christian
tradition in some of the most basic theological or metaphysical loci, I recognize that more
than one conception of a good Christian death could be conceived from such starting
points. My aim is to depict one such conception. I don’t argue here that this conception
is superior to alternative conceptions of a good death, Christian or other. Rather, I
discuss this conception in greater detail out of personal interest and in order to give a
more detailed picture of how a conception of a good death might be achieved by someone
embodying a particular constellation and specification of virtues.
Tradition-Based Inquiry and the Christian Moral Tradition
In 1979, Alasdair MacIntyre, assessing some contributions to a journal issue
devoted to medicine and theology, offered a challenge to religious scholars doing
bioethics. He said, “[w]hat we ought to expect from contemporary theologians in the
area of medical ethics: First—and without this everything else is uninteresting—we ought
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to expect a clear statement of what difference it makes to be a Jew or a Christian or a
Moslem, rather than a secular thinker, in morality generally.”314 MacIntyre, himself a
proponent of the claim that thick moralities emerge from moral traditions, invites
members of religious moral traditions to do work that self-consciously represents
particular traditions.315 In this chapter, I am attempting to do that. While individual
Christians might be unconsciously drawn to or consciously find attractive aspects of other
conceptions of a good death, they ought also, if the Christian moral tradition is relevant in
the way that MacIntyre challenges it to be, show themselves to be interestingly different
in how they approach dying and the notion of dying well. This difference might be
reflected in their conclusions. However, even when Christians reach conclusions similar
to those of non-Christians, their reasoning and the premises drawn on to carry out such
reasoning will often be different. Of course, in the pluralistic societies that characterize
much of the West today, many individuals are formed by multiple traditions or fragments
of traditions. So, in some sense, what I attempt to do here is idealistic. Many who claim
the term ‘Christian’ in America today are not so thoroughly formed as to represent, and
live out of, a coherent Christian moral tradition. Nevertheless, this chapter seeks to
articulate what that might look like.316
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I will seek to write out of a broad but orthodox understanding of the Christian
tradition. By broad, I mean that I do not intend to defend a particularly Roman Catholic,
Eastern Orthodox, or Protestant view. Rather, I will attempt to use theological claims
with wide acceptance within the Christian tradition. By orthodox, I mean that I intend to
draw on some of the most fundamental and, historically, widely accepted Biblical and
theological claims that have shaped the Christian tradition’s identity over time. The
Nicene Creed of the 4th century A.D. provides a brief, but important, statement of what
the core of that orthodoxy might look like. Christianity gains much of its identity from
the canonical texts of the Old and New Testaments. But those texts are not selfinterpreting. Thus, the Christian tradition refers to and draws on what it takes to be its
earliest and most widely held interpretations of those texts among Christians.317 The
Nicene Creed represents one widely agreed upon summary of key theological
interpretations of texts dealing with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.318
In focusing on a particular moral tradition, one inevitably invites questions about
where the Christian tradition stands with respect to other traditions. Must Christians
believe that their tradition is demonstrably rationally superior to all others in order to
confident in its truth? Must Christians believe their tradition is incorrigible and immune
to correction? I will answer “no” to both questions. These questions are, of course,
317

For one account of how the tradition has shaped Christians’ interpretation of scripture, among a branch
of Christians least likely to admit that tradition informs their reading and identity, see D.H. Williams,
Evangelicals and Tradition: The Formative Influence of the Early Church (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2005). For an argument that the Christian scriptures have long been read within interpretive
communities, see Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, Reading in Communion: Scripture and Ethics in
Christian Life (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991).
318
For an example of a book that seeks to use a broad and orthodox understanding of the Christian moral
tradition as I do here, see Joel James Shuman and Brian Volck, M.D., Reclaiming the Body: Christians and
the Faithful Use of Modern Medicine (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2006). For particular comment on
this approach, see endnote 30 on p. 147.

163

related to questions about whether some conceptions of a well-lived life and a good death
are superior to others. My approach in examining these questions is informed by
Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of tradition-based inquiry.319 To approach moral issues from
the perspective of particular traditions does not necessarily commit one to relativism or to
a permanent pluralism of views.320 Traditions are ongoing inquiries concerning, above
all else, the truth about what constitutes a well-lived human life. In the words of
Christopher Lutz, “[t]radition rejects both the once-for-all rationality of encyclopaedia,
and the once-for-all relativism of genealogy.”321 A tradition-based approach can
acknowledge serious disagreements concerning such questions as what constitute welllived lives and be somewhat hopeful that over time progress can be made in adjudicating
disputes among traditions. This is particularly so if the traditions in question are open to
examination and self-examination of the underlying narratives that supply
presuppositions to their adherents.322 Those presuppositions, of course, shape how their
possessors view moral issues and the shape of life more generally. MacIntyre argues that
some traditions might be shown to be superior to others if they can point to
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inconsistencies and incoherences in other traditions which those other traditions are
unable to account for or correct on their own terms.323 Presumably the most powerful
challenges by one tradition of another would be those aimed at the level of
presuppositions. MacIntyre draws on key figures in the philosophy of science reflecting
on key events in the history of science to show how a disruption of one’s presuppositions
can lead to the adoption of new ones, or at least a significant revision of old ones.324
Thus, someone adopting MacIntyre’s approach need not be committed to the relativistic
claim that all traditions are true only for their adherents. Rather, until one’s tradition and
its presuppositions have been put into serious question by another tradition offering a
better account of the issues at hand, it seems that members of a tradition can be confident
in it. Thus, Christians could be confident that the Christian moral tradition will guide
them to truth without also claiming that it has shown itself to be rationally superior to all
its rivals. Of course, their confidence would be qualified by the conviction that, while
some issues are relatively more settled, others are not and that the Christian tradition
should be open to new understandings as it has been at key points throughout its
history.325
Can members of the Christian moral tradition claim to be so open? Insofar as the
Christian moral tradition represents an interpretation of its canonical texts, its members
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can and should acknowledge some fallibility in its interpretation. Those who read widely
in the history of the church and theology will have good evidence that the tradition has
grown, and in some cases corrected itself, over time. Some, of course, do not see such
growth326. Indeed, Thomas Hibbs argues that MacIntyre’s own Thomism is not so open
to “radical revision” in the way MacIntyre suggests traditions are.327 However, to
stipulate Thomistic Christianity as the final, authoritative expression of the Christian
tradition would be to narrow the tradition in a way that I have sought to avoid doing.
Further, if MacIntyre is committed to a Thomistic interpretation of Christianity he could
respond to Hibbs’s criticism by pointing out that any claim of finality within Thomism
ignores Thomism’s history, a history which ought to shape its claims about its future.328
A concern of Hibbs’s that applies more generally to the Christian tradition is its
movement towards an eschatological “consummation of all things in Christ.”329
Christians are committed, I believe, to an end to history shaped by the consummation to
which Hibbs refers. Thus, the Christian moral tradition must be open to an end of inquiry
at some point in the future, but this is on the conviction that the need for inquiry will have
ended as well.
The Christian moral tradition need not see the interpretation of its growth and
history I am proposing here as an intellectually alien conceptual apparatus imposed on it.
On the contrary, Christians can see this as consistent with some of the theological claims
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that shape their tradition. The doctrine of sin, and particularly the claim that sin—as
alienation from God—has noetic effects, is consistent with the conviction that our ability
to perceive truth is at least partially marred by sin. If this is the case, then Christians
would expect that others—Christian or not—might be able to perceive truths to which
Christians in any given era would be blind unless they were willing to see themselves as
part of a tradition that can and should shape their understanding. G.K. Chesterton has
commented that a tradition is “democracy extended over time.”330 While that might not
be an entirely accurate characterization of a normative moral tradition, it does contain an
element of truth relevant here. Presumably the ways that Christians in one era are blind
to some aspect of truth could be corrected by those in another era who are not blind in the
same way.
The second theological claim that suggests an affinity between Christian
conviction and tradition-based inquiry is the incarnation, particularly the claim that God
entered time and is willing to work within time. That God enters time in the person of
Jesus and that Jesus sends his Spirit to continue the work of the Body of Christ (the
church) over time suggest that Christians should be open to the idea that their
understanding of God and themselves will require that they pay attention to how God has
acted and revealed himself over the course of time. Jesus and the church have histories
that are crucial to their identities. The theological doctrines of sin and incarnation
suggest that thinking of itself as a tradition-based inquiry ought not be foreign to
Christianity. Before going on to look at how the Christian moral tradition shapes its
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adherents’ views of a good death, I will discuss some other theological claims that form
the content of a broad but orthodox conception of the tradition.
The Theological Background
Any religious conception of a good death will entail some theological or
metaphysical claims about the nature of reality that inform the concepts of flourishing
and dying well claimed by the tradition in question. The Christian moral tradition is no
different in this regard. Its metaphysic can best be explained against the context of the
broad narrative strokes depicted in the Bible, its canonical scriptures. This narrative has
four major themes in it: creation, fall, reconciliation and redemption, and eschatological
consummation. God creates the world and calls it good. Sin enters the created order and
mars, without completely destroying, the original goodness of creation. This affects both
humans and their relationship with God and others and the rest of the created order.331
Sin is both a general condition of a creation alienated from God and an individual
condition of rebellion against God. God initiates the work of reconciling himself to
humans who have been alienated and turned away from God. Further, God sets out to
restore and redeem the original goodness of creation, including people and their capacity
to be friends with God. The person and work of Jesus Christ are central to these
activities, which are carried on by the Holy Spirit after Jesus’s departure from earth.
Finally, God will complete the work of redemption and enact the consummation of
friendship between God and humans and complete the restoration of the original
goodness of the created order. I will refer to this below as the Christian narrative.
331
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I will use theologian Karl Barth as a representative voice for the Christian moral
tradition out of which emerges a Christian conception of dying well. I am sympathetic to
Barth’s approach to these matters. My aim is not simply to interpret Barth but to think
sympathetically with him and, where he falls silent, to push faithfully beyond his own
thinking. My approach in this chapter is to be consistent with his thinking, even as I go
beyond his own explicit claims. Barth presumes and draws on the narrative outline
discussed above to articulate an ethic.332 The fall and the alienation from God that it
introduces mean that humans are not properly related to God. Sin introduces an element
of corruption into our nature and separates us from God’s moral perfection. Thus,
reconciliation and redemption are key movements in the narrative outline above. For
Barth, God is the initiator in these actions and humans respond. God invites people into
covenant. The human task, not taken up independently of God, is to become the kind of
person who can faithfully respond to God’s acts of reconciliation and redemption.333 The
Biblical theme Barth uses to characterize the human response to God is Sabbath rest.334
Christians are called to learn to rest in God and in what God has initiated through
reconciliation and redemption. Sabbath-keeping is a practice Christians take up in order
to remain mindful of the moral space they inhabit. God claims the whole of time but
designates a Sabbath rest in order that Christians can consciously pause from their own
332
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efforts to participate in God’s redemption and be reminded that this is a redemption that
comes from God and will be completed only by him.335 Sabbath rest serves as a sign that
all of time, for Christians, belongs to God.336 When faithfully practiced, it orients
Christians to understand their own activities in the light of what God has done and will
do. In doing this, it is a practice that serves the formation of practical wisdom in that it
trains Christians to see their actions from the perspective of the wider scope of the
Christian narrative. The theme of Sabbath rest looks both forward and backward in the
scriptural narrative. The origin of Sabbath is God’s rest from the work of creation
(discussed in Genesis 1-2). Sabbath also points to the eschatological consummation of
God’s reconciliatory and redemptive work when God calls his people to a completed
rest.337
This narrative shapes the Christian’s understanding of death. In some sense, a
good death in the Christian tradition would be one in which the person embodies this
narrative.338 Because humans beings are also a part of God’s creation called good
(though marred by sin), life has a basic value. God “loans” us our lives, in Barth’s terms;
they are not our own to do with as we please. Further, our lives are loaned to us for the
purpose of service to God and others.339 Thus, “[t]hose who handle life as a divine loan
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will above all treat it with respect.”340 Barth excludes suicide on these grounds. Suicide
is inconsistent with an acknowledgement of the goodness of humans as a part of creation,
a goodness which remains even amidst the marring effects of sin. Suicide is also
inconsistent with a grateful reception of God’s initiatives of reconciliation and
redemption.341 To treat our lives with respect is to affirm, Barth claims, the goodness of
creation and to look forward to God’s renewal of those aspects of creation that are marred
by sin. Such respect implies that we cannot subvert or attempt to shortcut God’s
redemptive work. Suicide, Barth claims, does this and is therefore excluded from moral
legitimacy. To put the matter in terms other than those Barth uses—but which he
implies—suicide represents a failure to pursue the kind of moral development that would
enable one to become the kind of person who can faithfully respond to God’s acts of
reconciliation and redemption.342
However, Barth also points out that life is not a “second god” and that the
reverence Christians owe God cannot be rivaled by an equal reverence for life itself.343
Christians ought not seek to preserve their lives at all costs. Martyrdom can be explained
in these terms: the martyr will not seek to preserve her life at the expense of betraying
convictions that are a fundamental part of her identity. For martyrs, life is not a god to be
340

Ibid, 338-9.
Ibid, 401-413.
342
In his discussion of suicide Barth recognizes that how an act is described greatly affects the moral
evaluation of it. And, he recognizes that not all acts we sometimes call suicide should necessarily be
morally excluded in the same way (ibid, 410). Barth engages, as the larger Christian moral tradition has, in
a kind of casuistry aimed at properly discerning the appropriate descriptions of our actions, including acts
that result in life’s ending. For a discussion of casuistry and description, see Stanley Hauerwas,
“Reconciling the practice of reason: Casuistry in a Christian context,” in Baruch A. Brody, ed., Moral
Theory and Moral Judgments in Medical Ethics (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1988): 135-55, 138. That Barth’s conclusions are consistent with the larger Christian moral tradition can
be confirmed in Nigel Biggar, Aiming to Kill: The Ethics of Suicide and Euthanasia (London: Darton,
Longman, and Todd, Ltd., 2004).
343
Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, 342.
341

171

worshipped and pursued in the same way that God is to be.344 God is worthy of
wholehearted devotion, so the task of becoming the sort of person who can be friends
with God is also worthy, on the Christian account, of wholehearted devotion. However,
this task will not, most Christians have believed, be completed prior to death. Death need
not be postponed to complete this task, and life need not be preserved indefinitely for this
or any other reason. Christians, then, have no obligation to preserve life at all costs.345
Indeed, in certain situations where doing otherwise would constitute worshipping life as a
second god, they have reasons not to. Worshipping life as a second god, in Barth’s
thinking, seems to involve any attempt by Christians to overvalue their lives as they
know them now. This could be done by overzealous efforts to preserve them in the face
of death.346 One clear indication of such overzealousness might be when the preservation
of the Christian’s life requires her to violate or ignore moral convictions that she claims
shape her identity. It could also be done by valuing the goods of this life above the goods
of reconciliation and redemption offered by God.
The chief task of Christians seeking to embody the scriptural narrative in their
dying is, Barth suggests, to learn to rest in God and in God’s work in the world. To rest
in God is to find a kind of contentment in God and in the goods that God offers. To
pursue a Christian understanding of rest is to seek to allow the Christian narrative to
define one’s identity and one’s character. On this account, Christians are those people
344
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who are defined by their story and whose activities in response to the God who is the
central actor in the story are an improvisation on the theme set by God.347
The Christian Narrative, Suffering, and Dying
The Christian narrative entails some implications for the end of life. Because the
original created order has been marred by sin, suffering results. For some, this raises the
problem of evil: how could a good, loving, and all powerful god allow suffering? For my
purposes here, the challenge is not to explain suffering so much as it is to learn to go on
in the face of our or others’ suffering at the end of life.348 Stanley Hauerwas argues that,
“historically speaking, Christians have not had a ‘solution’ to the problem of evil.
Rather, they have had a community of care that has made it possible for them to absorb
the destructive terror of evil that constantly threatens to destroy all human relations.”349
While I’m not sure Hauerwas keeps the promise he makes at the beginning of God,
Medicine, and Suffering not to offer a theodicy, and I’m not sure he is right, as he
implies, that no account should be offered for the origin of evil and suffering in the
world, Hauerwas is right to insist that Christians be a community capable of responding
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to the presence of suffering.350 Part of this response, as I will discuss more below, is for
Christians, as individual members of the Body of Christ, to embody virtues that enable
them to place their lives in the context of the larger Christian narrative that defines their
identity and their destiny. To do so is to understand that suffering is not an ultimate part
of God’s purposes in the world. The consummation of God’s redemption of the world
will result in the elimination of suffering. Theodicy, Hauerwas argues, attempts to
validate the current status quo by offering “a legitimation for the way in which society is
organized.”351 But Christians, if they are to situate their lives within the larger Christian
narrative, must, even as they live in the present, look to a future in which God’s designs
for his created order will be fully restored. A number of Christian virtues are aimed at
enabling their possessor to do precisely this.
To the degree that medicine suggests that all suffering is pointless and therefore
ought to be eliminated, it challenges the Christian moral tradition.352 On the contrary,
Hauerwas argues, some suffering “is impossible to avoid in the context of our moral
convictions.”353 Hauerwas implies that Christians should prepared to embrace some
suffering even as they seek relief for other forms of suffering. The challenge from an
overzealous medicine would be to see all suffering as needing to be eliminated.
Hauerwas offers relatively little to help us understand how to discern which suffering fits
350
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within our moral projects.354 However, he does suggest a way for Christians to think of
the suffering they do endure as being something other than meaningless. Consider, for
instance, the Christian who retains the conviction that she ought not seek to take her life
to avoid suffering at the end of life. From the perspective of some, such suffering is
meaningless.355 The patient will soon die anyway, so how can there be any meaning in
enduring it? The meaningfulness comes from the Christian’s being able to see her
suffering in the context of the larger Christian narrative. Christians need not
inauthentically claim that suffering that appears to be bad is really good. However, they
can find meaning even in the presence of suffering if they see the suffering in the context
of the larger Christian narrative.356 The degree to which Christians can see suffering in
that larger context will be the degree to which they have identified with that larger
narrative and, in a sense, grafted their own lives into it. This is a project which can be
achieved by embodying virtues that enable their possessors to see their lives and
suffering in such terms. Below, I will discuss a number of Christian virtues that are
aimed at precisely this. For example, hope and patience, in their Christian form, are
virtues which dispose their possessor to see her life as being defined not just by the
present realities she experiences but also by the future indicated in the Christian narrative,
particularly the eschatological consummation of the narrative. Hope is a disposition to
354
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anticipate such a future. Patience is a disposition to carry on in the present in the light of
that future.
One part of the body of thought known as “redemptive suffering” can be
integrated here.357 If Christians seek to bear their suffering in a manner that imitates
Jesus Christ’s manner of suffering, then they might grow in faith and in likeness to
Christ.358 Christopher Vogt offers an account of Jesus’s dying: “What this suggests is
that it was not toughness and indifference to pain and suffering that were crucial to Jesus’
practice of patience in dying. Instead, it was a learned attentiveness to God’s call and
presence, and a willingness to hand himself over to that calling and finally into the hands
of others.”359 Patience, as Vogt suggests, and also hope characterize Jesus’s
“attentiveness to God’s call and presence” in the midst of his own dying. Christian
virtues are, foremost, Christ’s virtues. Thus, when Christians suffer with hope and
patience, they imitate Christ. While suffering is often more a test of character than a
school of character, it gives Christians an opportunity to manifest virtues and to deepen
their identification with such virtues.360
In Chapter Three, I discussed Stan van Hooft’s claim that giving suffering a
meaning or purpose denigrates the sufferer “by making him a means to some purpose.”361
The account given of how the suffering has meaning takes a privileged place over the
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individual sufferer. To the degree that the Christian moral tradition gives an account of
how one’s suffering has meaning and purpose, I believe it is guilty of this charge.
However, a key claim of the Christian moral tradition is that Christians’ individual lives
are part of a larger, more comprehensive narrative that is the story of God’s activity in
the world. God is self-sufficient, so he did not need to create the world or its inhabitants.
Rather, creating the world is a manifestation of God’s love.362 God did not create
humans for any purpose beyond that of expressing God’s love. Christians understand
their lives to have value only within a context in which God is creator and humans are
creations. So, in a sense, Christians can embrace this objection; it is simply a fault line
between the Christian moral tradition and those other traditions—van Hooft aligns
himself with something he calls “postmodern authenticity”—which object to the idea of
individual lives having a place, and only a place, within a larger scheme.363
But if the meaning that the Christian moral tradition assigns to suffering is to
show how it can be viewed from within the perspective of a larger story, which is a story
chiefly of God’s overcoming sin, evil, and suffering through the work of Jesus and the
ongoing Body of Christ, animated by Christ’s Spirit, then it is not clear that the Christian
moral tradition, as I’ve discussed it here, gives suffering a purpose.364 Suffering need not
exist for some other end. Rather, the Christian tradition gives suffering meaning chiefly
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by contextualizing it. So it may be that the Christian moral tradition’s account of
suffering does not need to face the objection van Hooft raises.
The Christian moral tradition is not wholly opposed to suffering in any form. It
recognizes that some of its moral convictions will entail that it be open to suffering that
accompanies the living out of these convictions. Christians can expect suffering to be a
part of life as a result of the marring effect of sin on the created order. However,
Christians need not simply accept any suffering; they can happily accept the relief of
some suffering when relief is available and its attainment is consistent with other
Christian moral convictions.
Christian Virtues and the Christian Narrative
I have argued that for any conception of a good death, there are virtues that can
enable one to pursue the goods associated with that conception. In the Christian moral
tradition’s understanding of a good death, one function of the virtues is to conform
individuals to the narrative that provides them and the larger tradition with their identity.
Christians believe that they are shaped as persons and as a community by the convictions
contained in the narrative outline of scripture I have discussed above. Virtues embraced
by the Christian tradition will function, in part, to enable one to be the kind of person
who inhabits this narrative. That is, Christian virtues help their possessor to embody the
convictions that she and the created order are part of God’s good creation, a creation
which is marred by sin, but being redeemed and restored through God’s reconciliatory
initiative in Jesus, and that God’s work of redemption, in which individuals seeking to be
rightly related to God participate, will be completed at some point in the future. The
Christian virtues enable their possessor to see the world through the lens of such
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convictions. Speaking of how virtues function more generally, Bernard Williams says
that “the dispositions help to form the character of the agent who has them, and they will
do the job the theory has given them only if the agent does not see his character purely
instrumentally, but sees the world from the point of view of that character.”365 Christians
don’t embody these virtues for instrumental reasons—simply because they help one to
live or die well. Rather, they embody the virtues in question because such virtues enable
their possessor to see the world through the eyes of the narrative which the virtues draw
on to gain their moral content. But to do so enables one to become the kind of person
who can face the challenges of dying well. To embody virtues that constitute a personal
appropriation of the truths of the Christian narrative is to become the kind of person who
seeks not to let the prospect of suffering and dying to be more determinative of one’s life
than the Christian narrative.
Robert Roberts argues that certain emotions function this way also. As
propositional attitudes, emotions are “ways in which propositions become part of a
person’s ‘vision.’”366 After distinguishing normal Christian knowledge from mere
Christian knowledge (what we might call “knowledge about”), Roberts says, “[j]ust as
the normal access to the proposition, ‘These leaves are green,’ is to see the leaves with
one’s own eyes, so the normal access to the proposition, ‘Jesus died for your sins,’ is to
feel gratitude and peace and other emotions.”367 But emotions such as joy, hope,
gratitude, and contrition (Roberts’s examples) are, when found in a dispositional form,
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also virtues in the Christian life.368 These virtues enable one to be personally related to
propositions derived from the Christian narrative. They enable one to experience these
theological claims in important ways that mitigate the possibility of being overcome by
alternative perceptions of the world and one’s place in it. For many, the experience of
dying presents such alternative perceptions.
Christian Virtues and Dying Well
In Chapter Four, I argued that most virtues contain an emotion-disposition
component. Agents who embody a virtue like patience have their perceptions shaped by
concerns that constitute the grammar of patience. They are disposed to perceive objects
of emotion “patiently.” Above I have argued that one way virtues can help a Christian to
die well is by enabling her to perceive her own experience in terms of the Christian
narrative that is central to individual and communal identity for Christians. In this
section, I look at particular virtues in an effort to draw connections between the virtues,
the narrative, and the challenges of dying. My aim is to show how Christian virtues
enable their possessor to die well.
Hope
As with many other virtues, hope takes on a distinct character for Christians.
Although secular accounts of hope can be offered, when it is given a particular kind of
transcendent cast hope is a preeminently Christian virtue.369 It is one of the three
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theological virtues, along with faith and love.370 The aim of these virtues is to enable
their possessor to be rightly related to God. Hope is a future-looking virtue. We don’t
hope for what we already have or are about to get. Hope involves aspiration on the part
of the one who hopes. We don’t hope for what we dread will come about. Rather, we
hope for what we take to be good for us in the future. In Aquinas’s discussion of hope,
he describes it, first, as a movement toward that which will perfect our nature.371 The
notion of a perfected nature can be understood in terms of the Christian narrative. God
creates human beings with a nature, a telos, which sin mars. We cannot “naturally”
achieve the perfection of our nature, but when God intervenes to reconcile us to himself
and initiate the work of redeeming us, this includes our nature. Christians hope, at the
time of the eschatalogical consummation, to have their nature perfected so that they can
be rightly related to God. Christians hope to become “again” the kind of people we were
originally created to be, namely those who can be friends with God. Thus, “hope is a
preparation of man for the true love of God….”372 The kind of hope Aquinas discusses is
an ultimate hope. Of course, Christians, like others, will have more immediate hopes
(e.g., that my kids stay healthy, that my students learn what I am attempting to teach, or
that Americans will recognize the environmental consequences of their practices).
Christians need not deny these, and they can account for their more immediate hopes in

centered view” of hope but wants to say how hope might contribute to dying well when the hope of
survival is past (1). Waterworth offers “expressive hope” as a solution; she defines it as a “symbolic act
embodying meaning” (105). Such expressive hope allows the patient to die “in the light of hope” without
the negative emotions of despair or fear (141).
370
Thomas Aquinas discusses faith, hope, and charity (love) in Part II of Part II (IIa IIae, qq. 1-46) of the
Summa Theologiae. He gets that list from I Corinthians 13:13 in the New Testament.
371
Romanus Cessario, O.P., “The Theological Virtue of Hope (IIa IIae, qq. 17-22),” in Stephen J. Pope,
ed., The Ethics of Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 232-243, 232.
372
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles: Book III, Part II, trans. by Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 238.

181

terms of God’s providence in the world.373 However, at the end of life, particularly when
immediate hopes are diminishing, the ultimate hope that Christians cling to is especially
relevant.
When hope is understood as a Christian virtue, it designates that the virtuous
agent is characterized by this confident expectation.374 Christians confidently expect
what they do not yet see. To expect some future event is “to ‘look out’ for it or to ‘await’
it.”375 Romanus Cessario comments that, “the virtues of hope shape the proper emotional
response that a person should demonstrate when faced with some future, difficult, but
attainable good.”376 On the account of emotions that I offer in Chapter Four, the
emotions of hope will not just be passive responses but active perceptions based on
convictions drawn from the Christian narrative. The Christian narrative teaches
Christians their past and their future. Having hope in dying is embodying these
convictions and having one’s experience shaped by perceptions based on those
convictions. Christians dying with hope embody a confidence that death is not the final
word on their lives. Rather, hopeful Christians can rest in the confidence that God will
bring them to their final rest with himself.
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Patience
Patience serves hope.377 Those who embody Christian hope await a future in
which alienation from God and the destructive effects of sin will be bound up and finally
destroyed. But because Christians live before that time, they must be patient as well.378
If hope directs Christians toward the completion of the narrative, patience allows them to
fully participate in the narrative’s present. Those who embody Christian patience are
prepared to wait on God’s timing as they can discern it.379 Patience, like courage,
preserves or sustains other virtues and convictions. The Christian who believes that
God’s story is the true story of the world will need to be patient because the conclusion of
that story has not come and sometimes even the story’s plausibility is in question. The
dying are especially susceptible to the kind of despair that hope councils against and
patience preserves against. Christopher Vogt says, “[t]he true threat posed by pain and
suffering is that it will transform a person from one who is marked by faith, hope, and
charity (i.e., a good Christian) into one marked by infidelity or despair or resentment and
hatred toward God.”380 Absent virtues like hope and patience—indeed even with them—
the terminally ill are, more than most of the rest of us, forced to confront their mortality
and all that it entails. Patience aims to preserve hope in the midst of precisely this kind of
challenge. If patience is to function in this way, it must be more than a transformed

377

Vogt, Christian Art of Dying Well, 5.
This account draws on Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, “Practicing Patience: How Christians
Should Be Sick,” Christian Bioethics 2:2 (1996): 202-21, 208-9.
379
Hauerwas and Pinches briefly discuss how some early church theologians analyzed suicide as a failure
of patience: “According to Augustine, all that can be said to those who have killed themselves under
persecution is ‘Woe unto them which have lost patience’” (ibid, 209).
380
Vogt, Christian Art of Dying Well, 30.
378

183

perspective; it must be more than a different way of seeing things.381 It, like the rest of
the Christian life, must be practiced if it will serve Christians when they are dying.
Patience must be practiced in two related senses. We learn patience by taking up
activities that teach us to work steadily at something that will not have immediate results.
Thus, growing food, making long-term athletic or artistic goals, or building something
can teach us patience if we go about such activities with a proper appreciation for the
long-term and for the process involved.382 Thus, we practice patience in the sense that
we make an effort to learn this virtue, and we practice it in the sense that we learn the
virtue by engaging in complex activities, by patiently practicing them.383 Christians also
learn patience by practicing Sabbath rest. To rest one day out of a week from our efforts
to secure our lives—whether those efforts involve another day at the office for a
businessperson or in the library for a student—is to practice trust in God and to see our
own efforts as bounded by God’s ultimate provision. In this practice, Christians learn to
wait and to watch for God.
Christians who are dying will have myriad opportunities to practice patience. An
honest assessment of their decline will cause some sadness. This ought not be
suppressed. But, they can also look ahead to a future in which their own lives will be
restored and redeemed in the eschatalogical consummation that concludes the Christian
narrative. Patience enables them to be the kind of people who can hold this tension in
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balance without letting either side overwhelm the other.384 Patience allows Christians to
bear with the dying process. They need not prolong it; to do so might be to make of life a
second god, as Barth notes. Indeed, they ought not prolong out of a conviction that they
must not let go of the life they know now. That would be a failure to embody hope. But
they must and need not seek to end it prematurely. To do this would be to fail to embody
patience with respect to God’s timing in the world and with respect to the Christian
narrative that shapes Christians.
Gratitude and Humility
In Chapter Five I discussed gratitude and humility as virtues relevant to a broad
variety of deaths and conceptions of a good death. Gratitude I used as an example of a
virtue disposing us to acknowledge—in a positive fashion—our dependence on others. A
grateful person is well-disposed to deal with an increasing level of dependence on others
at the end of life. Christians can, like others, take up such a virtue. Additionally,
Christians can be grateful to God as well. While there is much about death for which one
might not be inclined to be grateful, Christians can put the suffering they face at the end
of life in the context of the larger narrative that defines them. This, as I argued above,
can enable them to find some meaning in their experience. One particular response
would be gratitude to God for God’s desire to initiate reconciliation and to bring the
narrative to a redemptive conclusion. Christians may also be grateful that God has not
stayed distant but has entered the narrative, and suffered, in the person of Jesus.385
Above all, Christians are in a position to see the whole of their lives as being dependent
384
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on God’s continued goodness to them. Christians can happily acknowledge the ways that
the good of their lives are interwoven with that of God and others.386 Thus, Christian
gratitude goes beyond its secular analogue in its specification of the object of gratitude.
Christians can also embrace humility as an other-centering virtue. The Christian
understanding of the common basic intrinsic worth of all human beings will be grounded
in some aspect of the Christian narrative. That humans are created in the image of God
or that God’s love extends to all, might be the sources of such intrinsic worth.387 A
mutual and equal basis for self-worth enables the humble to be glad for the successes of
the other. At the end of life, the humble can gladly celebrate others and their ongoing
lives. The humble can find reason to celebrate those others’ lives even if they have not
personally contributed to them. The humble need not see others as their (the humble’s)
own legacy. The other-centering effect of such a virtue preserves the humble against
excessive self-focus which, for the dying, might lead to self-pity. Humble Christians will
understand that their own lives are part of a much bigger story. They are fully a part of
that story—and so have a basis for self-worth—but they are no more than a part of the
story, so they can embrace and rejoice in others.
Peacefulness
Because many say they would like to die peacefully, it is worth looking at what
stake Christians have in such an ambition.388 Robert Roberts analyzes Christian
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peacefulness in terms of five propositions. These are: that the world and people in it are
alienated from God; that God has reconciled himself to the world; that the alienation was
“wretched;” that the peace God establishes is “glorious” and good; and an individual’s
experience of God and the world in terms of the first four propositions is a result of
God’s work in that individual.389 These suggest a confidence in God and one’s place in
God’s economy. Christian peacefulness would take these propositions as concerns in
terms of which to construe the world and the place of individuals in it. Roberts’s
propositions draw on and presume the Christian narrative I have outlined above. Because
this is a narrative, it has a time element to it. So, the peace that Christians will be
interested in has the same kind of tension in it as is found in patience, as discussed above.
Peaceful Christians are peaceful in light of the long view of the Christian narrative. Like
Jesus dying in Gethsemane, they may well be troubled in some sense as well.390 But the
peace that Christians can know derives, as we have seen before, from their appreciation
of the larger picture as captured in the claim of the Christian narrative that God will bring
about his peace in the end. Peacefulness, as a Christian virtue, might serve as a collective
term for the Christian’s response to the psychological challenges of dying discussed in
Chapter Three. Elizabeth Kubler-Ross observes that denial, isolation, anger, desperation,
and depression are common attitudes among the dying.391 Drawing on their moral

389

Roberts, “Emotions as Access to Religious Truths,” 87 and 92.
See Chapter Four, “A Biblical Ars Moriendi: Dying Well According to Luke” of Christopher Vogt,
Christian Art of Dying Well for a discussion of imitating Jesus, including Jesus’s troubled countenance, in
dying.
391
Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York: Scribner Classics, 1969/1997), Chapters 3-6.
Kubler-Ross believes that such common psychological attitudes resolve themselves into acceptance,
however, her notion of acceptance relies on detachment from the elements of this life in a way that does not
correspond to four propositions Roberts uses to characterize Christian peacefulness (see On Death and
Dying, Chapter 7).
390

187

tradition, Christians can seek to respond with hope, patience, gratitude, humility, and,
above all, peacefulness.
Practical Wisdom
Christian practical wisdom, like all forms of this virtue, will be ordered to the
goods presumed by the conception of a well-lived life that it serves. I have suggested in
Chapter Four that at the end of life practical wisdom could enable its possessor to deal
with the challenge of “technological brinkmanship.” Because Christians are called to
believe that, in Barth’s terms, life is not a “second god,” I believe they can be relatively
less eager to “risk” technological brinkmanship in hopes of gaining more life or greater
capacity. That is, Christians can be more free to bear their illnesses, including their
terminal ones, with relatively less intervention. This is a judgment they can make by
reflection on the value of their lives as they know them as compared with the place of
those lives within the perspective of the broader Christian narrative. Christian practical
wisdom will help patients to discern the increasing desperate measures medicine goes to
in order to be able to do something for the ill.392 Instead, Christian might simply seek to
accept their deaths with comparatively little therapeutic intervention. Of course, they will
gratefully receive care at the end of life. But as Paul Ramsey has argued, Christians
might be happy to receive only care.393 This restful approach to dying contrasts with
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what Albert Borgmann has been described as calling “a kind of addiction to
hyperactivity.”394
Practical wisdom will be required because it is not always obvious when a patient
needs only relatively simply treatment to restore a high degree of functioning and when
the next medical step is the first step into the brink. There are no rules to follow here, nor
are there obvious roadmaps to guide decision making in this context. But Christians can,
because of virtues that enable them to embody the truths of the Christian narrative, be
relatively more comfortable staying well away from the “technological brink,” where
they discern it. They understand that their lives in present form have only finite value as
compared with their future in the eschatalogical consummation of the Christian narrative.
Christians can die well with virtues because those virtues shape them to be the kinds of
people who are becoming fit to live with God.
Two issues seem to be especially pressing for Christians seeking to exercise
practical wisdom at the end of life. The first issue concerns the timing of one’s death.
The second concerns which pain and suffering to accept and which to seek to alleviate.
Each of these issues requires practical wisdom because neither allows for a formulaic
answer. Concerning the first issue, the timing of death, there are some extremes to avoid.
As I’ve claimed above, seeking to end one’s life prematurely would go against the virtue
of patience. Patience serves practical wisdom here by disposing the agent to wait, as is
necessary, for one’s life to take its full course. Similarly, at some point, one’s efforts to
zealously preserve life begin to amount to a valuation of one’s life as a second god. Both
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of these extremes are excluded in the understanding of the Christian tradition I have
developed here. In between those extremes, Christians might make their judgments on
the basis of the kind of lives they want to pursue. For instance, a Christian might well
choose a shorter, but more active, form of life if this enables her to continue to serve and
be a part of her church. For example, one might choose an organ transplant, if available,
over a dialysis schedule that made travel for missions or other purposes prohibitively
complicated.
The second issue calling for practical wisdom concerns which suffering to accept
and which suffering to seek to alleviate. Here also, some things are more clear than
others. Christians can relieve any suffering where the pursuit of that relief does not come
into conflict with other moral convictions. So, for instance, given my claims above that
suicide is morally excluded within this tradition, Christians ought to be prepared to face
any suffering that could only be relieved by suicide. Beyond moral convictions,
Christians—like non-Christians—will seek to make judgments consistent with their sense
of identity.395 For Christians, that sense of identity may well be shaped by Christian
convictions. To the degree that a Christian identifies himself with his community and is
eager to remain an active member in it, he might also accept a higher level of suffering in
order to remain active.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to give a fuller depiction of how, given a conception
of a well-lived life and a good death, virtues could enable a moral agent to become the
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sort of person who could achieve such a good death. Christian virtues have the role of
enabling their possessor to embody and see life from the perspective of the Christian
narrative. This narrative forms the metaphysical background for the Christian moral
tradition in general and for this particular conception of a good death. A large part of
dying well on this conception is being able to take up and view one’s life from the
perspective of God’s activity in the world. The Christian virtues, as I’ve depicted them
here, can serve that role. To the degree that the Christian embodies them, they enable her
to see the world from the point of view they entail. To do this is to be able to put one’s
dying into a perspective that mitigates the challenges of it. Thus, these virtues enable
Christians to achieve their conception of a good death.
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